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The Community economy 
Introduction 
The growth of economic activity in the Community 
decelerated sharply in 1980, gross domestic product (GDP) 
rising by only 1,3% after a 3,5% increase in 1979 (see 
Table 1). 
The business climate in the Community, as measured by the 
EC Business Surveys, had already begun to weaken after mid-
1979 under the impact of the oil-price shock. The cycle in 
activity reached a peak in the first quarter of 1980. The 
seconc::l quarter of that year saw a shatJl and widely-based 
decline both in industrial output and in total output (gross 
domestic product). Gross investment and private consump-
tion fell, while the changes in stocks and the foreign balance 
also made significant negative contributions to GDP growth. 
The decline in industrial and total output continued, 
although at a less rapid rate as private consumption 
recovered modestly, in the third and fourth quarters of 1980. 
In the second half industrial output was 3,4% lower than a 
year earlier; on the same comparison GDP was down by 
some 0,2%. The deterioration in business sentiment con-
tinued more or less throughout 1980 but may have been 
arrested around the turn of the year. 
Despite cyclically-depressed productivity growth, there was 
hardly any increase in employment between 1979 and 1980, 
while the labour force continued to expand rather rapidly. 
The result was a sharp rise in unemployment: the average 
rate for the year was 6,2% (against 5,5% in 1979), and by the 
end of the year had reached 7,0% with the rate of increase 
continuing to quicken. 
The deterioration in inflation performance which had begun 
in 1979 was accentuated in 1980; consumer prices in the 
Community rose by 12, 1 % in the latter year as against 8,9% 
in the former. The peak rate of increase in consumer prices 
was reached in the first half of the year. A deceleration 
followed, largely the lagged result of more moderate import 
price increases, but unit labour costs were rising more 
quickly in the second half of the year, as productivity fell at 
the annual rate of 2%, than in the first. 
The Community's current account deficit in 1980, amount-
ing to 1,3% of GDP, was the largest ever recorded. In 
contrast with 1979, exports in 1980 grew marginally faster 
than imports in volume terms. However, this was more than 
offset by a terms-of-trade deterioration (2,8%) considerably 
larger than that in 1979 (although still very much smaller 
than that suffered in 1974 after the first oil-price shock). 
Intra-Community exchange-rate relations were less stable in 
1980 than in 1979, but still considerably more stable than in 
the average of the six years preceding the introduction of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). The reduced stability in 
1980 was largely the result of the rise in the UKL outside the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS. 
As regards external exchange-rate relations, developments 
for the average of 1980 were very different from develop-
ments through the course of the year. For 1980 as a whole the 
ECU again appreciated against the USO and the yen 
compared with 1979. However, by the end of 1980 the ECU 
was sharply lower than twelve months earlier against the 
USO and had lost even more value against the yen, the 
Community's competitive position thus tending to improve 
through the year, from a very unfavourable base, against 
both the US and Japan. 
Prospects for 1981' have worsened since the previous round 
of Commission forecasts published in the Annual Economic 
Report for 1980/81 (European Economy, No 7). The latest 
Business Surveys in the Community, however, provide the 
first evidence that the trough in manufacturers' production 
expectations may be in sight. The beginning of a recovery in 
manufacturing output could occur by mid-1981, but any 
such recovery is likely to be modest rather than very rapid as 
in 1976. 
For 1981 as a whole, total industrial production is forecast to 
be 2, I% lower than in 1980 (Table 1). GDP could stabilize in 
the second quarter of the year, after falling for four quarters, 
the longest period of falling output in the Community's 
history. The second half of the year should be marked by a 
slow upturn (2,0% at an annual rate, after a fall of 1 % at an 
annual rate in the first half), but GDP in the year as a whole is 
forecast to be 0,6% lower than in 1980. The change in stocks 
is likely to be the most strongly depressing factor in 1981, but 
final domestic demand is also likely to fall. 
Employment could fall by nearly 1 % in 1981 and the labour 
force will continue to grow. By the end of the year the 
unemployment rate in the Community could be above 7,5% 
and still rising. 
The worsening of growth and employment prospects since 
the publication of the Annual Economic Report is not likely 
to be accompanied by a lower inflation rate than was 
previously foreseen since both import prices and produc-
tivity have developed more unfavourably than in the last 
round of forecasts. None the less, a significant slowdown in 
consumer prices can be expected during the course of 1981, as 
the effect of more moderate wage settlements in the first half 
of the year is reinforced by some rebound of productivity in 
the second half. Although consumer prices for 1981 as a 
whole could be up by around 10,5% on 1980 {Table 1), the 
annual rate in the second half of the year could, at 8,2%, be 
4 % points lower than in the second half of 1980. 
On current forecasts the Community's current balance 
{Table 1) is likely to change little during the course of 1981 
and for the year as a whole could be slightly worse than the 
previous record deficit in 1980. A further worsening of the 
terms of trade in 1981 will slightly more than offset an . 
improvement in volume movements. 
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Table 1 
Key economic indicators for the Comm.unity 
EC9 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 I 19812 
GDP volume growth 3 5,1 2,3 3,2 3,5 1,3 -0,6 
Industrial production index 3 7,4 2,4 2,3 4,9 -0,7 -2,1 
GDP deflator 3 9,7 9,6 8,5 8,8 11,5 9,9 
Consumer prices (implicit index) 3 10,2 9,8 7,3 8,9 12,1 10,4 
Compensation per employee 3 12,3 10,1 9,8 10,6 13,4 10,2 
Real disposable household income 3 1,8 0,2 3,9 3,2 0,9 0,1 
Savings ratio 4 18,0 16,8 16,8 16,7 16,3 16,5 
Unemployment rate 5 4,9 5,3 5,5 . 5,5 6,2 7,4 
General government net borrowing 6 3,8 3,3 4,0 3,6 3,6 4,0 
Current account balance (1 OOO million ECU) -4,9 2,2 13,4 -9,2 -30,3 -34,5 
Money supply 7 12,9 12,3 12,7 11,2 10,1 8,2 
I Estimate. 
2 Forecasts. , 
3 Percentage changes. 
4 Disposable household income minus private consumption as % of disposable household income. ! As % of civilian labour force - SOEC definition. 
As %of GDP. 
7 Average of money supplies of Member States weighted by 1978 GDP. December-on-December percentage increase. 
Source: Commission services. 
The European and other non-oil-producing countries are 
now undergoing the new readjustment process due to the 
second oil-price shock-whose impact on growth, prices and 
the balance of payments is similar to that of the first shock in 
1973-74. _The difficult task of governments, trade unions, 
employers and households lies in the need to avoid the policy 
errors and mistaken reactions that followed in 1974 and 
1975. The consequences of the second heavy transfer of 
resources in favour of OPEC have to be accepted. This 
implies priorities for reducing the growth of nominal labour 
costs and for restructuring the productive potential of our 
economies through accelerated investments and energy 
substitution and savings. The scope for overall policy actions 
in the Community is very limited mainly because the high 
budgetary deficits after the first oil-price shock could not be 
reduced during the modest recovery period 1976-79, and 
because present inflation rates and inflationary expectations 
in most countries are still excessive. The limited policy 
contributions of governments could be widened if progress in 
countering inflation becomes more evident and if the 
structural policy efforts make rapid progress. Only in this 
way is it possible for Member States to help each other 
through having a coherent, collective programme for 
economic recovery and improvement in the employment 
situation. 
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This programme of policy coordination implies for the 
Community: 
maintenance of the generally convergent monetary and 
budgetary policy orientations approved in December 
1980 and progress in strengthening the European 
Monetary System; 
stronger cooperation between the Community and the 
United States in monetary and exchange-rate policies; 
limited scope for demand-stimulatory actions through a 
qualified acceptance of automatic budget stabilizers, but 
more support for investment, a quicker restructuring and 
energy substitution policy, and improved labour retrain-
ing and mobility schemes. 
World trade: trends and prospects 
The growth of world trade in 1979 and 1980 has been very 
unequally distributed as between the main regions: imports 
of the OPEC countries, which fell sharply in 1979 as a 
consequence of the events in Iran, rose quite considerably in 
1980, whereas imports of the OECD countries (including the 
Community) after a rise of9 % in 1979 are estimated to have 
fallen slightly in 1980. The stagnation of OECD imports in 
1980 is attributable mainly to the decline in imports of the 
United States ( -4,7% in volume terms), Canada ( -4,8%) 
and Japan (-7,7%). In sharp contrast to trends in North 
America and Japan, however, imports of OECD Europe 
(excluding the EC) rose by as much as 5,9% in 1980 after a 
rise of 10,2% in 1979. Since the latter group of countries are 
relatively important trading partners for the Community, the 
growth of the Community's export markets (non-EC 
countries imports weighted according to their share in the 
Community's exports) in 1980 was faster (4,5%) than the 
unweighted growth in non-EC imports (1,8%). 
In 1981 the pattern of world imports may be less favourable 
to the Community: imports of non-European countries are 
expected to recover somewhat while imports of the European 
OECD countries may decline. EC export markets may thus 
grow by only 1,8%. These annual figures are a reflection of a 
half-yearly profile showing a marked decline in world 
imports in the second half of 1980 followed by an upturn in 
the course of 1981, although the recovery of imports of the 
European OECD countries (excluding EC) may be slower 
than elsewhere in the world (Table 2). 
Like the growth of volume imports world market prices have 
shown rather large divergences in the course of 1980. World 
export prices of food showed some degree of acceleration 
(due principally to an upturn of prices of food exports of the 
developed countries) while the rate of increase of prices of 
Table 2 
World output, foreign trade and EC export markets 
1976 1977 1978 
GDP/GNP, OECD total 5,2 3,7 3,9 
Imports of goods (volume) 
World 11,5 5,0 5,5 
World excluding EC 10,7 6,7 5,1 
of which: 
OEC:D excluding EC 12,9 6,8 5,1 
World trade: trends and prospects 
primary non-oil products slowed down considerably on an 
annual basis; indeed, a decline took place between the first 
and the second half of 1980, with a pronounced drop in prices 
of base metals. The price offuels for the year 1980 as a whole 
rose by 66% in dollar terms as against 41,4% in 1979. 
However, the half-yearly figures show a very pronounced 
deceleration from a rise of 85,6% in the first half of 1980 
(annual rate) to 18,2% in the second half. 
This slowdown of the Community's import prices was, 
however, considerably tempered by the depreciation of the 
Community currencies (on average) against the dollar (see 
the section on exchange-rate developments below). In fact, 
between June and December 1980 the ECU depreciated by 
almost 9% against the dollar adding thus considerably to the 
import prices measured in national currencies, except in the 
case of the United Kingdom where, due to the appreciation 
of sterling against the dollar, import prices in national 
currency rose less than world. market prices. 
As shown in Table 3 the Commission services (in January) 
forecast a relatively low rate of increase in commodity prices 
through 1981. Due to these violent exchange-rate fluctu-
ations the outlook for world market prices, however, now 
looks more uncertain than a few months ago. The rise in the 
dollar may in the course of 1981 exert a dampening influence 
on many commodity prices (expressed in dollar terms). It 
therefore cannot be excluded that a more pronounced 
slowdown in commodity prices could occur in 1981. Even so, 
as shown below, the rise in import prices of the Community 
measured in ECU will be substantial in 1981. 
( percentage change over previous period, seasonally adjusted annual rate) 
1979 1980 19813 1979 1980 19813 
II, II II 
3,6 1,5 0,9 3,0 3,4 1,6 -0,3 0,5 2,5 
6,9 1,9 0,5 6,3 7,6 2,4 -4,4 1,2 4,4 
4,8 1,8 1,4 4,2 6,5 1,7 -2,4 2,1 4,1 
7,1 -2,3 -0,7 7,5 3,1 -2,7 -7,l 0,5 3,4 
OPEC 19,5 14,6 5,3 -15,0 18,2 13,0 -25,0 32,0 20,0 3,5 14,5 20,0 
Other developing countries 5,0 6,6 7,5 9,0 3,5 1,5 10,4 5,0 3,0 2,8 1,0 1,2 
Other countries 1,0 1,1 2,2 4,0 2,5 1,0 3,5 4,0 2,5 1,1 1,0 0,9 
EC export markets I 
Intra markets 13,4 4,1 6,2 10,3 1,8 -1,1 
Extra markets 9,6 5,4 4,5 3,6 4,5 1,8 
Total 11,6 4,7 5,4 7,2 3,1 0,2 
Exports of ~oods, EC total 2 10,8 5,2 5,2 6,7 1,9 0,1 
I Imports to the various markets weighted together according to their share in EC exports (goods). 
2 Including intra-EC trade. 
3 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 3 
World export price developments (in USO), 1976-1981 
1976 1977 1978 
Fuels 4,5 10,5 1,0 
Food -2,0 14,5 1,5 
Other primary products 9,5 9,5 5,5 
Total primary products (excluding fuels) 2,3 12,5 3,1 
Total primary products (including fuels) 3,4 11,5 2,1 
Manufactured goods I (unit value) 3,0 6,5 12,6 
I Non-EC developed countries. 
2 Forecasts. 
Source: United Nations and estimates of Commission services. 
Output and demand 
The trend of economic activity in the Community in 1980 
was strongly influenced by the fall in domestic demand 
following the second oil-price shock in less than ten years. 
The rate of growth of GDP fell back to 1,3%, less than half 
the rate achieved in 1979, although this was slightly higher 
than had originally been forecast due to a stronger than 
expected first quarter, notably in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The subsequent slowdown, however, was par-
ticularly rapid with a sharp drop in the second quarter 
followed by further falls in the third and fourth (see Table 4). 
As a result, GDP growth of 1,9% in the first half gave way to 
a fall of 2,4% in the second half (see Table 8). 
Industrial production in the Community, after rising steadily 
throughout 1979, reached a peak in the first quarter of 1980, 
then fell back markedly over the rest of the year (see Tables I, 
4, 5). Although the slowdown in the first quarter of 1980 
compared with the last quarter of 1979 can be largely 
attributed to the fall in industrial production in the United 
Kingdom, the downturn in the second and third quarter was 
general for the Community as a whole. Some signs of an 
upturn, however, became apparent in the fourth quarter. In 
October, all Member States actually registered an increase in 
industrial production, and in November, the three-monthly 
average turned up for the first time since January (see Graph 
1). Another fall in December, however, brought the result for 
the year to - 0, 7%, and industrial production in the fourth 
quarter of 1980 was 3,9% lower than a year ago. 
While manufacturing industry provided most of the steam 
behind the upswing in 1979, compared with the other main 
sectors (agriculture, construction and services), it also bore 
the brunt of the recession in 1980 (Table 5). Likewise, the fast 
expansion in the intermediate goods sector in 1978 and 1979 
was followed by a sharp fall in 1980. This was particularly 
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(percentage change over previous period, annual rates) 
1979 1980 19812 1979 1980 19812 
II II II 
41,4 66,0 18,7 39,6 95,3 85,6 18,2 21,2 14,4 
12,4 17,3 8,9 12,0 23,7 15,3 15,6 6,9 6,8 
20,4 5,8 3,5 21,8 14,2 9,4 -8,0 3,4 16,4 
15,5 12,8 6,8 15,8 20,0 13,0 6,4 5,5 10,5 
28,4 39,4 12,7 27,7 57,6 49,3 12,3 13,4 12,5 
12,8 10,0 7,5 10,3 10,7 9,0 11,0 6,0 8,0 
true of those industries which had stepped up production for 
stocks in early 1979 in anticipation of raw material price 
increases, and which were then hit by a sharp drop in demand 
and consumption following the oil-price shock: chemicals, 
man-made fibres and oil refining, where oil is the principal 
input. The metal-processing industry also contributed to the 
decline in this sector: the steel strike in the United Kingdom 
in the first quarter merely exaggerated an already weakening 
trend in the European steel industry which was confirmed by 
a further large fall in the third quarter. 
Production in consumer goods industries also fell sharply in 
the second and third quarters, as the squeeze on household 
disposable income gathered pace, and the only industry to 
have maintained relatively stable production was that of 
food, drink and tobacco, while footwear, clothing and 
textiles all saw sharp falls over the second two quarters. 
Output in services (measured by gross value added (Table 6)) 
was also hit in 1980 in line with the slowdown in private and 
public consumption, but less so than industry and construc-
tion. The situation in the construction industry also 
worsened as the year progressed, largely due to the cutbacks 
in public expenditure on housing construction and the 
decline in investment expenditure by enterprises (see below). 
In 1980, domestic demand grew at exactly the same rate as 
GDP, at 1,3% in volume terms, reflecting the stabilization of 
the foreign trade sector after the increase in speculative 
imports of 1979. Private consumption, which makes up more 
than half of total domestic demand remained strong in the 
first half of the year ( + 2,9%), and particularly in the first 
quarter. Since real disposable household incomes accelerated 
by only one point between 1979 and 1980, this was probably 
financed out of reduced savings. In the second half of the 
year, however, this trend seems to have reversed: consumer 
spending fell sharply ( -0,8%), despite a slowdown in the 
rate of increase of consumer prices, and the savings ratio was 
almost restored to its previous level: there was· a fall of only 
0,4 percentage points in the household savings ratio for the 
year as a whole. 
The slight slowdown in the rate of growth of public 
consumption for 1980 as a whole conceals a sharp drop 
between the two halves of the year. Expansion of some 2,9% 
in the first half of 1980 was replaced by a decline of 0,8% in 
the second half, as governments in most Member States 
stepped up their efforts to reduce expenditure and budget 
deficits in spite of the difficulties attaching to such an 
operation in times of declining activity and rising unemploy-
ment. 
In 1980, as in 1979, gross fixed capital formation grew faster 
than GDP, although this was concentrated entirely in the 
first quarter, before the financial situation of enterprises 
deteriorated in the face of high interest rates and a general 
tightening of financial conditions as the authorities con-
tinued to give overriding priority to anti-inflation policy. By 
the second half of the year, investment was falling at a rate of 
some 3% on an annual basis; as demand and production fell , 
investment in equipment and machinery slumped, par-
ticularly in the United Kingdom, Italy and Denmark. The 
fall in investment in buildings, which had been quite marked 
in some Member States in the first half of the year, slowed 
somewhat in the second half, however. 
Inventory formation exerted a negative influence on activity 
growth in 1980, the -result of a sharp fall in imported raw 
materials and a rundown in finished product stocks as the 
recession deepened. In fact, the build-up of imported raw 
material stocks in anticipation of further price rises, which 
had been very heavy in the third quarter of 1979 came to a 
complete halt in the fourth quarter of that year. On top of 
this drop in raw material stocks, the rise in finished product 
stocks came to a halt towards the end of the year with 
enterprises responding to falling demand and worsening 
fi nancial conditions by cutting production and selling from 
stock. 
The prevailing opinions of heads of enterprises in the 
Community is reflected in the monthly business surveys (see 
European Economy, Supplement B).From July to December 
1980, the business climate indicator fell by 22 points, a more 
severe drop than in 1977, but much less than in 1974/75. The 
trend in the three major product categories at first behaved 
rather differently: the outlook for intermediate and 
investment-goods industries deteriorated much sooner than 
the outlook for consumer-goods industries, the indicator for 
those two industries falling by 10 points between the first and 
second quarters of 1980 compared with only 5 points for 
consumer-.goods industries; by the third and fourth quarters, 
projected development of production in all three groups was 
at around the same level. Unsurprisingly, lack of demand 
was the principal cause of this decline in business sentiment: 
in December chief executives in all Member States surveyed 
Output and demand 
GRAPH 1 : Business survey indicators for manufacturing 
industry and the index of industrial production, EC 9 
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(a) Industrial production excluding building and construction and, in the case of 
France, the foodstuffs and beverages industry. Three months' moving 
average. 
(b) Composite indicator based on the replies to the questions on production 
expectations and stocks of finished products. The indicator is an average of 
the net balances: i.e. differences between the percentages of respondents 
giving positive and negative replies. 
(c) Net balances: i.e. differences between the percentages of respondents giving 
positive and negative replies. 
(d) Dotted line shows average for 1968-1977. 
Source: European Community business surveys. 
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Table 4 
Major supply and demand components, EC 9 
{percentage change over preceding period, in volume, annual rates, seasonally adjusted) 
GDP lmports I Exports I Foreif2 Domestic Chan~ Gross Private Government Industrial 
balance 2 demand in stocks 2 fixed consumption consumption production 
investment index3 
1978 1 2,9 7,9 7,6 0,1 3,4 -1,8 5,1 5,1 6,2 4,5 
2 6,4 7,2 4,8 -0,5 6,8 1,4 8,2 5,1 2,6 3,2 
3 2,2 10,5 2,7 -1,7 3,9 1,3 1,9 3,3 0,7 2,4 
4 4,9 13,8 8,8 -1,0 5,9 1,9 5,2 3,4 3,9 10,0 
1979 I 0,9 9,8 0,4 -2,2 3,4 1,0 -7,0 5,7 2,5 3,2 
2 6,6 16,0 15,6 0,0 6,7 -1,4 16,6 7,0 2,8 7,0 
3 1,9 13,0 4,9 -1,9 3,6 4,0 10,2 -4,3 1,5 3,2 
4 4,8 6,6 2,9 -0,9 5,8 0,0 9,6 5,6 2,4 4,5 
1980 1 4,9 14,8 13,6 -0,3 4,9 -0,6 2,5 7,5 2,8 2,0 
2 -5,3 -10,5 -12,7 -0,6 -4,5 -1,1 -3,4 -5,4 3,4 -5,1 
3 -1,7 -3,1 -1,1 0,5 -1,9 -2,7 -2,6 1,7 2,0 -10,1 
4 (-1,0) 
Goods and services, including intra-Community trade. 
Change as percentage of GDP of preceding quarter. 
EC total (all Member States). 
Source: Estimates by the Commission services based on national accounts data for the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Table 5 
Industrial production by branch, EC 9 
{percentage change over previous period, seasonally atQusted) 
1971-741 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
II III 
Industry (excluding construction) 4,1 -6,6 7,4 2,4 2,3 5,0 0,5 -1,3 -2,8 
Intermediate goods 4,7 -9,5 9,9 2,1 2,9 6,3 0,1 -2,1 -3,9 
Investment goods 4,3 -3,4 1,8 2,7 0,3 3,4 -0,9 1,0 -2,1 
Consumer goods 4,0 -4,6 7,6 2,5 2,7 3,9 1,0 -1,8 -1,9 
Manufacturing industries 4,4 -7,7 7,4 1,9 1,7 4,4 0,3 -1,2 -2,9 
Energy2 -1,6 9,6 5,9 6,1 9,5 0,8 -1,8 -1,5 
Non-metallic mineral products 3,7 -8,8 6,8 2,3 1,1 4,5 2,0 -2,5 -3,0 
Chemicals and man-made fibres 8,0 -10,7 13,7 2,0 4,9 5,7 0,7 -3,8 -6,0 
Mineral oil refining 2,5 -13,7 10,8 -0,9 -0,5 7,8 -2,5 -2,4 -4,0 
Production and preliminary processing of metals 6,6 18,4 8,9 -2,0 3,6 5,3 -8,0 4,5 -6,6 
Engineering and allied industries 3,8 -5,7 5,4 3,0 1,2 3,7 0,4 -1,2 1,3 
- Motor vehicles, parts and accessories 1,1 -3,2 12,7 5,5 2,1 4,0 0,3 -2,7 -5,4 
Food, drink and tobacco industry 3,3 -0,1 3,5 0,1 3,6 3,2 0,2 -1,7 1,5 
Textiles industry 1,3 -7,6 10,0 -2,9 -2,9 5,1 1,8 -1,3 -5,2 
Clothing industry -0,7 -2,0 5,6 -1,8 -4,3 5,2 1,4 -6,7 -1,7 
Footwear manufacture 0 -5,2 1,0 0,7 -.3,7 3,3 -3,3 13,0 -4,l 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 5,4 -16,1 11,4 2,2 3,8 5,6 0,5 -1,9 -3,0 
I Avera;e change over the period indicated. 
2 Including mineral oil refining. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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Table 6 
Output and employment by sector, EC 9 
( percentage change over previous year) 
Gross value added Wage and salary earners 
at 1970 prices 
and 1979 exchange rates 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19812 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19812 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0,0 3,7 4,6 1,5 3,1 2,0 -0,4 -1,3 -3,5 -1,9 -1,7 -1,4 
Industry 7,5 2,2 2,3 4,7 0,3 
-0,8} 
-1,6 -0,5 -1,0 0,6 -1,2 -2,6 Construction 1,5 0,9 2,5 3,2 1,4 -2,0 
Services 4,0 3,0 3,2 3,2 1,8 -0,3 1,4 1,2 2,0 2,2 1,0 0,2 
Total I 5,0 2,5 2,9 3,5 1,2 -0,6 0,1 0,6 0,5 1,1 0,0 -1,0 
I Total gross value added at market prices differs from GDP at market prices primarily because the latter includes the value of taxes linked to imports. 
2 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
were reporting insufficient demand as the major factor 
limiting output. While shortages of labour and equipment 
were cited as significant in some cases, their importance was 
clearly declining, as labour supplies and capital stock became 
more abundant in relation to weaker demand for industrial 
products. 
Since the end of the year, expectations have improved: in 
January 1981 the business climate indicator rose by 5,5 
points, particularly due to an apparently sharp turnabout in 
producers' expectations in the United Kingdom. Other 
Member States showed similar positive movements but on a 
more modest scale. The upturn in sentiment is not uniform 
across sectors however. Expectations seem to be improving 
in the consumer-goods and intermediate-goods industries 
but those in the investment-goods industries are still 
declining. 
Other leading indicators also showed the same trend in 
January. Judgments on the level of finished-product stocks, 
which had deteriorated by some 26 percentage points in the 
course of 1980 improved by 3 percentage points in January, 
the first time the majority of chief executives considering that 
stock levels were above normal has declined since July 1979, 
although the level ( + 27) is still considerably above the 
average for the years 1968-77. Judgments on order books 
also turned up slightly (6 percentage points) in January, but 
this contrasts with a decline of 40 percentage points during 
1980. 
On the whole, therefore, these preliminary results would 
suggest that the decline in industrial production may reach its 
low point some time in the first quarter and that the 
underlying trend would be on the upturn by the middle of the 
year. 
Some indications of the outlook for consumer behaviour 
during the first half of 1981 can be gauged from the EC 
consumer surveys (Table 7). According to the last survey 
carried out in January 1981 in eight of the Community 
countries, there was a slight deterioration in consumer 
confidence in the Community as a whole compared with the 
previous survey in October 1980. In line with their 
assessment of a deterioration in both the general economic 
Table 7 
. Index numbers of consmner sentiment, EC 9 
(index numbers 1975 = 100) 
Financial Intentions Saving 
situation of to make intentions, 
households, major next 
next 
12months 
purchases 12 months 
1976 102 108 100 
1977 103 107 99 
1978 106 110 103 
1979 105 108 104 
1980 99 104 99 
1978 May 106 112 103 
October 106 110 103 
1979 January 105 108 105 
May 107 110 105 
October 102 106 102 
1980 January 98 107 101 
May 99 104 100 
October 99 101 96 
1981 January 96 100 98 
Source: European Community consumer surveys, European Economy Supplement C, 
No 3, December 1980. 
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situation and their personal financial situation, consumers 
have responded by reducing their intentions to make major 
purchases while at the same time their savings expectations 
are on the whole lower. Given that consumer confidence is 
currently at a very low level, comparable to that of 1974, this 
would nevertheless suggest that consumer spending in the 
Community will remain weak throughout the first half of 
1981. 
Assuming no change in savings behaviour, private consump-
tion growth is forecast to fall to 0,2% in 1981 as a whole, with 
an absolute decline in the first half, followed by positive 
growth of 2,0% in the second half as real disposable incomes 
rise in the wake of a slowdown of price increases (see 
Table 8). A failure for prices to rise less fast than expected 
could, however, trigger a rise in savings which would 
seriously retard the revival of private consumption in the 
second half of the year, especially since on.current forecasts, 
disposable household incomes only rise by 0, 1 percentage 
point for 1981 as a whole. 
A severe . drop in the rate of growth of government 
Table 8 
Demand, output and external balance, EC 9 
1960-69 3 1970-80 3 
Annual 
averages 
Private consumption 4,6 3,4 
Public consumption 3,6 3,1 
Gross fixed investment 5,7 2,0 
Stockbuilding I 1,3 1,0 
Final domestic demand 4,7 3,0 
Exports 2 8,0 6,2 
Imports 2 8,2 5,9 
Gross domestic product ~t market prices 4,7 3,1 
Domestic demand ( excluding changes in 
stocks) 4,6 2,8 
Stock building 0,0 -0,0 
Foreign balance 0,0 0,1 
Trade balance (fob/cif) -1,0 -1,0 
Current balance 0,5 0,0 
l As %of GDP. 
2 Goods and services. 
3 Forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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consumption is forecast for 1981, with a continuation of the 
modest rate reached in the second half of 1980 (0,8%). Even 
so, public consumption will still grow faster than all other 
components of domestic demand. 
The downward trend in gross fixed capital formation begun 
in the second half of 1980 will continue in 1981: for the year 
as a whole, investment expenditure is forecast to fall 
substantially faster than GDP ( - 2,5%). Given the usual lag 
in investment relative to the trend in overall activity, the 
trough in the investment cycle will probably not be reached 
until sometime in the second half of 1981 : for the first half of 
the year investment will still fall at the same rate as in the 
second half of 1980, and indeed, for some Member States, 
including the Federal Republic of Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Belgium, investment growth is forecast to 
remain negative throughout the year. 
Stockbuilding will again contribute the largest negative 
impact to GDP growth in 1981. While the negative influence 
of investment expenditure will be offset to a certain extent by 
both public and private consumption growth so that the 
1977 1978 1979 1980 19813 1980 19813 
II II 
% change at 1975 prices 
2,3 3,9 3,7 1,6 0,2 -0,8 -0,3 2,0 
1,0 3,7 2,7 2,2 0,8 0,8 -3,0 0,7 
0,8 3,0 4,0 2,0 -2,5 -3,0 -3,0 0 
1,2 0,8 1,7 1,2 0,6 0,7 0,4 0,8 
1,6 3,3 4,~ 1,3 -0,9 -3,0 -1,3 2,4 
5,0 4,7 6,1 2,1 0,1 -5,3 0,8 4,4 
1,9 5,8 10,3 2,4 -0,9 -7,9 -0,4 4,6 
2,3 3,2 3,5 1,3 -0,6 -2,5 -1,0 2,0 
Contributions to changes in GDP 
1,6 3,4 3,5 1,7 -0,3 -1,1 -0,7 1,3 
-0,1 -0,2 1,0 -0,5 -0,6 -1,9 -0,6 0,8 
0,7 -0,2 -1,0 0 0,2 0,6 0,2 -0,l 
as% of GDP 
-0,6 -0,1 -1,6 -2,5 -2,5 
0,2 0,8 -0,5 -1,5 -1,5 -1,4 -1,5 -1,5 
contribution of domestic demand (excluding stocks) to the 
fall in GDP growth is limited to 0,3 percentage points, the 
continuing rundown in stocks of both raw materials and 
finished products, particularly in the first half of the year, will 
contribute a further 0,6 percentage points to the fall in GDP. 
The overall negative contribution from total domestic 
demand of 0,9 percentage points will be slightly offset by a 
small positive contribution of0,2 percentage points from the 
foreign balance, after a neutral contribution in 1980. Import 
· growth is expected to decline, particularly in the first half of 
the year while export growth will expand in the first half 
already, and should expand marginally faster than the 
growth of export markets. 
The trend of output in 1981 is expected to follow the same 
general profile as the demand components. No significant 
improvement in the underlying trend of industrial produc-
tion is expectec_l in thP. early months of 1981, and in the first 
half of the year it is expected to decline by a further 1,2% 
(annual rate). In the second half, modest positive growth of 
some 3,0% (annual rate) is forecast, but even so, industrial 
production for 1981 as a whole is expected to fall by 2, 1 % 
relative to 1980. On a sectoral basis, manufacturing industry 
(plus fuel and power) will provide most of the decline in 1981 
with a further fall in output compared with 1980 (see 
Table 6). The highest output growth is again expected in the 
agricultural sector, but construction and services, both of 
which were less hard hit than industry in 1980, are forecast to 
show absolute falls in output in 1981 . 
Following this profile, the downward trend in activity is 
expected to come to a halt during the first half of 1981, with 
the Community economy on the upswing by mid-year. GDP 
is forecast to fall by some 1,0% in the first half, but should 
turn round strongly in the second half to achieve 2,0% 
growth (annual rates). For the year as a whole, however, 
GDP is forecast to fall by 0,6%. 
Labour markets 
The labour-market situation in the Community worsened 
during the course of 1980: unemployment reached new 
record levels and the number of available jobs declined as 
labour-force growth outstripped the growth of employment. 
By the end of 1980, there were 7, 7 million people unemployed 
in the Community, equivalent to just under 6,2% of the 
occupied population (seasonally adjusted), the major 
contributory factor being the sharp recession in economic 
activity. 
The sharp fall in GDP growth, from 3,4% in 1979 to 1,3% in 
1980 showed clearly in its effects on employment. After 
growing strongly, by some 0,6% in 1979, employment failed 
to expand at all in 1980, the worst result since 1976, but there 
was no repeat of the absolute falls which occurred in the 
Labour markets 
1974/75 recession, since there was also a parallel slowdown in 
productivity growth. The bulk of this contraction has been 
borne by manufacturing industry, in the wake of sharp 
declines in industrial production in most sectors; and 
particularly the labour-intensive ones, such as textiles, 
footwear, and clothing. At the same time, however, 
employment growth in the service sector which is essentially 
consumer-orientated, has suffered from the squeeze in real 
disposable incomes in the middle quarters of the year, as ~ell 
as an increasing trend towards the use of labour-savmg 
technology. As a result, it has failed to act in its traditional 
role as safety-net in times of slack labour demand, and the 
employment growth which has occurred has been insufficient 
to compensate for the shortfall in the other two sectors. 
Labour-force growth, on the other hand, has continued at a 
relatively high rate: after reaching 0,9% in the boom yea~ ~f 
1979, it slipped back slightly to 0,6% in 1980, but even th1s_1s 
far in excess of the growth of employment. To a certam 
extent this rapid growth is due to demographic factors: a 
higher than average number arriving at school-leaving ~ge 
combined with a lower than average number reachmg 
retiring age. On the other hand, preliminary indications on 
participation rates give conflicting results for different 
Member States: in some there has been a rise in the size of the 
labour force, due to increased unemployment registration of 
women, while in others there has been a decline in the 
measured labour force due to lower registration behaviour. 
Overall, unemployment in the. Community by the end of 
1980 was some 27% higher than it had been a year 
GRAPH 2: Unemployment (s.a.), EC 9 
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Employment and unemployment, EC 9 
Active population I 
Employment total 
Wage and salary earners 
Unemployed I 
- Unemployment rate (%) I 
Vacancies2 
GDP volume growth 
Productivity growth 3 
I SOEC definition (% of active civilian population). 
2 Excluding I and IRL. 
3 Index of GDP volume divided by employment index. 
4 Forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
previously. The tendency, noted in the Annual Economic 
Report 1980/81, for women and young people under 25 years 
to be more seriously affected by unemployment continued, 
but by the end of the year, the biggest increases in 
unemployment were among male adult workers, a significant 
number of whom are probably construction workers: recent 
results from the EC business surveys show a marked drop in 
employment expectations in the construction industry in the 
second half of 1980. This trend towards higher unemploy-
ment among male adults reflects the essentially cyclical 
element in the recent increase in unemployment. By 
December, the proportion of women among the unemployed 
had declined from its 1980 peak of 45,6% in September, to 
43,1%, its lowest level since March 1979 (compared with 
45,8% in December 1979). The relative share of young people 
( under 25 years) in the total of unemployed on the other hand 
fell only marginally, from 38,2% in January 1980 to 37 ,9% in 
January 1981. 
The impression that the cyclical component in unemploy-
ment has gained in relative size is strengthened by recent 
results from the Community business surveys on limits to 
production in industry. Between January and November 
1980 the number of chief executives reporting shortage of 
labour as a limit to production has fallen by half, and among 
the Member States this trend is even more marked in the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Ireland. 
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1980 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19814 
in OOO 
( Percentage changes over previous year) 
114 880 0,6 0,8 0,6 0,9 0,6 0,6 
108 080 -0,1 0,3 0,4 0,6 0,0 -0,9 
91414 0,1 0,6 0,6 1,0 0,5 -1,0 
6 804 13,6 9,5 4,1 1,5 12,3 24,0 
4,9 5,3 5,5 5,5 6,2 7,4 
600 -2,9 2,8 11,6 16,4 -15,7 
5,1 2,3 3,2 3,4 1,3 -0,6 
5,2 2,0 2,8 2,8 1,3 0,3 
No early improvement in the overall labour-market situation 
is expected in 1981. The rate of unemployment is now 
forecast to reach 7,4% on average for the year as a whole, 
0,5% higher than was forecast in the Annual Report, with the 
upwards revision attributable principally to the downward 
revision of the forecast for output (GDP is now expected to 
decline by 0,6% as against a rise of0,6% forecast in October). 
Assuming an upswing in activity in the second half of 1981, 
unemployment may still not stabilize before mid-1982. Given 
the forecast increase in the labour force, employment growth 
must in fact achieve levels in excess of 1,0% per annum if 
unemployment is actually to decline. For 1981, employment 
is forecast to fall by 0,9%. The low level of productivity 
growth in 1980 and 1981 would also seem to indicate that the 
labour 'shake-out' during the present recession is somewhat 
less than might be indicated by the absolute unemployment 
figures, although the increase in the numbers unemployed in 
1980 (12,3%) and in 1981 (24,0%) is much less than in 1975 
(50,4%). Comparing productivity growth with output 
growth in 1980 and 1981 suggests, however, that while 
employment was probably being protected more than 
productivity during the downturn in 1980, the trough of the 
recession in the first half of 1981 is likely to see a much more 
severe employment effect alongside a relatively better 
performance of productivity compared to output in 1981. In 
addition, the immediate effects of any upturn in the second 
half of the year are also likely to be reflected by a rise in 
productivity rather than ·a rise in employment. 
Prices and incomes 
After accelerating in 1979 and in early 1980, the rate of 
increase in the consumer price index slowed down during the 
second half of 1980. On a twelve-month basis, the rate fell 
from 14,9% in May 1980 to 13,3% in December. 
Among the major expenditure items, energy and electricity 
prices showed the most marked acceleration, rising by 22,8% 
between October 1979 and October 1980, compared with an 
averagefigureofl6,1% for 1979and 7,1 % for 1978. Unlike in 
1978, the increase in rents outstripped the average increase in 
consumer prices in 1979 and 1980. However, taking the 
average for 1980, food prices had a moderating influence 
overall (Table 10). Even so, the upward movement in food 
prices showed only a modest deceleration during 1980 while 
non-food prices, energy prices, the prices of services, and 
rents have lost a great deal of momentum since the spring of 
1980--witness the seasonally adjusted six-month increase 
(Graph 3). 
As the increase in consumer prices gathered pace in 1979 and 
in 1980, the spread between the lowest and the highest rate 
widened. Although the Community average fell and 
although the degree of dispersion (measured by the standard 
deviation) around this rate of increase narrowed slightly, the 
gap between the lowest and the highest rate did not narrow 
during 1980 (Graph 4). 
In most member countries, the consumer price index traces 
movements in the prices of a basket of goods consumed by 
what may or may not be a specific type of household and 
thereby sheds light on the position of the average consumer. 
As a result, however, price movements are more volatile than 
those identified by the consumer price indices based on the 
macroeconomic aggregates of national accounts. The 
consumer price deflator rose by 12, 1 % in 1980, compared 
with 9,4% in 1979, and the GDP price deflator, which gives 
the overall change in domestic costs, climbed by 11 ,5% in 
1980, compared with 9,5% in 1979 (Table 11). The fact that 
the consumer price deflator outpaced the GDP price 
. deflator, the opposite of what happened in 1978, can be put 
down partly to changes in the terms of trade, which 
deteriorated by 3,3% in 1980 (following a 1 % deterioration in 
1979). Overall, the divergences in inflation rates in the 
individual member countries as pinpointoo by the consumer 
price index are also reflected in the price indices calculated on 
the basis of the national accounts aggregates expressed in 
terms of national curencies. In this respect, the Member 
States fall into three groups: those experiencing relatively 
low inflation (the Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux 
countries); those experiencing high inflation (Italy, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland); and those falling in between 
Prices and incomes 
GRAPH 3 : Consumer prices and main components, EC 9 
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Table 10 
Components of consumer price developments 
Food Non-food Fuel and 
goods light 
EC 9 1978 7,4 7,3 7,1 
1979 9,2 10,1 16,1 
1980 2 10,8 13,6 22,8 
of which: 
B 4,9 8,3 
DK 11,3 10,7 22,8 
D 3,7 6,1 7,1 
F 10,5 15,6 21,8 
IRL3 11,4 22,4 41,6 
I 16,8 24,7 40,1 
L 4,4 9,2 
NL 5,2 9,4 21,9 
UK 11,2 13,5 27,1 
Standard deviation 1980 4,2 6,3 12,7 
Services excluding rents. 
October 1980 compared with October 1979. 
August 1980 compared with August 1979. 
Source : OECD. 
Table 11 
Price and cost indicators, EC 9 
1970-79 1974 1975 1976 
GDP price deflator 9,0 11,1 13,5 9,7 
Consumer price deflator 8,7 12,7 12,5 10,2 
Export price deflator 1 8,2 23,1 7,7 9,6 
Import price deflatorl 9,0 36,l 4,4 12,0 
Unit labour costs 2 9,9 15,3 16,4 7,1 
Per capita compensation of employees 12,8 16,9 16,3 12,3 
Real per capita compensation of employees 3 3,8 3,7 2,7 1,4 
Real labour costs 4 3,5 5,2 2,5 2,4 
Real per capita GDP 2,7 1,4 -0,1 4,9 
Terms of trade -3,3 -9,6 +3,2 -2,1 
Adjusted productivity 5 -0,6 0,9 4,6 
Change in the dollar value of the ECU -3,1 4,0 -9,8 
Goods and services. 
Per capita compensation of employees, including social security contributions, by unit of GDP at constant prices. 
Deflated by the consumer price index. 
Deflated by the GDP price deflator. 
Services I Rents Total 
9,3 6,4 7,5 
9,7 14,3 9,9 
14,4 17,3 13,1 
6,4 9,7 7,0 
9,8 7,4 10,7 
4,9 4,8 5,1 
14,2 13,6 13,5 
20,9 18,8 
20,4 21,0 21,1 
6,0 
5,6 7,5 6,6 
20,7 29,2 15,4 
6,3 8,0 5,0 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
forecasts 
9,6 8,5 9,5 11,5 10,0 
9,8 7,3 9,4 12,1 10,4 
8,3 4,0 9,7 11,6 9,9 
8,5 0,9 10,9 15,4 10,9 
8,3 7,0 8,2 11,9 10,0 
10,1 9,8 10,7 13,3 10,1 
-0,3 2,1 0,6 -0,4 0,0 
0,5 1,2 1,0 1,6 0,1 
1,7 2,6 2,3 1,3 0,4 
-0,2 +3,1 -1,0 -3,3 -0,9 
1,8 3,4 2,2 0,4 -0,2 
2,1 11,6 7,5 1,4 -3,6 
Adjusted productivity is defined as follows: GDP at 1975 prices plus exports at current prices, deflated by the import price deflator minus exports at 1975 prices = GDP adjusted for the 
terms of trade. This adjusted measure of GDP is then divided by total employment. 
Source : Commission services. 
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(Denmark, France). The forecasts for 1981 point to a change 
in this classification, with the United Kingdom moving into 
the intermediate group (see below). 
Since the exchange rates of the currencies participating in the 
EMS have remaint;!d virtually unchanged, inflation dif-
ferentials were not offset to the same degree as in previous 
years, except in Denmark, where the krone showed an 
average fall in value against the ECU of close on 8,6% 
between 1979 and 1980. The Italian lira lost only 4,3% 
against the ECU, even though inflation in 1980 was running 
8,2 points above the Community average. The position of the 
United Kingdom is different in that it does not participate in 
the exchange-rate mechanism and in that sterling rose by 7% 
against the ECU in spite of an inflation rate well above the 
Community average. Some countries such as the Benelux 
countries which urgently need to improve their competitive-
ness succeeded in this respect, with their performance in 1980 
not having been offset by a relative appreciation in their 
currencies. Because of the trend in the exchange rate of 
sterling, the overall divergence in consumer prices in the 
Community calculated in ECU terms (7,3) was more marked 
in 1980 than that calculated in terms of national currencies 
(5,6). 
Nominal wages (per capita compensation of employees) 
climbed by around 13,3% in 1980, as against 10,6% in 1979. 
This, however, was only a very modest increase compared 
with 1974 and 1975, and did not match the increase in 
consumer prices. In the United Kingdom, the reintroduction 
of free collective bargaining between the two sides of industry 
did not lead to any wage explosion in 1979 or in 1980. At the 
end of 1980 and in early 1981, settlements seemed to be being 
struck at a level that did not engender any marked distortions 
either, although the limit expressly indicated as being 
desirable by the Government (6,5%) was not observed in all 
cases. In some countries, the authorities are urging wage 
restraint but the indexation mechanism has not been 
seriously challenged in Italy or Belgium, although, in the case 
of Belgium, a freeze on wages and salaries over BFR 35 OOO 
per month, envisaged in the recovery programme adopted in 
January, was part and parcel of the agreement signed 
between the two sides of industry in February, although the 
freeze applies only to increases over and above those 
warranted under the indexation mechanism. Real per capita 
compensation of employees declined by 0,4% in 1980, while 
productivity rose by 1,3%. However, in view of the serious 
deterioration in the terms of trade, adjusted productivity 
(GDP per person employed adjusted for the impact on 
national income of changes in the terms of trade) rose by only 
0,4%, with the result that, even in 1980, the slowdown 
(discernible since 1976) in the upward movement of labour 
costs relative to the increase in real national income 
continued. 
Prices and incomes 
If the two sides of industry continue to show restraint in 
1981 , as is suggested by the level of settlements to date for 
1981 , producers will be better able to cope with the trend in 
their other costs and to climb out of the recession quickly. 
Even so, the price forecasts for 1981 compiled by the 
Commission staff in September 1980 have had to be revised 
upwards. The slowdown in activity at the end of 1980 and in 
early 1981 will permit only a small gain in productivity 
(0,4%). The ECU's appreciation against the dollar between 
1977 and October 1980 served to offset in part the 
deterioration in the terms of trade. 
GRAPH 4 : Consumer price index, average price increase and 
divergence indicators, EC 9 
(change on the last 12 months) 
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Table 12 
Trend and divergence of prices and costs, 1970-81 
Consumer price 
deflator 
1970-79 1980 1981 
average forecasts 
B 6,7 6,2 6,0 
DK 9,6 11,0 9,5 
D 5,1 5,4 4,5 
F 8,6 13,5 11,8 
IRL 12,7 18,2 15,0 
I 13,0 21,2 17,9 
L 6,3 6,3 6,3 
NL 7,4 6,5 6,3 
UK 12,1 16,1 11,0 
EC 8,7 12,0 10,4 
Standard deviation, EC 9 2,8 5,6 4,3 
USA 6,3 10,5 
Japan 8,1 6,3 
B 9,3 5,1 5,3 
DK 10,3 2,2 8,3 
D 10,1 4,8 4,4 
F 7,5 12,7 10,2 
IRL 7,7 17,1 13,4 
I 6,7 16,0 13,7 
L 8,9 5,2 5,6 
NL 10,6 6,1 6,4 
UK 7,5 25,4 16,9 
EC9 8,7 12,1 10,4 
Standard deviation, EC 9 1,3 7,3 4,2 
USA 3,2 8,8 
Japan 10,3 1,4 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services, except USA and Japan (source: OECD). 
The dollar's appreciation since October 1980 may lead to a 
more marked deterioration in the terms of trade than that 
currently predicted (0,5%), even if the dollar does not stay at 
its February 1981 level. On this basis, adjusted productivity 
will probably fall by 0,2%. In spite of the anticipated 
slowdown in the growth of wages, unit labour costs are 
expected to rise by around 10,0% and import prices by 
around 10,9%, with the result that, overall, the GDP price 
deflator will probably climb by 10% and the consumer price 
deflator by 10,9%. All in all, the increase of 0, 1 % in real 
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GDP deflator Unit labour 
costs 
1970-79 1980 1981 1970-79 1980 1981 
average forecasts average forecasts 
(national currencies) 
7,2 5,1 6,1 9,2 6,5 6,9 
9,5 8,5 8,9 9,7 9,5 8,2 
5,4 5,0 4,4 6,2 5,6 4,0 
8,9 11,9 11,3 10,3 12,9 11 ,5 
13,2 14,8 14,3 14,7 21,2 13,0 
13,3 20,8 16,9 15,4 19,1 19,7 
7,0 4,4 6,7 10,9 9,6 9,3 
7,7 5,6 5,2 8,3 5,3 3,6 
12,6 19,0 12,3 13,1 20,5 10,4 
9,0 11,5 10,0 9,9 11,9 10,0 
2,8 6,0 4,1 2,8 6,1 4,6 
6,6 9,5 10,8 
7,2 2,0 -1,0 
(ECU) 
9,8 4,0 5,4 11,8 5,2 6,2 
10,2 -0,1 7,7 10,4 0,6 7,0 
10,5 4,4 4,3 11,3 5,6 3,9 
7,8 11,1 9,7 9,2 12,4 9,9 
8,2 13,7 12,8 9,7 21,2 U ,5 
7,0 15,6 12,8 8,9 15,7 15,5 
9,6 3,3 6,0 13,6 8,9 8,6 
10,9 5,2 5,3 11,5 4,6 3,7 
8,0 28,5 18,2 8,5 27,6 16,2 
9,0 11,5 10,0 9,9 11,9 9,7 
1,3 8,3 4,4 1,6 8,6 4,3 
3,5 7,8 3,7 9,1 
9,3 -2,8 9,9 -5,6 
labour costs coupled with a fall of 0,2% in adjusted 
productivity will once again mean a slight discrepancy tot e 
detriment of non-wage incomes, without there being any 
gain in employee's purchasing power. 
For the above reasons, the slowdown in inflation in t e 
different countries is also expected to moderate. If we still 
work on the assumption of exchange-rate stability within t e 
EMS, the figures expressed in ECU will probably be little r 
no different from those expressed in national currencies. 
Budgetary policy developments 
Recent estimates of the expenditure and revenue aggregates 
for general government in the Member States result in a 
slight upward revision of the level of general government net 
borrowing in the Community in 1980, as compared with the 
estimate published in European Economy No 7. 
The net result is that general government net borrowing in 
the Community remains unchanged between 1979 and 1980, 
at 3,6% of GDP, instead of falling very slightly as previously 
foreseen. 
General government net borrowing rose· in most Member 
States, France, Italy and the United Kingdom being 
exceptions. In France a surcharge on social security 
contributions was in effect in 1980, and incomplete 
indexation of the income-tax system led to an increase in tax 
pressure. In Italy, accelerated inflation increased receipts 
sooner than expenditure. In addition there was a significant 
reduction of fiscal fraud, VAT rates were raised towards the 
end of the year and income-tax payments were accelerated. 
In the United Kingdom, the result reflected the implemen-
tation of a medium-term programme to reduce the volume of 
public spending and government net borrowing as a 
Table 13 
Public finance aggregates, EC and Member States 
General government 
(percentage change) 
Expenditure Receipts 
1979 1980 19815 1979 1980 
B 9,5 10,9 9,3 8,1 6,6 
DK 13,4 14,9 12,7 13,2 12,2 
D 8,0 8,3 5,2 7,7 7,2 
GR 22,1 24,7 25,1 
F 14,0 15,9 14,8 18,0 16,6 
IRL4 24,2 27,8 18,7 19,8 26,7 
I 19,1 24,4 22,7 19,5 29,7 
L 8,3 10,5 10,6 4,6 8,6 
NL 11,7 9,5 7,0 9,8 8,1 
UK 15,7 21,3 14,7 19,8 24,4 
EC 12,6 14,7 12,0 13,6 15,0 
I Net borrowing ( - ) or lending ( + ). 
2 National accounts transactions basis, excluding loans and participations. 
19815 
9,2 
10,8 
4,5 
22,6 
11,7 
18,7 
22,1 
8,5 
6,5 
15,4 
11,0 
Budgetary policy developments .. 
percentage of GDP. However, a worsened financial deficit of 
public corporations and an increase in general government 
financial transactions led to a rise in the public sector 
borrowing requirement. The largest relative increase in net 
borrowing was recorded in Denmark despite restrictive 
budgetary measures introduced during the course of the 
year. Special factors, including statistical revisions and large 
military purchases, were important, as also were the fall in 
incomes and output and the rising cost of debt service. 
In most member countries budgetary policy in 1980 was 
aimed at reducing or at least restraining the general 
government deficit as a percentage of GDP. In consequence, 
programmes of expenditure reduction or restraint, some-
times supplemented by tax increases, were announced in a 
number of countries. In some instances political or 
administrative difficulties prevented the full implementation 
of programmes of restraint of expenditure, particularly in the 
areas of public sector salaries and of expenditure only 
indirectly controlled by central governments. In addition, 
announced programmes of restraint were in some cases 
modified to provide support to particularly hard-hit sectors, 
notably the construction industry, and to stimulate private 
investment either through tax reliefs or investment incent-
ives. None the less, discretionary changes in budgetary policy 
affecting 1980 operated to reduce deficits. 
General government Central government 
(percentage of GDP) (percentage of GDP) 
Net borrowing I 2 Net borrowin~ 
requirement I 
1979 1980 19815 1979 1980 19815 
-7,2 -9,4 -9,7 -6,9 -9,0 -9,2 
-3,1 -4,6 -5,7 -5,0 -4,7 -5,0 
-3,0 -3,5 -3,8 -2,9 -3,5 -3,4 
-3,6 -2,8 -0,9 
-0,8 -0,6 -1,8 -1,6 -1,2 -1,4 
-11,9 -13,5 -11,7 -13,9 -14,5 -13,3 
-9,4 -7,8 -8,4 -10,9 -10,6 -9,5 
0,1 -0,9 -2,1 0,1 -1,1 -2,5 
-2,0 -2,8 -3,2 -4,4 -4,8 -5,3 
-3,3 -2,3 -2,2 -3,9 -4,8 -3,8 
-3,6 -3,6 -4,0 -4,2 -4,5 -4,3 
3 Budgetary accounts including loans and participations. Financial year basis for UK. 
4 1979 and 1980 !i.~ reflect distortions in government financial transactions due to the 1979 postal strike. Net borrowing of general government and central government amounts to 
13,8°/o and 15,4% respectively of GDP in 1981 if no account is taken ofIRL 200 million private participation in public investment, an item which, according to standard definitions is not 
deductible. 
5 Forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates· of Commission services. 
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Against this, the recession in economic activity operated 
'automatically' to reduce tax revenues and swell current 
transfers, particularly unemployment benefits. Moreover, 
high nominal interest rates increased the cost of servicing a 
growing nominal public-sector debt. For the Community as 
a whole these two factors just balanced discretionary changes 
to produce the unchanged general government deficit, as a 
percentage of GDP, referred to above. 
In qualitative terms, the forces affecting general government 
deficits in 1981 will be working in the same direction as in 
1980, although the 'automatic' effects of the recession in 
activity will be intensified while on the other hand the 
increase in interest payments will be smaller than in 1980. 
Current forecasts by the services of the Commission for 1981 
(Table 13) suggest that the growth of both general govern-
ment receipts and general government expenditure in current 
price terms will slow down in 1981 as the increase in nominal 
incomes in the Community decelerates quite markedly. 
Table 14 
Income and outlay transactions of general government, EC 9 
1978 
Indirect taxes 203,8 
Direct taxes 192, l 
Social security contributions 219,0 
Other current receipts 2 50,0 
Total current resources 664,8 
Current transfers 329,5 
Other current outlays 45,6 
Government consumption 283,5 
Total current uses 658,5 
Gross saving 6,4 
Net capital transfers 16,4 
Gross capital formation 3 52,7 
Net lending ( +) or borrowing ( - ) 
- in OOO million ECU -62,6 
- as a percent of GDP -4,0 
Unless otherwise indicated. 
Including consumption of fixed capital. 
Including net purchases of land and intangible assets. 
Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Total current resources in 1981 are none the less forecast to 
rise by 11,0%, against an increase of9,3% in nominal GDP. 
Among the major categories of general government receipts 
(Table 14), indirect taxes will rise more rapidly than nominal 
incomes, reflecting the full-year effect of increases in average 
VAT rates or in excise duties introduced during 1980 in a 
number of countries and the first-year effects of similar 
increases in the 1981 budgets in the Netherlands and Ireland. 
Despite the implementation of the direct tax reductions in the 
Federal Republic of Germany decided last year, direct tax 
payments in the Community as a whole will also increase 
more rapidly than nominal incomes, adjustment of allow-
ances and bands of taxable incomes again incompletely 
compensating for inflation in most countries, while the 
increases in direct tax rates applied from mid-1980 in 
Denmark will have a full-year effect. In addition, some 
further success in combating fiscal fraud is assumed in Italy 
and Belgium. Social security contributions will rise less 
(OOO million ECU) I 
% 1979 % 1980 % 19814 
change change change 
15,7 235,8 15,8 273,1 10,9 302,8 
10,4 212,l 15,6 245,3 11,3 273,1 
14,6 250,6 13,9 285,4 10,5 315,2 
14,6 57,3 14,2 65,4 12,8 73,8 
13,7 755,8 15,0 869,2 11,0 964,9 
11,8 368,5 12,5 414,5 13,8 471 ,7 
20,2 54,9 26,9 69,7 18,4 82 5 
12,6 319,1 15,3 368,0 10,6 406,9 
12,8 742,6 14,8 852,1 i2,8 961 , l 
13,3 17,1 3,9 
18,4 21,0 20,7 
9,9 57,9 14,2 66,2 8,0 71 ,5 
-63,0 -70,0 -88,3 
-3,6 -3,6 -4,0 
Table 15 
Budget bJ.dicators, EC 9 
1971 1972 
GDP constant prices, % change 3,5 4,0 
Government consumption, constant prices, % 
change 4,2 3,6 
Social benefits, % of GDP 13,3 13,9 
Taxes and social security contributions,% of GDP 36,0 36,0 
Actual change in general government net borrow-
ing, % of GDP 2 -0,8 -1,0 
less: change due to the automatic impact of 
cyclical fluctuations, % of GDP 2 3 -0,3 -0,2 
equals: residual change (discretionary changes 
plus change in net interest payments), % of 
GDP2 -0,5 -0,8 
Forecasts. 
A minus sign indicates an increase in net borrowing. 
See European Economy, No 7, p. 72 for methodology. 
Source: Eurostat and estimates of Commission services. 
rapidly than direct tax payments, but will still account for a 
higher proportion of nominal incomes than in the previous 
year. The main discretionary influences on this category of 
receipts are an increase in contributions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. These 
increases more than offset, in the Community aggregate, the 
removal of the 1 % surcharge on contributions in operation in 
1980 in France and a further fiscalization of employers' 
contributions in Italy. Other current receipts, including 
general government factor income, rise rapidly as a result of 
relatively sharp increases in government prices and property 
charges. 
Total current expenditure by general government is expected 
to rise by 12,1% in 1981. All the main categories of general 
government expenditure decelerate, with the exception of 
current transfers. The sharp forecast rise in unemployment is 
the major factor behind the higher rate ofincrease in current 
transfers. In addition, increases in social benefits are being 
implemented in France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany and rates of unemployment benefits are being 
increased in Ireland. Against this, the real value of most 
social benefits, including unemployment benefit, is being 
reduced in the United Kingdom, economies in social benefits 
are being effected in the Netherlands, and the conditions of 
payment of unemployment benefits are being tightened in 
Belgium. Current transfers to companies (subsidies) are 
rising relatively slowly or being reduced in nominal terms in a 
number of countries, thus reversing a trend apparent 
throughout the 1970s. 'Other current outlays' (mainly 
interest payments) is still the fastest-growing category of 
Budgetary policy developments 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19811 
5,9 1,7 -1,4 5,0 2,3 3,0 3,4 1,3 -0,6 
3,6 2,2 3,9 2,7 1,1 3,5 2,7 2,2 0,8 
14,2 15,0 17,0 17,3 17,6 17,7 17,0 17,2 17,7 
36,9 37,9 38,0 39,2 39,9 39,6 39,l 39,9 40,4 
0,7 -1,0 -3,9 1,8 0,5 -0,7 0,4 0,0 -0,4 
1,0 -0,5 -2,3 1,1 -1,2 0,2 0,4 -0,8 -1,9 
-0,3 -0,5 -1,6 0,7 0,7 -0,9 0,0 0,8 1,5 
expenditure in 1981 as the nominal amount of public debt to 
be serviced increases, but the forecast reduction in nominal 
· interest rates in 1981 and the effect oflengthening the average 
maturity ofnew debt in postponing payments in Italy imply a 
deceleration from the extremely rapid 1980 rate of growth of 
interest payments. 
Governments' attempts to restrict the growth of their 
consumption can be clearly seen in the forecasts for 1981. In 
France and the Netherlands, compensation of employees 
rises more slowly than do current purchases of goods· and 
services. In the other countries, however, the private sector 
seems to be bearing the brunt of the first-round impact of the 
stringency forecast in government consumption. For the 
Community as a whole, compensation of general govern-
ment employees is forecast to rise noticeably faster than total 
compensation of employees. Although a breakdown within 
the general government sector into employment and 
compensation per head is not directly available for the 
Community it seems likely that compensation per head in 
general government will be rising faster than compensation 
per head in the rest of the economy (the Netherlands and 
Ireland may, on current forecasts, prove exceptions to this 
general tendency). 
On capital account, net capital transfers from general 
government fall in nominal terms, reduced transfers to some 
public utilities more than offsetting, on currently announced 
expenditure plans, growing aid to certain industrial sectors, 
including publicly-owned industries. Gross capital form-
ation almost certainly falls again in real terms. 
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The difficulties of budgetary developments in the current 
recession are brought out in Table 15. In the deep recession 
year of 1975, the volume of government consumption was 
sharply boosted as a counter-cyclical measure. In 1981, 
government consumption is forecast to grow by only 0,8% in 
volume, a rate of growth probably below what might be 
expected to be its trend rate even given worsened medium-
term prospects and, in some countries, an intention to reduce 
the share of expenditure accounted for by the public sector. 
Clearly, an important influence tending to depress govern-
ment consumption is the desire of governments to limit their 
budget deficits. Similarly, whereas the share of social benefits 
in GDP increased by about 2 points in 1975, the increase in 
1981 is expected to be about Y2 point, the difference being 
considerably bigger than is explained by the somewhat 
smaller increase in unemployment in 1980 as compared with 
1975. Further, the need to limit the expansion of deficits has, 
at least in part, frustrated the desire of governments to avoid 
increases in tax pressure, as measured by the share of taxes 
and social security contributions in GDP. The impact of 
attempts to steer as close as possible to the desired medium-
term course of budget deficits despite the recession can be 
seen by comparing the final three lines in Table 15. The 
operation of the automatic stabilizers in 1981 would tend to 
increase the general government net deficit for the Com-
munity by an amount equivalent to 1,9% of GDP. The 
forecast increase in the deficit is 0,4% of GDP (the deficit 
excluding net interest payments, which, as a rough first 
approximation to an 'inflation-adjusted' deficit, may be 
more relevant both to the demand impact of the budget 
position and to the real indebtedness of the public sector, in 
fact hardly changes as a percentage of GDP). However, the 
'cyclically-adjusted' deficit is reduced on these forecasts by 
an amount equivalent to 1,5% of GDP. In other words, 
about three-quarters of the impact of the automatic 
stabilizers in 1981 would be offset by discretionary action. 
These figures suggest that governments in the Community 
may have difficulty in keeping the expansion of budget 
deficits in 1981 within the limits currently forecast. 
Monetary trends and policies 
The slowdown in money creation came to a halt in the second 
half of 1980. In the third quarter of the year, the quarterly 
growth rate of the money supply in the Community, 
seasonally adjusted, which had fallen back to 1, 7% in the 
previous quarter, started to climb again, to reach 2,6%, under 
the impact of renewed monetary expansion in Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom. In the fourth quarter, this 
tendency was confirmed in these three countries and became 
apparent in the Netherlands and in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Graph 5). 
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Taking 1980 as a whole, the rate of monetary expansion in 
the Community was none the less slower than in 1979 (10, 1 % 
as against 11,2%). The growth in the money supply in 
France, Italy and Belgium slackened significantly. The out-
turns recorded in the Federal Republic of Germany and in 
the Netherlands were similar to those in 1979, while 
Denmark and, above all, the United Kingdom were the only 
Member States to witness an acceleration in monetary 
expansion. 
In sum for the Community the authorities' desire to see a 
slowdown in the rate of money creation was fulfilled. Even 
so, the causes of this slowdown were different from those t e 
authorities sought: they key determinant was a widening in 
balance-of-payments deficits while, generally speaking, t e 
rate of credit expansion was largely maintained (Table 16). 
Table 16 depicts the trend in bank lending to the private 
sector, which, taking the average for the Community, rose by 
14,7% in 1980, compared with 15,5% in 1979. There was thus 
little if any slackening in the rate of increase in lending 
despite the weakening of activity in real terms. Lending 
continued to expand briskly in Denmark, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom. While the growth in bank lending 
remained within the credit control ceilings set in France, the 
Netherlands and Italy, the demand for credit, particularly in 
Italy, continued to exert strong pressure on interest rates. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany and in Belgium, the 
expansion in bank lending remained buoyant throughout the 
year, although a slight easing was discernible in Belgium. A 
shift in private-sector financing demand towards short-tenn 
bank borrowing may go some way towards explaining this 
sustained expansion in bank lending to the private sector. 
Given the ruling levels of interest rates, borrowers have 
preferred to borrow less at long term and more at short term. 
Moreover, this shift in demand facilitated the financing of 
budget deficits in a number of Member States. 
In the · light of the general increase in budget deficits, 
monetary financing by the authorities made a rather modest 
contribution to money creation. As compared with 1979, 
monetary financing in 1980 increased in Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom but was 
reduced in the other Member States. The authoritie:s 
benefited quite appreciably from the increased demand for 
government stock by the private sector and the banks. Thus, 
in Italy, private transactors purchased large quantities of 
short-term Treasury bills and in France the entire budgt::t 
deficit was covered by placing long-term paper on the 
financial market. Sales of public debt instruments to the 
private sector were also substantial in the United Kingdom. 
Generally speaking, governments benefited from a fairly 
high level of liquidity in the private sector, coupled wit 
reduced demand from firms for long-term financing. A 
policy of encouraging the taking-up of government stoc 
through attractive yields was followed, particularly in Italy 
and France. In the Federal Republic of Germany and i 
Monetary trends and policies 
Table 16 
Money supply and bank lending 
December/ December, percentage change 
Money supply Credit to firms 
and households from 
monetary institutions 
1979 1980 1981 1979 1980 1981 
forecasts estimates forecasts 
B(M2H) 6,0 3,0 I 5,0 B 14,0 10,0 8,1 
DK(M2) 9,9 10,9 8,7 DK4 14,3 14,8 14,3 
D(M3) 6,0 6,2 I 4,5 D 12,1 9,8 6,5 
F(M2) 14,4 10,5 I 10,0 F 15,3 15,5 13,0 
IRL(M3) 12,0 18,9 1 12,0 IRL 25,2 12,8 15,3 
l(M2) 20,3 12,3 I 13,1 I 18,4 18,7 14,6 
NL(M2) 7,6 5,8 I 6,5 NL 16,8 12,3 11,0 
UK (Sterling M3) 12,7 2 19,5 2 10,2 UK5 20,4 22,7 18,3 
Total 3 11,2 10,1 8,2 Total 3 15,5 14,7 11,6 
Estimate. 
Money supply not adjusted for the effects of the abolition of the 'corset'. Figures adjusted for these effects would give an increase of+ 16,1% for sterling M3 in 1979 and 1980. 
Weighted by 1978 GDP. 
As % of the money supply at the end of the previous period. 
Sterling loans to the private sector and to external residents during the financial year. 
Source : Commission services. 
Belgium, it did not always prove easy to place government 
stock in 1980, but the scale of sales of medium-term and long-
term debt to the banks helped to contain monetary growth. 
Whereas in the Federal Republic of Germany, the propor-
tion of the budget deficit financed out of monetary resources 
showed little if any change from 1979, this was not the case in 
Belgium, where very extensive recourse was had to bank 
financing in order to meet Treasury requirements. 
The external contribution to the money supply served to curb 
money supply growth in all Member States except France, 
where substantial foreign capital inflows and borrowing 
abroad added to monetary expansion. In general, the 
deterioration in Member States' trade balances (with the 
exception, that is, of the United Kingdom) was not entirely 
offset by an improvement in the balances on services and 
private capital. Even so, in some Member States, such as the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, the negative contribution made by the balance of 
payments to money supply expansion was reduced in 1980. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany and Ireland this was in 
part a result of borrowing abroad. In the other Member 
States, the balance-of-payments contribution turned negat:.. 
ive in 1980 (Italy) or exerted a greater negative impact than 
. previously (the Netherlands, Belgium). 
GRAPH 5: Money supply (s.a.), EC 9 (1) 
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Average of national money supplies weighted by 1978 GDP at current prices 
and exchange rates. Luxembourg is not included. 
Sources: Eurostat and Commission services . 
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Taking the average for the Community as a whole, interest 
rates peaked in March 1980 (13, 7% for short-term rates and 
12,9% for long-term rates) before easing in the period up to 
July. Long-term rates then started to climb moderately once 
again, while short-term rates held steady at just over 12%. 
In November, for the first time since September 1979, long-
term rates were higher than short-term rates (Graph 6), but 
this normalization of the interest-rate structure occurred at 
high levels, higher in fact than those deemed desirable a year 
earlier. In December, short-term rates averaged 12,3% and 
long-term rates 12,7%. 
Several factors prevented an orderly fall in the cost of money 
in the second half of 1980. In the first place, inflation-rate 
pressures turned out to be stronger than had been forecast. 
The second factor stemmed from external conditions, with 
the combination of a widening trade deficit in the Com-
munity and a return to a restrictive monetary policy in the 
United States at the end of the summer bringing t e 
European currencies, and in particular the mark, under 
pressure and thereby preventing a reduction of interest rates 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. Although some other 
Member States (Denmark, France, the Netherlands) found 
themselves relatively well protected by the mark against 
exchange-rate fluctuations, they decided not to ease back 
interest rates beyond making, that is, a number of downward 
technical adjustments designed primarily to support t e 
mark within the EMS ; certain structural variables such as 
inflation or the budget deficit made it impossible for them to 
GRAPH 6: Relative movements of short and long-term interest rates, consumer prices and real GDP 
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Table 17 
Monetary targets and out-turns 
Key 
variable I 
D M2 
F M2 
IRL PSCE 
I TDCE 
NL DM2 
UK Sterling M3 
Target 
% 
5-8 
11 
13 2 
17,5 
8 
7-11 3 
PSCE: public sector credit expansion. 
TDCE: total domestic credit expansion ; 
DM2: growth in domestic M2. 
February 1980/February 1981. 
1980 
Out-turn 
% 
4,9 
10,5 5 
11,5 4 
17,3 5 
75 
22 4 
Mid-February 1980/mid-April 1981, expressed at an annual rate. 
1981 
Target 
4-7 
10 
% 
Out-turn between February and December 1980, expressed at an annual rate. 
Estimate. 
Source : Commission services. 
contemplate bringing down short-term rates significantly. 
The United Kingdom found itself in a special situation in 
that, although sterling had risen steadily against the ECU 
throughout the year, it was only at the end of November that 
the United Kingdom authorities decided to cut the minimum 
lending rate from 16% to 14%, the steep rise in sterling M3 
having prompted them to adopt a cautious approach to the 
lowering of interest rates. Lastly, the placing of large 
quantities of government stock gave a renewed twist to long-
term yields in the Community in the second half of 1980. 
Table 17 compares monetary out-turns with the targets set a 
year earlier. The Federal Republic of Germany achieved its 
target by keeping the expansion in central bank money to just 
under 5% between the fourth quarter of 1979 and the fourth 
quarter of 1980, i.e. the very bottom of the target range set 
for the year. In France, M2 is expected to expand at a rate 
just below or equal to the target of 11 %, whereas in the 
Netherlands domestic money supply might grow less than 
the target of 8%. In Italy, total domestic credit expansion will 
probably be very close to the LIT 50 300 OOO million forecast. 
In the United Kingdom, the growth of sterling M3 showed a 
distinct acceleration after the summer and as a result was 
running at an annual rate of around 20% at the end of the 
year. The combination of a high public-sector borrowing 
requirement and strong private-sector demand for credit is 
the root cause of this development. However, the abolition in 
June of the supplementary special deposits scheme (the 
Monetary trends and policies 
'corset') also contributed, owing to the scale of the ensuing 
reintermediation within the UK banking system. In Ireland, 
a target of 13% was set for the expansion in domestic bank 
lending to the private sector between February 1980 and 
February 1981. Foreign currency lending by Irish banks to 
GRAPH 7 : Trend of liquidity ratios 
Cumulative indices 
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Money supply for 1979 and 1980 adjusted for distortions resulting from the 
effects of the 'corset'. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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residents, previously disregarded when calculating the target, 
has been included in the calculation since October 1980. 
Although between February and November lending covered 
by this target rose at an annual rate of 11,5%, i.e. below the 
target set, its growth has accelerated sharply since August. 
Two Member States have already published their monetary 
targets for 1981. The Federal Republic of Germany has 
announced that it will endeavour to keep within the 4-7% 
target range for the expansion in central bank money, and 
France has fixed a target of I 0% for the increase in M2. Two 
other Member States have published their credit expansion 
ceilings for the year as a whole: in agreement with the 
banking system, the Netherlands has imposed a 6% ceiling 
(8% in 1980) on the expansion in bank lending not financed 
out of long-term resources. For its part, the Banca d'Italia 
has decided to retain its controls on lending, restricting to 
12% the rise in bank lending in 1981, including credits ofless 
than LIT 130 million, which where previously exempt. A 
ceiling has been imposed until the end of the year on foreign-
currency bank lending with the exception of export credits. 
In November, Denmark decided to suspend the ceilings on 
credit commitments. The guideline now in force applies 
uniformly to actual lending by all banks. The growth in bank 
lending between the end of September 1980 and June 1981 
must be kept below 6%. 
Graph 7 gives the trend of liquidity ratios in the Member 
States and in the Community since 1973. In 1980, the average 
liquidity ratio fell in most Member States, except Denmark 
and the Netherlands, which both recorded slight increases. In 
the United Kingdom, there was only a very small fall in the 
liquidity ratio, adjusted for the effects of the 'corset'. Since 
these developments were accompanied by a continuing high 
level of nominal interest rates, the general thrust of monetary 
policy in the Community in 1980 can be described as 
relatively restrictive. It should be pointed out, however, that 
the fall in the liquidity ratio was due mainly to the impact of 
the balance of payments on the money supply, while the ratio 
of domestic credit expansion to GDP remained unchanged 
or, in some cases, actually increased; but there was probably 
also an increase in the elasticity of the demand for credit with 
respect to GDP in some Member States; 
The monetary forecasts by the Commission's services for 
1981 have been drawn up taking account of the forecasts for 
the real economy and in the light of the guidelines already 
announced by Member States' monetary authorities. The 
overall restrictive stance of monetary policy will probably be 
maintained in 1981. The slowdown in nominal GDP growth 
is expected to be accompanied by generally modest monetary 
expansion, and as a result the average liquidity ratio in the 
Community is likely to remain unchanged. 
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Foreign trade and balances of payments on current 
account 
In 1980, world trade grew very little in volume terms and 
actually declined in the second half of the year. The 
Community's foreign trade did not escape the effects of this 
decline. Taking the average for the year, Community imports 
and exports of goods increased less than in 1979, but, as in 
1979, the growth of imports in value terms was higher than 
that of exports (17,7% and 13,7% respectively). In volume 
terms, however, imports and exports both showed a 2% 
increase (see Table 18). The downturn in activity in real 
terms, and in particular a slowdown in stockbuilding, 
contributed to the slower volume growth of imports. 
Although imports continued to grow in volume terms during 
the first half of the year, if at a slower rate, they fell back in 
the second half. Exports followed the same profile, but the 
decline in volume during the second half of the year was less 
marked than that of imports. 
Graph 8 shows the monthly movements in the trade balance 
(cif/fob). The period of rapid deterioration in 1979 gave way 
to relative stabilization in monthly deficits from early 1980 
onwards, albeit at a very high level (arou1,1d ECU 4000 
million on a cif/fob basis). There was a slight improvement 
during the final months of the year. This was mainly the 
result of movements in the trade balance in Denmark and the 
United Kingdom: in Denmark, the deficit began to shrink in 
the second quarter of 1980 as a result of a sharp increase in 
exports followed by a decline in imports; in the United 
Kingdom, the balance on goods was in surplus from May 
onwards mainly as a result of oil exports and the slowdown in 
imports. The trade balances of the other Member States 
tended on the whole to remain little changed: this was the 
case in France, whose monthly deficits were of the order of 
ECU 1 OOO million (fob/fob), in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, where the trade balance remained in surplus 
though at a distinctly lower level than in 1979, and in Ireland, 
while Italy's deficit on trade in goods widened further during 
the second half of 1980. 
Table 19 gives gives a breakdown of Community trade by 
area. The deterioration in the Community's trade balances 
with the United States and Japan is particularly pronounced, 
with the United States undoubtedly benefiting from a high 
level of competitiveness over the past few years and Japan 
from major gains in its competitiveness between 1978 and 
1980. 
The worsening of the trade balance with the United States 
involved all groups of products and was mainly due to the 
French and United Kingdom trade balances. As regards 
trade with Japan, the increase in Community imports was 
Table 18 
Trade balance and current account balance of the Community, 1976-81 
EC9 1976 1977 
Exports (value fob) 287,2 324,6 
Imports (value fob) 288,9 316,9 
Trade balance (fob/fob) -1,7 6,6 
Balance on services and transfers -3,2 -4,4 
Current account balance -4,9 2,2 
Exports: 
- volume 11,l 4,9 
- price 9,9 7,7 
- value 22,0 13,0 
Imports: 
- volume 13,1 2,3 
- price 12,5 7,9 
- value 26,6 10,1 
Terms of trade (1974 = 100) (goods) (total) 101,5 101,3 
Components of EC trade balance changes 1 
- volume -3,8 7,4 
- terms of trade -5,2 -0,7 
I These estimates are not exactly additive due to the presence of second order terms. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services: balance-of-payments definition. 
not matched by any increase in Community exports. The 
Community's trade balance with the other OECD countries 
remained in surplus during the first half of 1980. During the 
same period, the deficit with the OPEC countries worsened 
and the net balance of trade with the other developing 
countries and the centrally-planned economies shifted into 
deficit. 
All in all, last year's trade deficit amounted to ECU 23 800 
million (fob/fob), as against ECU 6 500 million in 1979. A 
breakdown of the increase in the deficit as between the 
volume effect and the terms-of-trade effect shows that the 
increase was due almost entirely to the deterioration in the 
terms of trade, with the volume effect accounting for only 
ECU 100 million of the increase. It is in this respect that 1980 
Foreign trade and balance of payments on current account 
(s.a.) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1981 
forecast 
II 
OOO million ECU 
352,7 413,9 470,7 517,5 497,4 537,7 
339,4 420,4 494,5 542,3 521,6 563,1 
13,3 -6,5 -23,8 -24,8 -24,2 -25,4 
0,1 -2,7 -5,5 -8,4 -8,6 -8,0 
13,4 -9,2 -29,3 -33,2 -32,8 -33,4 
% change over previous period, 
annual rates 
5,2 6,7 2,0 0,1 0,4 5,3 
2,5 9,3 11,5 9,9 10,5 11,3 
7,8 16,6 13,7 10,0 10,9 17,2 
6,2 10,6 2,0 -1,2 -0,3 4,8 
0,0 10,7 15,4 11,0 12,9 11,3 
6,2 22,4 17,7 9,7 12,6 16,6 
103,8 102,5 99,0 98,0 
OOO million ECU 
-2,8 -12,3 -0,1 6,4 
8,1 -3,5 -17,1 -7,8 
differs from 1979, when the volume increase in imports was 
the main cause of deterioration in the external balance 
between 1978 and 1979. As the deficit on services and 
transfers widened from ECU 2 700 million in 1979 to ECU 
5 500 million in 1980 as a result of larger net outflows of 
transfers, the Community's current account deficit stood at 
ECU 29 300 million as against ECU 9 200 million in 1979, 
equivalent to 1,5% and 0,5%, respectively, of GDP. 
The forecasts for foreign trade and current account, 
established by the services of the Commission on the basis of 
the prospects for world trade analysed above, look for a 
gradual recovery in the volume growth of exports durjng 
1981. However, given the decline in the second half of 1980, 
export growth expressed as an annual average will probably 
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Table 19 
EC 9 trade balances (fob/cit) by area 
1978 1979 
United States -5,1 -9,3 
Canada -0,8 -1,7 
Japan -5,0 -5,2 
Other OECD countries 8,7 9,2 
Total OECD 2 -0,2 -3,8 
OPEC countries -7,1 -20,3 
Other developing countries 2,5 1,7 
Centrally-planned economies 1,4 -0,5 
Other countries 1,5 1,6 
Total -2,5 -20,8 
I Seasonally adjusted. 
2 Including the difference between intra-Community imports and exports. 
Source : Eurostat. 
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(000 million ECU) 
1979 I 1980 I 
II III IV II III 
-2,0 -1,6 -2,6 -2,8 -4,1 -5,1 -4,8 
-0,3 -0,3 -0,4 -0,6 -0,6 -0,7 -0,8 
-1,2 -1,2 -1 ,2 -1,5 -1,6 -1,9 -2,2 
2,3 2,3 2,4 2,3 2,5 2,9 
-0,2 0,1 -0,6 -1,6 -3,2 -3,3 
-3,4 -4,4 -5,3 -7,0 -8,4 -8,4 -7,1 
1,0 0,7 0,5 0,0 -0,7 -0,5 
0,4 0,3 -0,2 -0,8 -0,5 -0,7 -0,8 
0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 
-2,2 -2,9 -5,3 -8,8 -11 ,6 -11,9 -12,3 
be slight or non-existent in 1981. The reduction in 
stockbuilding could well continue in the first half of 1981; 
this is expected to influence the growth of imports, and the 
improvement in the net external balance in volume terms will 
probably continue . The terms of trade, by contrast, could 
well show a further deterioration, and the trade deficit is 
likely to remain more or less unchanged. The surplus on 
services might well show a slight increase, but this would not 
be sufficient to offset the worsening balance on transfers. The 
forecasts by the services of the Commission thus indicate that 
the current account deficit could grow from ECU 29 300 
million in 1980 to ECU 33 200 million (1,5% of GDP) in 
1981. However, the major shifts in exchange rates at the end 
of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 are a source of particular 
uncertainty as regards the outlook for world trade. 
The rise in the Community's import prices stemming from 
the depreciation of the ECU against the dollar could well 
bring about a deterioration in the terms of trade and in the 
trade deficit in the early months of 1981. But since the recent 
trend of the dollar and the pro.spect of a fall in commodity 
prices in the months ahead could curb imports significantly 
(resulting in a rundown of raw material stocks), the 
Community's trade balance, after deteriorating initially, 
could show a significant improvement as the year progresses. 
Exchange rates 
Whereas in 1979 the ECU appreciated against the dollar and 
the yen, 1980 saw the dollar rate recover appreciably and that 
of the Japanese currency even more so. As early as the first 
quarter of 1980, the dollar strengthened against the 
European currencies, owing to a substantial rise in American 
interest rates. The rapid fall in interest rates in the second 
quarter caused the dollar to fall back slightly, although its 
upward movement resumed early in the second half of the 
year and accelerated spectacularly in the last months of 1980 
and the first months of 1981. Beginning in November, the 
interest-rate differential again widened in favour of Amer-
ican markets and boosted the inflow of capital into the 
United States. In January, the average rate of the ECU in 
dollars regained its August 1978 value. In 1980 the yen made 
up almost all the ground lost in 1979 : the ECU was worth on 
a monthly average 272,3 yen in December 1980-almost the 
same rate as in February 1979-whereas it had fallen 
between these two dates to 349 yen in February 1980. 
The exchange-rate movements between Community cur-
rencies and the dollar had some impact on exchange-rate 
relationships within the EMS. The German mark, the 
European currency most exposed to capital movements 
linked to the dollar, gradually became established in the 
lower half of the bilateral fluctuation margin of ± 2,25% and 
several times at the end of October reached its lower 
intervention point. Action to support the German currency 
was therefore taken mainly by the French authorities, whose 
currency had reached the upper intervention point of the 
bilateral margin of fluctuation against the mark. While the 
pressure on the German mark eased in the last two months of 
1980, it again increased at the end of January and in 
February of this year once more necessitated intervention 
within the EMS. The German mark's position on foreign 
exchange markets is currently made more difficult by the fact 
that it is practically the only European currency actually to 
be used against the dollar under the bilateral swap 
arrangements between the Federal Reserve and certain 
Member States, with the result that the burden of adjustment 
is not truly spread among the other EMS currencies. The 
position of the currencies within the EMS changed compared ' 
with that of 1979. The French franc remained in the upper 
half of the fluctuation margin throughout the year and 
several times reached its upper intervention point, notably at 
the end of October and beginning of November 1980 and at 
the end of January and beginning of February 1981 ; since the 
summer of last year, it has been accompanied by the Dutch 
guilder. The Danish krone and the Irish pound fluctuated in 
the middle of the band, while the Belgian franc, which was 
weak throughout the year, remained close to its lower 
intervention point and had to be supported frequently. The 
Italian lira, which fluctuates within a margin of ± 6%, began 
to weaken in June and remained approximately 4% below the 
French frahc until the end of the year. While no currency 
Exchange rates 
exceeded its divergence threshold in 1980 (fixed at 75% of the 
maximum spread of divergence against the ECU), the 
relative position of the currencies in relation to this indicator 
was roughly similar to their bilateral exchange rate position: 
the French franc remained towards the top of the appreci-
ation zone against the ECU, while the German mark and the 
Belgian franc saw their indicator remain around 50 to 70% in 
the depreciation zone against the ECU. This situation 
persisted in the first months of 1981, with the French franc 
reaching its divergence threshold on 28 January. 
The pound sterling, which is not part of the exchange rate 
agreement, steadily appreciated last year against the other 
Community currencies. It appreciated by 17% against the 
ECU within one year. The United Kingdom currency has 
tended to follow the dollar rate, benefiting, like the United 
States currency, from capital inflows brought by high 
interest rates and from the United Kingdom's satisfactory 
external trade results. 
Table 20 shows the extent to which the Community 
currencies and the other major currencies have fluctuated 
against the ECU. It can be seen that in 1980 the average 
coefficient of variation of the currencies involved in the 
exchange rate agreement was again lower than in the 
previous year, thus confirming the positive role played by the 
EMS in promoting exchange-rate stability.' On the other 
hand, the degree of fluctuation of the other currencies 
against the ECU (notably the pound sterling, the dollar and 
the yen) was very high, while the Swiss franc was relatively 
stable. 
Table 20 
Variation of major currencies against the ECU 1 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
BFR/LFR 38,5 6,2 11,4 8,4 9,0 
DKR 33,8 32,4 7,7 32,7 4,5 
DM 42,7 11,6 11,7 8,6 9,6 
FF 30,1 9,6 18,0 7,4 6,1 
IRL 63,5 11,3 23,8 7,7 9,2 
LIT 55,5 21,1 24,8 9,8 17,9 
HFL 39,0 . 5,7 11,3 9,0 4,4 
Average EMS 2 43,3 13,9 15,5 11,9 8,7 
FS 43,5 45,5 53,9 10,5 13,0 
UKL 63,2 11,3 23,8 32,2 44,7 
USO 20,1 24,9 49,1 28,1 34,4 
Yen 34,1 39,2 70,8 87,5 82,2 
I Coefficient of variation (standard deviation of end-of-month rates for each national 
currency against the ECU divided by the average rate for the year). Results multiplied 
2 
by l OOO. 
Unweighted mean. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 21 
Movement of effective and real exchange rates 
Movement of effective Movement of real exchan~e rates 
exchange rates I (competitiveness) I 
1980 1980 
quarters quarters 
II III IV II III IV 
BFR/LFR 120,5 120,6 120,8 116,9 89,9 88,6 87,4 84,2 
DKR 105,4 103,9 104,4 100,7 104,4 103,2 103,2 99,8 
DM 159,1 156,7 156,5 150,1 106,5 103,9 102,1 96,9 
FF 99,8 99,2 99,5 96,3 102,1 102,9 104,4 101,9 
IRL 73,4 72,5 72,7 68,2 93,7 92,8 92,9 87,7 
LIT 54,4 53,1 52,4 50,6 105,8 104,7 104,2 101,4 
HFL 128,6 127,5 128,4 125,4 99,4 97,4 97,8 95,0 
UKL 70,8 72,2 73,9 77,5 115,0 118,4 122,4 127,6 
USD 85,5 85,1 82,8 85,3 92,6 92,2 90,0 93,0 
Yen 112,9 119,2 124,0 133,0 96,3 103,3 106,4 114,5 
I Rates based on export markets. 1972, first quarter = 100. 
2 A rise in the index indicates an increase in relative prices and therefore a fall in competitiveness. 
Source : Commission services. 
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Table 21 shows changes in effective and real exchange rates. 
In the fourth quarter of 1980 the effective exchange rates of 
the Community currencies declined fairly sharply, except for 
the pound sterling which continued its steady increase of the 
first three quarters. At the other extreme, the effective 
exchange rate of the Italian lira has fallen since the beginning 
of 1980; the German mark is in the same position, while the 
fall in the exchange rates of the other Community currencies 
did not get under way until the last three months of 1980. 
While the yen's effective exchange rate has appreciated 
markedly, that of the dollar has varied little. Real exchange 
rates (variation in relative prices adjusted for changes in 
effective exchange rates) showed a general downward trend 
in 1980, except in the United Kingdom where there was a 
sharp rise in the competitiveness index. However, the 
improvement in the price competitiveness of the European 
economies varied: between the first and last quarters of 1980, 
the improvement was sharp in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, appreciable in Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Italy, and slight in France. In the United 
Kingdom the loss of competitiveness amounted to 11 % over 
the same period. In 1980 Japan saw an appreciable rise in its 
relative prices adjusted for exchange rate variations, 
reversing the steady downward trend of 1978 and 1979. The 
United States saw a slight gain during the first nine months of 
1980, followed by a slight loss in the fourth quarter of the 
same year (see also the special article on unit labour costs in 
manufacturing industry). 
Oil and energy 
The slowdown in economic growth in the Community, a 
relatively mild winter at the beginning of the year, the 
reaction to the sharp rise in the real cost of energy ( especially 
the real price of oil) and other efforts at energy-saving led to 
an estimated reduction in 1980 of 4% in the Community's 
gross inland consumption of primary energy (see Table 22). 
Gross inland consumption of crude oil and equivalents fell 
even more sharply last year, by 7,7% to 485 million tonnes 
( 497 million tonnes in EC I 0). Crude-oil production within 
the Community rose by 3 million tonnes, much less rapidly 
than in recent years. The weakness of domestic demand for 
oil together with much smaller additions to oil stocks than in 
1979 resulted in a large reduction in net imports of crude oil 
and oil products, down 10, 7% to 424 million tonnes for 1980 
(EC 9). This fall in the volume of oil imports was much larger 
than had initially been expected, but because of the further 
substantial rise in the price of oil the Community's bill for net 
imports of crude oil nevertheless increased from some USO 
70 OOO million in 1979 to USO 103 OOO million in 1980. 
Table 22 
Oil-market developments in the Community, EC 9 
Net oil imports ( crude and refined) 
Crude-oil production 
Gross inland consumption of crude oil and equivalents 2 
Gross inland consumption of primary energy 2 
Share of oil in total inland energy consumption (%) 
Dependence on imported oil 3 (%) 
Crude-oil imports, average price per barrel (fob) 
Net crude-oil import bill ( cif), OOO million 
Net oil imports (crude and refined) 
Crude-oil production 
Gross inland consumption of crude oil and equivalents 
Total inland consumption of primary energy 
Crude-oil import price (fob) 
Net oil import bill 
I Estimates and forecasts. 
Oil and energy 
The share of oil in total energy consumption fell from 54% in 
1979 to 52% in 1980. (Among the energy policy targets 
adopted by the Council on 13 May 1980 is a reduction in this 
share to 40% by 1990.) The share of imported oil in the 
Community's total energy requirements (including bunkers) 
also continued to decline last year, to reach about 44%, some 
11 percentage points lower than five years earlier. 
Oil prices were increased by OPEC countries in several stages 
during 1980. The official price of 34° API Arabian Light, 
which now represents a minimum crude marker price, rose 
from USO 24 per barrel at the end of 1979 to USO 32 per 
barrel with effect from I November 1980. Further increases 
effective from January 1981 were decided at Bali last 
December by other OPEC countries who on average added 
about USO 2-3 to their prices per barrel. 
With continuing weakness in economic activity in the 
Community during 1981 gross inland consumption of energy 
is again expected to fall. Further gradual progress in 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 I 19811 
Million tonnes of oil equivalent 
482,6 517,8 481,1 472,1 474,2 423,5 403 
11,2 21,0 47,2 62,1 87,2 90,0 95 
478,3 508,6 496,6 512,7 525,2 485,0 472 
847,6 902,3 898,3 924,5 967,7 931,9 930 
56,4 56,4 55,3 55,5 54,2 52,0 50,8 
55,0 55,5 51,9 49,5 47,6 44,2 42,1 
US c,lollars 
10,3 11,4 12,6 12,8 19,5 31,3 (37) 
39,9 45,2 48,9 47,9 69,7 103,0 (116) 
Percentage change 
7,3 -7,1 -1,9 0,4 -10,7 -5 
87,5 124,8 31,6 40,4 3,2 6 
6,3 -2,4 3,2 2,4 -7,7 -3 
6,5 -0,4 2,9 4,9 -3,9 -0 
11, 1 10,5 1,3 52,3 60,5 18 
13,3 8,2 -2,0 45,5 47,8 13 
2 Equal to production plus net imports less additions to stocks less marine bunkers, (energy supplied balance sheets). 
3 Net oil imports as % of gross inland consumption of primary energy plus bunkers. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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substituting other sources of energy for oil is likely, and oil 
production in the North Sea should expand more strongly 
than in 1980. Demand by the Community for imported oil 
may therefore fall by about 5%, to about 403 million tonnes 
( 415 million tonnes in EC I 0). But, even on the assumption of 
only modest oil price increases during the remainder of 1981, 
the price rises that have already taken place mean that the 
Community's oil import bill in US dollars will again rise. 
36 
The recent rise in the US dollar against most Community 
currencies introduces a new element of uncertainty in the 
outlook for 1981 : a mechanical conversion of dollar-
denominated prices entails a very large rise in import prices 
measured in local currency. Even in early 1981 there were, 
however, signs that the rise in the US dollar was exerting a 
dampening impact upon world market prices, notably in the 
market for crude oil and base metals. 
The economies of Member States 
Belgium 
Trends and prospects 
Economic activity began to slacken in the spring of 1980 and 
continued to do so until the end of the year. Despite the very 
high level it reached in the period January to April, the index 
of industrial production for 1980 as a whole was not higher 
than the average outturn for 1979. As suggested by the 
business survey results, the slowdown should be less 
perceptible in the next few months and there could even be 
signs of a slight upturn in the second half of the year. All in 
all, gross domestic product, which increased by slightly over 
I% in 1980, should fall by 0, 7% in 1981. I 
Any upturn during the year could only be due to some . 
strengthening of export demand, contrasting with a decline 
in domestic demand. Economic policy will not be able to 
provide much support for the upturn, since the room for 
manoeuvre is now very limited in view of the public finance 
situation and the external deficit. The recently adopted 
recovery programme, the prime objective of which is to 
moderate incomes, will, in the immediate future, have a 
somewhat restrictive effect on demand. Against an inter-
national background of high interest rates, the Belgian 
authorities have been compelled to raise the yields offered on 
capital. This policy became all the more necessary because 
the budget deficit has forced the public authorities to borrow 
frequently on the financial market. 
As a result of implementation of the recovery plan, private 
consumption is likely to remain static in real terms in 1981. 
The measures taken to limit social transfer payments and 
increase social security contributions with a view to 
correcting the social security situation will have a con-
siderable impact on personal incomes. The interprofessional 
agreement, concluded in February between management and 
unions with the active participation of the government, will 
to some extent moderate the upward movement of wages in 
the private sector, as compared to the rise recorded in 1980. 
The law on moderation also provides for a reduction in 
certain other income categories (professional fees, remuner-
ation for public office, public service salaries). All in all real 
personal disposable income must be expected to fall and the 
effect on consumption should be only offset by a reduction in 
the savings ratio. 
General government consumption will increase, in nominal 
terms, at a faster rate than in 1980, reflecting a more frequent 
application of the mechanism for indexing civil servants' 
salaries and the increase in the number of pensioners. 
Expansion in volume terms should nevertheless remain very 
low, as it was in 1980, because of the economy measures 
taken. 
1 See table. 
Fixed corporate investment last year was well up on the 1979 
figure. Towards the end of the year, however, the confirm-
ation of less-favourable prospects, low company profit-
ability and the high level of interest rates seemed to slow this 
trend down, a tendency which will probably became more 
marked in 1981, despite the considerable support of the 
restructuring programmes implemented in some industrial 
sectors, and the execution ofimportant multiannual projects. 
The result could be a slight reduction in the volume of 
corporate investment for the year as a whole. 
The effect of the government's support measures in the area 
of residential construction will probably be only limited. 
Activity in this sector should therefore remain depressed, 
under the impact of the moderation of incomes, the high cost 
of mortgage loans, the taxation impact of the reform of the 
land register and restrictions on rent increases especially 
since the property market is showing signs of saturation. 
Public investment too is likely to fall back, since the 
implementation of new programmes has for two years been 
held back by budgetary difficulties. 
Since April 1980, exports have definitely been on a declining 
trend; a limited upturn in 1981 is probable but not entirely 
certain. Belgian exports are likely to be out of step with the 
expansion of world trade, because of the high level of costs, 
and because their composition is ill-adapted to external 
demand. Compared with the action taken in certain 
neighbouring countries, wage costs have not been moderated 
sufficiently to enable Belgium to improve her market shares. 
Imports, after expanding vigorously at the beginning of 1980, 
have since turned down considerably. Given the persistent 
weakness of overall demand, the volume of imports should 
not go any higher this year. The rapid rise in import prices, 
which in 1980 led to a considerable deterioration in the terms 
of trade, could ease in 1981. 
The slowdown in economic activity will be reflected, in 1981, 
by a further reduction in the number of wage and salary 
earners, particularly in industry. In the public sector, the 
numbers employed should remain stable overall. At the same 
time, the labour force will probably increase, as female 
participation rates go up and the effects of the early 
retirement measures disappear. The number of registered 
unemployed, which went up sharply in the second half of last 
year,2 could continue to mount. The average unemployment 
rate for 1981 should be some I 0, 7% of the labour force. The 
jump in the number of unemployed men of normal working 
ability and in the number of young unemployed, reveals 
particularly the deterioration in the labour market. 
In the absence of large increases in public utility charges or 
indirect taxes, the rise in consumer prices is likely to slow 
down during the year. 
2 See graph. 
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Belgium: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
1970-79 1979 1980 19813 1979 1980 1980 19813 19813 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) BFR 
OOO Mio 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1975 prices 
Private consumption 3,9 4,6 2,0 0 3,8 1,8 0,6 1 966,9 
Public consumption 4,3 2,5 0,2 0,6 0,5 0,1 0,3 566,3 
Gross fixed capital formation 2,6 -0,7 2,9 -1,9 0,8 4,3 2,4 667,5 
Change in stocks I 0,9 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,3 13,0 
Domestic demand 3,6 3,4 1,6 -0,3 2,6 1,7 0,6 3 213,7 
Exports of goods and services 5,9 5,8 2,6 -0,8 5,9 2,4 0,1 1 805,5 
Imports of goods and services 6,1 7,6 3,3 -0,2 7,6 2,8 0,3 1 844,2 
GDP at market prices 3,4 2,4 1,2 -0,7 1,6 1,4 0,5 3 175,0 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 10,8 6,5 
Industrial production 2,7 4,5 
Unemployment rate 2 4,9 8,6 
Compensation of employees 12,9 6,7 
M2 12,2 6,1 
GDP (implicit price index) 7,2 4,0 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 6,7 3,4 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 6,2 9,9 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 6,7 9,7 
Terms of trade -0,4 0,2 
Trade balance (fob/cif) -2,0 -6,2 
Current balance 0,4 -2,9 
Net lending ( +) or net borrowing ( - ) of 
general government -4,3 -7,1 
I As% of GDP. 
2 Unemployment as % of total labour force. 
3 Forecasts. 
Sources: Eurostat and Commission services. 
According to present forecasts, the deterioration in the 
balance of payments on current account should be less 
pronounced than in 1980. The deficit should nevertheless be 
6,6% of gross domestic product as against 5,6% in 1980 and 
should be one of the highest in the Community in absolute 
value. The heavier deficit will mainly be the result of the 
steady deterioration in the trade balance, one reason for 
which is the higher cost of energy products. It will also reflect 
the unfavourable movement of the balance of factor 
incomes, which is mainly due to the considerable increase in 
charges relating to the external debt largely contracted in the 
form of public sector borrowing in foreign currencies. 
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6,3 5,5 
1,5 -2,4 2,8 1,8 -0,4 -2,7 -3,7 
9,3 10,7 8,8 9,0 10,2 10,5 10,9 
7,8 6,6 6,7 8,2 8,2 7,4 6,8 
3,0 5,0 
5,1 6,0 
6,3 6,2 5,0 6,7 6,7 5,9 5,6 
11,0 8,5 12,7 11,0 9,4 8,4 7,8 
14,0 9,2 14,9 14,9 11,8 8,7 8,0 
-2,6 -0,6 -1,9 -3,4 -2,1 -0,3 -0,2 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
-8,5 -9,2 
-5,6 -6,6 
-9,4 -9,7 
Problems of economic policy. 
The levels of the external deficit and the budget deficit, but 
above all the rapid rate at which these balances have 
deteriorated in the last few years, are today the most 
worrying aspects of Belgium's economic situation. The room 
for manoeuvre with regard to economic policy has been 
reduced considerably, and in particular, there are far fewer 
opportunities for improving growth and employment 
conditions. There is no doubt that an even more marked 
deterioration in the balance of payments on current account, 
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mainly as a result of heavier interest charges on foreign 
borrowings, would make rectification of the external 
situation very painful. 
The deterioration in the terms of trade, in the wake of the 
second massive oil-price rise, has certainly played an 
important part. But the external disequilibrium is also a 
reflection of the fact that, in real terms, domestic demand has 
risen far faster than gross domestic product, private 
consumption having continued to grow at the expense of 
investment and the external balance. 
The question is whether this trend can be changed by the 
interprofessional agreement recently concluded between 
management and the unions. Although it is difficult to assess 
the impact of this agreement it can only be expected to 
stabilize the volume of private consumption. Since, at the 
same time, gross domestic product will fall, the Belgian 
economy will, for the fifth consecutive year, have to rely on a 
net contribution of resources from abroad to meet consump-
tion needs. 
The general government cash deficit also increased from 
8,5% of gross domestic product in 1979 to some 11,0% in 
19801 and, unless very strong measures are taken, this 
proportion will be more or less maintained in 1981. The 
increase can be explained by both a smaller rise in tax receipts 
following the slowdown in economic activity, and a sharp 
Including loans, advances and shareholding. 
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increase in expenditure, notably in social transfer payments 
(unemployment benefits), aid to firms in difficulties, and 
public debt interest charges. In 1981, the latter will account 
for 13,8% of all public expenditure. 
Reduction of the budget deficit is essential if external 
equilibrium is to improve. Given the already very high level 
of the burden of taxation the deficit would have to be cut 
mainly by restricting expenditure. A smaller deficit would 
also help to limit monetary financing, which has increased 
sharply in the last few years, and would make it possible to 
reduce public authority borrowing on the capital markets, 
which has been largely responsible for the maintenance of 
high interest rates. 
The Belgian economy still has the advantage of a relatively 
moderate inflation rate, and, in the relatively more exposed 
sectors, its competitiveness has tended to improve in the last 
few years. However, the composition of exports, geared 
towards less-buoyant sectors, is somewhat unfavourable. 
It will consequently be difficult to restore external equilib-
rium in the next few years. In order to achieve this, action 
must concentrate on both supply and demand. However, 
given the lags inherent in the reaction to these two types of 
action, together with the absolute necessity of preventing an 
even greater deterioration on current account suggests that 
the only effective short-run remedy is a severe restriction of 
the volume of consumption: this policy is also being pursued 
by other Community countries with particularly open 
economies. 
Denmark 
Trends and prospects 
The fairly high level of activity prevailing towards the end of 
1979 started to decline in the early spring and resulted in a fall 
of gross domestic product in 1980 of some I%- 1 Gross 
domestic product in 1981 is likely to show little change on 
1980, implying a further recession in the beginning of the 
year and a certain pick up in activity during the latter half of 
1981. 
The fall in economic activity during 1980 is largely the result 
of a more r~strictive economic policy stance adopted since 
autumn 197·9. Fiscal policy has been tightened affecting both 
private business and households. The deterioration in the 
terms of trade, resulting from the depreciation of the Danish 
Krone and from the new escalation of oil prices, which was 
passed on to the consumers by the measures concerning wage 
indexation and wage control was another deflationary factor 
affecting domestic demand. 
Despite the tightening of direct and indirect taxation the 
government deficit increased compared with previous 
estimates, because of a fall in receipts, due to a slowdown in 
private consumption, and a rise in transfer payments 
associated with unemployment and the early retirement 
scheme. 
The monetary authorities have pursued a restrictive policy 
with respect to domestic liquidity. Interest rates were 
maintained at a high level. However the fall in international 
interest rates towards mid-1980 allowed the Central Bank to 
lower the discount rate by 2%. The fall in the demand for 
credits facilitated furthermore an easing of the credit ceilings. 
The present economic policy stance will be maintained in 
1981. The raising of direct and indirect taxation and the 
envisaged slowdown in central and local government 
expenditure should result in a further decline of domestic 
demand. Monetary policy will remain restrictive. The need to 
maintain an adequate non-monetary financing of the 
government deficit and the present level of external interest 
rates limit the scope for a further easing of credit policy. 
Domestic demand will remain weak during the coming 
months. The ceilings imposed upon general government 
expenditure, aimed at a gradual slowdown of its increase 
over a number of years, will contain public consumption and 
investment in 1981. Whereas public consumption might still 
grow at a moderate pace, public investment will continue to 
fall, although to a lesser extent than was the case during 1980. 
I See table. 
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In 1980, the decline in private investment has been somewhat 
more important than was the case in the public sector. Thus 
residential construction fell considerably and will continue to 
do so at least during the first half of 1981. The sluggishness in 
private gross disposable income and the high costs of 
borrowing, together with a general lack of consumer 
confidence, may explain the present setback within this 
sector. Rising energy prices and the impact of measures to 
improve heat insulation have on the other hand sustained 
some repair and renovation activity. Industrial construction 
slowed down last year, and this may continue, at least in the 
early part of 1981, as investment plans are adjusted 
downwards and idle production capacities increase. In 
agriculture, deteriorating profitability of previous invest-
ment due to the rise in costs of factor input is the main 
explanatory factor behind the fall in construction. Invest-
ment in equipment will remain depressed during most of the 
year. New orders for investment goods were fairly low 
towards the end of 1980 compared to the year before, and 
survey results actually confirm the fall at the beginning of 
1981. However, it may be expected that a recovery in 
domestic and external demand in the latter half of 1981 as 
well as the impact of improved competitiveness, will give rise 
to some expansion in private investment. 
Private consumption will continue to fall in volume terms in 
1981 although at a slower pace than in 1980. Gross real 
disposable income will decline for the year on average, but 
might start to pick up during the year as a consequence of 
wage indexation and some wage drift, and thus sustain the 
recent tendency for private households to increase their 
savings. 
The sluggishness of final demand and of economic activity 
resulted in a considerable fall in stocks in the course of last 
year. This trend is unlikely to continue in 1981 as the larger 
part of the downward adjustment has already taken place. 
The improvement in the trade and services balance 
constituted the main expansionary element during 1980. 
Better competitiveness due to the measures taken since the 
end of 1979 and the levelling-off in domestic demand, which 
curbed imports of goods and services are the main 
explanatory factors for this improvement. Export volume 
continued to perform well in the first quarter of 1980 but 
started to fall off during the remaining part of the year and 
this trend could still prevail during most of 1981. The fall in 
foreign demand for investment goods and other manu-
factured products was to a large extent linked to the 
relatively unfavourable geographical structure of Danish 
industrial exports. The deterioration might however have 
been even more important if competitiveness had not 
improved, implying slight market gains. Stagnating exports 
oflivestock products will reflect not so much general demand 
trends but rather stagnating or, in certain respects, even 
declining domestic production. The fall in import volume in 
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Denmark: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
1970-79 1979 1980 19813 1979 1980 1980 19813 19813 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) DKR 
OOO Mio 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1970 prices 
Private consumption 2,5 3,0 -3,8 -2,0 2,0 -5,4 -6,3 -1,4 0,6 195,7 
Public consumption 4,4 4,5 5,8 3,0 8,0 5,9 4,4 3,6 1,2 86,4 
Gross fixed capital formation 1,0 -1,9 -14,9 -6,4 -7,1 -22,8 -11,5 -5,9 -1,0 75,8 
Change in stocks I 0,6 0,6 0,2 -0,1 0,4 1,3 -0,9 -0,9 0,6 2,0 
Domestic demand 2,5 2,6 -4,2 -1,8 0,6 -4,4 -8,8 -1,0 3,4 359,9 
Exports of goods and services 4,9 9,8 5,5 1,3 9,8 12,6 -11,1 4,6 6,3 102,2 
Imports of goods and services 3,9 6,4 -5,6 -3,7 7,7 -0,4 -29,7 4,2 7,7 114,0 
GDP at market prices 2,8 3,5 -0,9 -0,1 1,0 -0,8 -2,2 -0,8 3,0 348,1 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 12,5 10,8 
Industrial production 2,5 4,4 
Unemployment rate 2 3,3 5,3 
Compensation of employees 12,6 11,0 
M2 11,0 9,9 
GDP (implicit price index) 9,4 7,1 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 9,4 9,5 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 7,7 8,5 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 9,1 14,0 
Terms of trade, goods -1,3 -4,8 
Trade balance (fob/cif) -2,5 -3,4 
Current balance -2,8 -4,6 
Net borrowing of general government -0,9 3,1 
I As% of GDP. 
2 Unemployment as % of total labour force. 
3 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission and national services. 
1980 was in particular linked to a slowdown of activity in 
manufacturing industry and construction and affected 
investment goods as well as intermediary products used in 
these sectors. Furthermore the volume indices for imported 
fuel continued to fall from the second half of 1979, reflecting 
both a slowdown in activity and the continued efforts to 
increase efficiency in using fuel and power. An increase in 
domestic demand could bring about some rise in imports in 
1981, particularly in the latter half of the year. 
Although an increasing number of persons have chosen to 
retire early from the labour force, the participation rate 
continued to rise due to a growing number of women looking 
for jobs. The considerable rise in the rate of unemployment, 
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7,5 8,2 11,2 5,5 8,0 7,1 10,5 
0,6 -1,4 10,5 1,2 -9,6 1,0 2,0 
6,2 7,6 5,0 5,5 6,9 7,7 7,5 
9,0 8,7 12,4 8,2 7,5 8,2 10,9 
10,9 8,7 
8,5 8,3 10,0 6,5 10,3 8,1 7,5 
11,0 9,0 16,2 9,2 9,4 8,8 9,0 
13,8 9,0 16,6 15,1 9,0 9,0 9,4 
22,3 13,3 26,l 27,7 9,4 13,4 16,2 
-7,0 -3,8 -7,5 -9,9 -0,4 -3,9 -5,9 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
-1,8 -1,1 -4,2 -3,6 -0,1 -0,6 -1,6 
-4,1 -3,6 -5,2 -5,8 -2,3 -3,1 -4,2 
4,6 5,7 
which may attain some 7,5% of total labour force on average 
in 1981 (SOEC definitions), will continue during the first half 
of the year, but could be reversed in the latter part of 1981. 
Persons under the age of 25 now account for one-third of 
those unemployed. Compared to 1980 employment in the 
private sector, especially in manufacturing industry and 
construction, will be considerably lower and public employ-
ment somewhat higher. 
Domestic prices may rise at a moderate pace during most of 
1981. Although the price freeze adopted in December 1979 
expires at the end of February this year, the impact on actual 
prices should be fairly limited. Planned increases in public 
charges could however be carried through and a certain 
adjustment of rents may be envisaged. 
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The improvement of the balance of payments towards the end 
of 1980 should not conceal the underlying disequilibria. 
Despite considerable gains in volume terms on the trade and 
services balance which took place during 1980 and which 
may continue during the greater part of 1981, the deterior-
ation in the terms of trade partly linked to the depreciation of 
the effective exchange rate almost halved the improvement in 
real terms. An economic recovery towards the end of 1981 
could halt this improvement, and as there is very little reason 
to expect a more favourable development in terms of trade, 
the deficit on the balance of goods and services could tend to 
grow again. As a result of increasing external debt, 
amounting to almost one-fourth of gross domestic product-
in 1981, interest payments have become an autonomous 
drain on the external balance, largely depending upon 
changes in the international level of interest rates and on 
changes in the effective exchange rate. 
Problems of economic policy 
The economic outlook described above emphasizes the 
continuous need for a better internal and external balance. 
The measures adopted at the end of 1979 and during 1980, 
aiming at improved competitiveness and reduced domestic 
demand, brought about a marked fall in the external deficit 
throughout the year. The improvement is however not yet 
consolidated, as it stems mainly from a fall in imports due to 
a decline in final domestic demand, which could be reversed 
later on. A further deterioration in the terms of trade and the 
increasing cost of servicing the external debt are risks of 
which due account should be taken. 
The policy guidelines endorsed by the government aim at 
external equilibrium in the second half of the decade. 
Although wage settlements now having been concluded for 
the next two years will result in moderate·increases during 
1981, it is not certain that the evolution of income they imply 
is sufficient to ensure the attainment of this balance-of-
payments-o bjective. The changes in the system of wage 
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indexation I have reduced the impact stemming from higher 
energy prices, but some wage drift may cushion the fall in real 
income in the latter part of the year. 
Despite the raising of direct and indirect taxation and the 
imposition of ceilings on public expenditure of the central 
government (no volume increase in 1981) and for the local 
authorities (2% volume increase in 1981 ), the general 
government deficit will probably increase from 4,6% of gross 
domestic product in 1980 to 5,7% in 1981, as a result of a 
slowdown in tax revenue and substantial increases in social 
transfers. 
The constraints on monetary policy resulting from the 
financing of the external deficit, whilst at the same time 
controlling the rise in domestic liquidity, are considerable. In 
order to assure a sufficient inflow of capital a difference 
between domestic and foreign interest rates must be 
maintained. It is necessary, in particular, to encourage a 
substantial amount of gross borrowing by the private sector 
in order to ensure a renewal of outstanding private sector 
debt. With a view to prevent an excessive expansion of 
domestic liquidity the monetary impact of a rising central 
government deficit needs to be neutralized through sales of 
government securities. 
Given the fairly bleak outlook for 1981 and in view of the 
constraints imposed on economic policy stance, the employ-
ment problem will remain severe. The shedding of labour in 
the private sector is only to some extent compensated for by a 
rise of employment in the public sector. Selective measures 
have been evisaged in the government employment schemes 
to encourage structural adaptation on the labour market. 
Although the apparent lack of mobility and correlation 
between job skills demanded and qualifications offered is less 
acute at current levels of unemployment, these are problems 
which should be considered both in the context of relative 
factor prices and the costs of redundancy. 
1 See box on 'Incomes policy in Denmark'. 
Incomes policy in Denmark 
I. During the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, incomes 
pnli,.:~ in Denmark was only considered as having a modest role 
in supporting budgetary and monetary policies. However, the 
growing external deficit and rising unemployment brought about 
new interest in a feasible incomes policy as an alternative to the 
traditional approaches. The measures taken to moderate income 
developments so as to achieve a better economic balance have 
been conceived so far on an ad hoe basis intended to put a brake 
on domestically-generated increases in factor costs, to sustain 
competitiveness in exporting and import substituting sectors and 
to restrict the autonomous tendency towards a growth in 
consumption. 
~. National wage agreements are negotiated biennially hi:tween 
the social partners in the private and the public sectors. Matters 
nr particular interest to the different trade unions are negotiated 
separately, whereas questions concerning the labour market in 
general are negotiated between the main partners at a central 
level. An official arbitrator can be asked by the social partners to 
assist during the negotiations and may eventually put forward a 
draft proposal, which is intended to avoid a conflict of interests 
rather than to constitute a policy. Apart from conditions 
concerning holidays, working hours, etc. the agreements 
stipulate general changes in basic rates, the application of wage 
indexation and other modifications in pay to different sectors or 
categories. The agreements implemented in March 1981 were, 
· however, negotiated separately in almost all cases. The fairly 
successful outcome may be explained by the need felt by the 
social partners to reassert their autonomy as regards the 
government, by the decentralized procedures allowing charac-
teristics in each sector to be taken into account and by the 
gm crnmi:nt's firm commitment on the permissible rise in wage 
incomes. 
3. From 1975 until 1981, the government has intervened by liaw 
due to a failure to obtain agreement, and has to a varying degree 
acted on the different wage components. 
In general the government has confined itself to setting forth 
qualitative recommendations when referring to real wage 
increases. Prior to the wage negotiations for 1977 /78 however, 
the government framed its policy in the form of quantitative 
guidelines suggesting a total nominal increase of 6;~ p.a. of which 
2% represented a real increase. In the pluriannual programme 
endorsed by the government in December 1979 'guidelines' in 
terms of real disposable income were presented. The government 
invited the social partners to agree upon moderate settlements in 
order to improve competitiveness, implying that excessive 
nominal increases in average income would be counterbalanced 
by fiscal measures neutralizing any apparent gains. 
Steps have been taken in order to reduce the impact on wages 
resulting from the index system. The cost of living adjustments 
may take place automatically twice a year. A fixed amount is 
released for every 3 points by which the wage-regulating price 
Denmark 
index exceeds its base. The price index (excluding indirect 
taxation) is calculated as an average of three months ending 
January and July:- The index payment is due in March or 
September respectively and covers some 60% of the increase in 
the cost of living. The modifications to the index system have 
concerned partly the calculation of the index, partly its 
application to wages and the impact upon labour costs. The wage 
regulating index was rebased in 1971, 1975 and 1980 in order to 
slow down the number of portions released for every 3 points 
increase in the index, and the amount paid per portion was 
adjusted. In I 980, energy items were excluded from the basis of 
calculation. The government decided on several occasions, in 
1974 and again in 1976, to compensate employers for all or part 
of the costs resulting from released index portions, in order to 
reduce the impact of the index system upon labour costs. In 
connection with the guidelines for 1977 /78, the government fixed 
a 4% limit on annual cost-of-living adjustments (corresponding 
to one half-yearly portion); supplementary increases were to be 
paid by the government into the Wage Earners' Pension Fund 
until the end of August 1979. In 1980 the index portions released 
in January were abolished and part of the impact from the 
currency depreciations in 1979 was set off in a reduced 
compensation in September 1980. Finally, the fixation of index 
portions in absolute amounts for all wage earners in 1975, as 
against percentage compensation previously granted to certain 
categories, gave an egalitarian· trait to the wage system, in 
particular as between the public and the private sector. 
The residual part of the wage increases (settlements by sector and 
-by plant, wage drift) is far more difficult to control as it 
represents a complex of different factors at play between sectors 
and among different categories of wage earners ( depending to a 
large extent on different conditions of demand for and supply of 
labour and oflabour productivity, and on changes in the level of 
transfers and taxes). In order to avoid wage drift, the authorities 
have, on some occasions, adopted a temporary freeze on prices 
and wages or applied specific rules of price calculation supervised 
by the Monopolies Control Authority. The controls intended to 
exclude from the price calculations wage increases not provided 
for in the settlements and to maintain the levels of profits, fees, 
dividends, etc. 
4. Danish experience shows that the latter part of wage 
increases has had a determining impact in recent years (see 
graph.). Specific negotiated supplements to certain low-income 
categories may have added to wage drift. The more or le&'$ 
explicit linking between wages in different sectors ( e.g. wage drift 
guarantees) has furthermore spread the benefits that may be 
economically justified in one part of the labour market to other 
parts. Finally tax push elements may have played a role and been 
carried forward into nominal wages. The temporary price freezes 
and controls applied, in particular with respect to domestic non-
competitive sectors-the last one expired end-February 1981-
have frequently been used to act as a brake on wage drift, without 
any conclusive effects however. 
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Denmark: Development in wage components (% increase compared to same quarter previous year) 
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Source: Danish Employers' Confederation: Statistics of hourly wages. 
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Trends and prospects 
Following a particularly sharp downturn in the second 
quarter of 1980, economic activity continued to fall in the 
remainder of the year. Because of the high level reached in the 
first quarter, average real GDP for 1980 was still 2% higher 
than in 1979, 1 but by the fourth quarter, its level had fallen to 
some 1% below the average for the year. 
In the opening months of 1981, activity has remained weak 
but the downswing is expected to bottom out by mid-year. If 
the international environment improves as assumed, the 
second half of the year should mark the beginning of a 
cyclical upswing. The recovery will probably be relatively 
slow, in part because of the continuing limited room for 
manreuvre in economic policy. All in all, because of the low 
starting level, the forces of recovery are unlikely to be strong 
enough for average economic growth to be positive between 
1980 and 1981. Indeed, real GDP is likely to be 0,5 to 1% 
down on the out-tum for 1980. 
Room for manreuvre in economic policy was considerably 
reduced in the past year both by external developments and 
by constraints arising from the domestic economy, par-
ticularly in the area of public finance. Budgetary policy fell a 
long way short of success in carrying out the Financial 
Planning Council's recommendation that the general 
government deficit (excluding social security) in 1980 be 
brought below that of the previous year, mainly because of a 
failure to curb the expansion of expenditure in line with 
plans. In spite of the marked economic slowdown during the 
year, receipts .were barely lower than forecast. Overall, the 
public budgets continued to provide a marked expansionary 
stimulus, as they had done the year before. 
The Bundesbank tightened the restrictive stance of its 
monetary and credit policy adopted in 1979, reducing the 
target range for the expansion of central bank money from 6-
9% in 1979 to 5-8% in 1980. In order to forestall a surge in 
domestic prices following the oil-price rises, and taking 
account of the behaviour of the exchange rate of the German 
mark, the Bundesbank reduced the growth of central bank 
money to the lower limit of the target band. Because of heavy 
outflows of foreign exchange in the wake of the rising current 
account deficit and the movement into deficit of private 
capital movements, the Bundesbank gave the banking 
system considerable liquidity assistance on several occasions, 
but nevertheless raised its key rates in stages. As the 
economic slowdown intensified, monetary and credit policy 
was increasingly prone to conflicting objectives, being caught 
I See table. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
between moves to keep the mark exchange rate within the 
limits of fluctuation vis-a-vis the other EMS currencies and 
efforts to keep the rise in interest rates within bounds, with a 
view to limiting as much as possible its effects on the already 
weak domestic economic activity. 
Although short-term pressures may at times become more 
marked, the authorities intend to maintain their policy 
approach towards the medium-term improvement of the 
general economic environment. As a result of the tax reliefs 
effective since the beginning of the year and the raising of 
certain social benefits, combined with cyclically-induced 
shortfalls in tax receipts, the general government borrowing 
requirement will again rise sharply. This deterioration of the 
budgetary position is accepted but there are no plans for 
further measures to support demand, over and above the 
stimuli resulting from automatic stabilizers. 
In 1981 as in 1980, monetary and credit policy will be caught 
in the conflict between domestic and external requirements. 
Considering the dangers of a resurgence of inflation and the 
persistent current account deficit, the Bundesbank reduced 
by 1 % (to 4-7%) its target range for the growth of central 
bank money stock from the final quarter of 19.80 to that of 
1981. Within this band, the Bundesbank has allowed 
sufficient margin so as not to obstruct somewhat stronger 
economic growthifthis proves possible. All in all, however, 
there is not much scope in the short term for supporting a 
revival of economic activity. 
In the first half of the year domestic demand is likely to fall 
further, but will gradually improve as the year goes on. 
Efforts to hold down public expenditure are clearly reflected 
in the Federal Government budget for 1981. The Financial 
Planning Council has also recommended that the regional 
and local authorities should join in these efforts. Con-
sequently, after a vigorous increase in the past year, public 
consumption will not climb much further in real terms. 
Following the slump in demand connected with a sharp drop 
in orders, building investment is likely to decline sharply in the 
current year, the austerity. measures probably having a 
noticeable effect on public building orders. It is true that 
because the fund allocation periods for 1981 have been 
extended, some residual effects are still to be expected from 
the future investment programme ('Programm fur Zu-
kunftsinvestitionen'), but public building investment in 1981 
will nonetheless fall appreciably in real terms. In private 
residential construction however, new orders and in 
particular mortgage loan commitments point to some 
improvement in demand. Building output will probably not 
be effected, however, until the second half of the year. Since 
output will initially drop even further, the average for the 
year is expected to be well down in real terms compared to 
1980. Commercial and industrial building investment might 
tum out to be somewhat more resilient, but will probably 
also fall short of the previous year's level after the 
consistently brisk expansion in recent years. 
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FR of Germany: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
1970-79 1979 1980 19814 1979 1980 1980 19814 19814 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) DM 
OOO Mio 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1970 prices 
Private consumption 3,6 3,2 1,7 0,7 -0,8 3,9 -0,2 0,5 1,9 766,3 
Public consumption 2,9 2,9 2,8 0,5 1, 1 4,8 0,7 0,4 0,4 277,9 
Gross fixed capital formation 2,9 8,7 4,1 -2,8 14,5 2,3 -1,7 -3,8 -1,8 318,1 
Change in stocks 1 1,0 2,3 1,7 0,7 2,9 1,9 1,4 0,5 0,9 29,6 
Domestic demand 3,3 6,1 1,8 -1,2 5,8 1,6 -1,4 -2,6 1,7 1 391,8 
Exports of goods and services 6,2 5,1 5,4 0,6 5,4 12,4 -7,2 2,0 6,0 357,4 
Imports of goods and services 7,1 11,0 5,0 -1,2 10,4 7,7 -5,2 -2,3 5,1 349,l 
GDP at market prices 3,2 4,6 2,0 -0,7 4,5 2,9 -2,1 -1,4 2,0 1 400,2 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 8,9 8,6 
Industrial production 2 2,8 5,3 
Unemployment rate 3 2,8 3,3 
Compensation of employees 9,6 7,3 
M3 10,3 8,9 
GDP (implicit price index) 5,5 3,8 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 5,2 3,9 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 4,2 3,8 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 4,1 7,9 
Terms of trade 0,1 -3,8 
Trade balance (fob/cif) 3,0 1,4 
Current balance 0,9 -0,7 
Net borrowing of general government -2,1 -3,0 
l As% of GDP. 
2 Excluding construction. 
3 Unemployment as % of total labour force. 
4 Forecasts. 
Sounes: Eurostat; Commission and national services. 
Last autumn's business surveys already pointed to a 
considerable slowdown in corporate investment in plant and 
machinery for 1981. Because of the deterioration in growth 
prospects for the current year, persistent pressure on profits 
and continuing relatively high interest rates, it is now 
assumed that investment plans will be revised downwards 
more sharply, but without causing a real cyclical downturn in 
investment. 
In 1981 private consumption is likely to be supported mainly 
by the programme of tax reliefs which came into force at the 
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7,1 3,7 9,0 7,7 4,1 2,4 5,8 
1,0 -1,5 6,0 2,0 -7,0 -1,0 1,6 
3,3 4,3 3,2 3,2 3,5 4,4 4,3 
7,7 3,3 9,6 6,2 9,0 1,3 1,9 
5,2 4,5 5,0 5,6 4,9 4,0 5,0 
5,0 4,4 4,3 4,7 6,3 3,9 3,7 
5,4 4,5 6,1 4,8 5,8 4,2 3,8 
6,0 5,5 6,1 6,8 4,4 5,7 6,0 
10,8 6,0 18,8 11,0 3,8 7,0 6,1 
-4,3 -0,5 -10,7 -3,8 0,6 -1;2 -0,l 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
0,4 0,8 0,7 0,5 0,3 0,7 0,8 
-1,7 -1,6 -1,3 -1,6 -1,7 -1,6 -1,5 
-3,5 -3,8 -3,5 -2,8 -4,0 -3,8 -3,7 
beginning of the year. Nonetheless, an expansion in real 
terms can only be expected if efforts to reduce inflation are 
successful, since the rise in disposable income is seen to slow 
down. The savings ratio is expected to remain at a relatively 
high level because of the unfavourable employment situ-
ation. 
Stockbuilding could still be a dampening force in the coming 
months, but this will gradually change to give way to a more 
expansionary trend. 
Federal Republic of Germany: Industrial production (s.a.) 
1970 = 100 
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Federal Republic of Germany: Unemployment (s.a.) 
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Federal Republic of Germany: Consumer prices (s.a.) 
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Federal Republic of Germany: Trade balance. (s.a.) 
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The expected recovery in world trade and the consequent 
acceleration in German exports of goods, sustained by a 
favourable competitive position, are likely to provide the 
main impetus for the revival of economic activity which it is 
assumed will take place during the year. The cyclical upswing 
will probably start slowly in most industrialized countries. 
German exports, whose strength lies in investment goods, 
will certainly not be especially favoured, as world demand for 
capital equipment is not expected to show much strength. 
Despite cost advantages which have recently been 
strengthened by movements in the German mark, and which 
are seen to go on increasing this year, market shares are 
unlikely to increase significantly. The rapid decline of 
domestic demand has dragged down imports in 1980. Falling 
output and the adjustment of stocks to lower demand led to 
lower imports of raw materials and primary products in 
particular; the demand for foreign finished products did not 
react to the same extent. In the early months of this year, 
import demand in volume terms will probably remain at a 
low level and only pick up again as output rises and the stock 
cycle turns around. 
Employment, which was still increasing considerably up to 
the middle oflast year, will in part adjust to the slackness of 
economic activity and may fall in the months ahead. It can be 
assumed, however, that as in other downward phases, firms 
will attempt to hold on to their staff, and will firstly go over 
to increased short-time working, thus limiting the fall in 
employment. Nevertheless unemployment will increase 
appreciably and the level as a percentage of the labour force 
is expected to climb from the 1980 average of 3,3% to 4,3% in 
1981, partly as a result of the increase in the labour force. 
The upward movement of prices, which had abated at the 
beginning of 1980, has again gathered momentum over the 
last few months. 1 The main factor pushing up prices was the 
renewed appreciable rise in the cost of imports, following the 
effective depreciation of the German mark. Certain ad-
ministered prices were also raised. The planned increase in 
taxes on mineral oil and spirits will be an additional burden 
in the first half of the year, and "only after this can the rise in 
prices be expected to slow gradually. On a year to year basis, 
the rise in consumer prices is unlikely to be held below 4,5% 
in 1981. 
The movement of the current account of the balance of 
payments, which has been discussed in detail in the 
accompanying box, is heavily dependent on the future course 
of import prices which in tum are largely determined by 
movements in the exchange markets. 
As exports are expected to pick up and import demand to 
remain relatively weak, the surplus on trade in goods could 
increase considerably despite a further deterioration in the 
I See graph. 
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terms of trade. On the other hand it must be expected that the 
deficit on services and transfers will again rise, so that overall 
the 1981 current account deficit is unlikely to be markedly 
lower than in 1980. 
Problems of economic policy 
The economic prospects for 1981 show that the basic 
economic policy objectives, as laid down in the 'stability law' 
( Stabilitiitsgesetz) are in varying degrees far from being 
achieved. Exogenous factors are at work in this respect, 
namely the direct effects on the domestic economy of the last 
wave of oil price increases, reinforced by the repercussions on 
the external economy of the world-wide weakening of 
economic activity. As this recent evolution points to the need 
for a fundamental adjustment to changed world economic 
conditions and given the very limited room for manreuvre in 
the present situation, traditional short-term cyclical policies 
may be of limited effect. It is in the Federal Republic's 
interest to shoulder the burdens of fundamental adjustment 
with other Member States, in proportion to her economic 
strength, so as to make it easier for countries in even weaker 
positions to solve their problems and to prevent any upsurge 
of unilateral protective measures. · 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the experiences of the 
first oil crisis resulted in economic policy being more firmly 
directed toward the medium-term improvement of supply 
conditions and the promotion of structural change. The 
latest setback caused by the second oil shock means that this 
policy must be pursued with even more determination, even 
if difficulties stretch over a fairly long period and pressures 
are mounting for a solution which is more demand-oriented. 
Since the market's steering function is crucial if the necessary 
adjustment processes are to operate efficiently, reception of 
the market signals as regards costs and prices should be as 
undistorted as possible. In this respect increased mobility of 
factors of production and the ability to compete will play an 
important role. 
If the adjustment process is to be as smooth as possible, it is 
important to contain inflationary pressures. In this respect 
the recent drop in the effective exchange rate of the German 
mark is exerting an unwelcome effect on domestic costs and 
prices. 
The present balance-of-payments position severely limits the 
room for manreuvre for tackling domestic economic policy 
. problems. Because of the scale of the burdens created by the 
latest oil price rises and the resultant international dif-
ficulties, the current account deficit is likely to be fairly large 
in the near future. It is therefore important that some 
improvement is seen to be underway and that the market 
succeeds in financing the current deficit by corresponding 
imports of capital. This would ease the external economic 
constraints on monetary policy and enable it to be more 
closely geared to domestic economic requirements. In this 
respect, the Bundesbank's target range for the expansion of 
central bank money stock gives sufficient flexibility for 
dealing with developments if and when they arise. 
Budgetary policy is presently directed toward the medium-
term reduction of the large public deficits. The essential poine 
here is to change the structure of expenditure and reduce the 
rate at which it is rising. The Federal Government draft 
budget for 1981 points in this direction and regional and 
local authorities too should comply with the recommend-
ation of the Financial Planning Council and control current 
expenditure more strictly. 
The task of mastering the structural adjustment process at a 
time of keener international competition and revolutionary 
high-risk technological change, lies primarily with the 
economy itself. Economic policy can only give assistance. 
What matters is that all sectors concerned with economic 
policy work together as closely as possible and that the 
necessary adjustments are not held up by group interests. 
The investment needed to convert productive capacity can 
Federal Republic of Germany 
only be forthcoming if the introduction of new technologies 
is not obstructed, if the greater risks are also balanced by 
greater opportunities and if the necessary mobility of the 
factors of production is accepted. Such a conversion process 
can also be expected to produce substantial positive 
employment effects which could undoubtedly outweigh the 
losses in the declining sectors. Labour market policy can use 
its range of instruments to help improve professional 
mobility, to promote retraining and training programmes in 
respect of new production techniques and processes, and to 
facilitate the reabsorption of specially disadvantaged groups. 
The energy situation has important macroeconomic impli-
cations. As long as epergy requirements are met to such a 
large extent by foreign resources, they constitute a genuine 
constraint on the balance of payments and on the future 
growth potential of the economy. It is important that 
decisions on these matters are taken and uncertainties 
removed. At the same time continuing attention should be 
given to measures which save energy and stimulate its more 
rational use, so as to bring about a new structure of 
consumption, particularly as regards reduced dependence on 
oil. 
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External disequilibrium in the Federal Republic of Germany 
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The external position of the Federal Republic of Germany 
showed a further appreciable deterioration in 1980. The shortfall 
on current account, which in 1979 moved into deficit 
(-DMIO 100 million) for the first time since 1965, grew to 
approximately DM28 200 million.I Given the relatively high 
surplus achieved in 1978 ( + DMl 7 500 million), the negative 
swing since the last oil-price rise, i.e. between 1978 and I 980. was 
some DM45 700 million. About DM28 500 million of this swing 
was due to the higher oil bill, although the volume of oil imports 
fell considerably. Thus, although an overwhelming part of the 
deterioration is attributable to the oil-price rise, other areas of 
the current account, mainly tourism and unrequited transfers. 
also contributed to the widening of the external deficit. 
Of the main components of the current account balance, the 
balance of trade showed a particular deterioration, due largely to 
the higher oil bill. Indeed, the surplus on non-oil trade in goods 
hardly changed over the last few years. The geographical 
composition of the trade balance, since 1978, has however shown 
quite marked changes. OPEC's share in the supply of oil to the 
Federal Republic of Germany fell considerably between 1978 
and 1980, while that of other oil producers, in particular the 
United Kingdom, followed at some distance by Norway, the 
Soviet Union and the Netherlands increased, the last named 
mainly supplying reprocessed mineral oil products or products in 
transit. The trade balance with the European oil-supplying 
countries (including the Soviet Union), deteriorated by some 
DMIO OOO million between 1978 and 1980, although the 
deterioration would have been higher but for the rapid expansion 
of exports to these countries. This contrasts sharply with the 
trend in German exports to OPEC, which fell by 20% in 1979 and 
which despite a considerable recovery in 1980, are not yet back to 
the 1978 level. A substantial proportion of the fall is explained by 
the sharp decline in exports to Iran, but other OPEC countries, in 
particular Saudi Arabia, expanded their purchases from the 
Federal Republic of Germany only gradually. In addition to the 
oil-price-induced burdens, the trade balance with the North 
American continent deteriorated appreciably, but rising sur-
pluses with European neighbours, especially Italy, France and 
Switzerland, more than off set this movement. Overall, the higher 
oil bill broadly matches the deterioration in the trade balance. 
The remainder of the deterioration in the current account 
between 1978 and 1980 (approximately DM17 OOO million) is 
largely due to the sharp increase in the deficits on services and 
transfers. The important factors here were in particular the 
persistent buoyancy of tourist travel, which in 1980 showed a 
deficit of approximately DM25 OOO million (DMI9 OOO million 
in 1978) and the sharp rise in the deficit on unrequited transfers. 
In I 979, the current account deficit was almost entirely financed 
by corresponding imports of capital: net private capital 
movements produced a surplus of some DMI I 200 million. 
See table. 
However, this process ran into considerable difficulties last year. 
Although in 1980 the public sector, in particular the Federal 
Government, borrowed abroad for the first time on a fairly large 
scale. raising more than DM21 OOO million mainly in long-term 
funds chiefly from the OPEC countries and the USA, the 
Bundesbank used about DM28 OOO million of its exchange 
reserves. There was a decisive move into deficit on overall private 
capital movements (-DM15 600 million) contrasting sharply 
with the surplus recorded in 1979. 
Companies and private individuals borrowed some DM8 500 
million net abroad in short-term funds in I 980, mainly financial 
loans, but this was more than matched by long-term net capital 
exports ( -DM14 400 million). In addition the credit institutions 
invested a further DM9 700 million net abroad in short-term 
markets. The swing into deficit of private long-term capital 
movements was attributable to the fact that the taking-up of 
long-term foreign loans fell sharply while portfolio investments 
showed a substantial net outward movement. Moreover, in line 
with the trend evident since 1975, German direct investment 
abroad was again much higher than foreign direct investment in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The main factor behind the marked deterioration in the balance 
of private capital movements from 1979 to 1980 is undoubtedly 
the level of interest rates abroad which were, in general. 
considerably above the German rates. For example at the end of 
1980, rates for short-term dollar investment stood at 201~ 
compared with the corresponding DM rates of 10%. Other 
factors, including political developments, both domestically and 
internationally, may also have affected capital flows and market 
sentiments on future exchange-rate movements. 
The above developments have put the German mark's exchange 
rate under considerable pressure. Within the EMS the mark 
moved for quite some time along its lower intervention point and 
at times required support under the EMS arrangements. Heavy 
intervention was also needed to check the mark's fall against the 
dollar. By the end of 1980, the mark had lost some 10% of its 
value against the dollar compared with the level of a year earlier. 
The exchange rate against sterling and the Japanese yen fell back 
by approximately 20% over the same period, while the German 
mark lost just under 1 % in value against the weighted average of 
the currencies participating in the EMS. The effective exchange 
rate of the German mark against 23 important trading partners 
was down by roughly 3,5%. At the beginning of 1981 the 
strengthening of the dollar accelerated and brought the 
depreciation over a twelve-month period temporarily to over 
20%. This induced the Bundesbank on 19 February to take 
special measures with a view to raising short-term interest rates 
and limiting further capital exports. 
The weakness of the German mark cannot be explained by any 
major change in the overall competitive position of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, as this has been improving recently 
against most countries given the lower rate of increase in prices 
and costs compared with those of its major trading partners. It 
can therefore be assumed that the underlying external position is 
likely to improve, once the adverse effects on the trade balaace 
resulting from the fall in the mark's exchange rate (J-curve) have 
worked through. In addition, when account is taken of the level 
of foreign reserves built up in periods of surplus and of the 
relatively low foreign indebtedness of the German economy, it is 
clear that the Federal Republic is able to spread the necessary 
adjustment over a longer period. As a result domestic short-term 
needs can be better accommodated and at the same time the 
Federal Republic could contribute to a smoother solution of the 
difficult international balance-of-payments problems. 'Extensive 
use of the Bundesbank's foreign exchange reserves can, however, 
only be justified if the breathing space it procures is used to chart 
a course for the gradual closing of the external gap. Nevertheless, 
the higher oil bill, a further net increase in the use of foreign 
services, growing international commitments and substantial net 
capital exports, together represent excessive strains on the 
German economy in the longer term, even though it is still 
distinguished by its industrial strength and efficiency. Nor does 
there appear to be any prospect that the Federal Republic of 
FR of Germany: balance of payments 
1972 
Trade balance (fob/cif) +20,3 
Mineral oil imports, net ( cif) -9,5 
Trade balance (fob/cif) excluding mineral oil +29,8 
Trade balance (fob/fob) 1 +26,7 
Services 2 -10,1 
Unrequited transfers -14,0 
Current account +2,6 
Long-term capital movements (exports - ) 
private +17,0 
public -1,5 
Short-term capital movements (exports - ) 
private -4,0 
public +0,5 
Total capital movements +12,0 
Residual items + 1,1 
Change in the Bundesbank's external position +15,2 
of which: change in valuation of reserves -0,5 
I Includ,ing supplementary trade items. 
2 Including the freight and insurance costs included in the cif value of imports. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Germany will in the near future again benefit from the 
favourable circumstances which followed the first oil-price shock 
in 1973/74, and be able to reduce con.siderably the current 
account deficit solely by expanding exports more rapidly. In 
addition, a drastic devaluation of the mark or the introduction of 
exchange controls with regard to individual balance of payments 
positions in heavyi deficit should be ruled out. Under these 
circumstances, the Federal Republic will be running a substantial 
balance of payments current account deficit for some time to 
come. This points to the need to finance the deficit at least partly 
by correspondingly high net capital inflows and by stimulating a 
restructuring of the use of domestic resources away from 
consumption and in favour of capital expenditure, innovation 
and energy saving. Such structural changes should be favoured 
by moderation in wage settlements, which are in tum conducive 
to investment, and a successful outcome to the present price 
stabilization policy. This would help to set the conditions for a 
gradual improvement in the current account of the balance of 
payments and restore confidence in the exchange markets. Such 
a development would permit the Bundesbank to rely less heavily 
on interest rates as an instrument of balance-of-payments policy. 
(DM OOO million) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
+33,0 +50,8 +37,3 +34,5 +38,4 +41,2 +22,4 +9,1 
-13,5 -29,2 -26,7 -32,6 -31,8 -29,3 -44,3 -57,8 
+46,5 +80,0 +64,0 +67,1 +70,2 +70,5 +66,7 +66,9 
+40,6 +57,4 +43,3 +42,0 +46,0 +51,2 +32,5 +20,1 
-12,7 -14,8 -15,5 -14,2 -18,3 -16,l -21,8 -24,1 
-15,6 -16,1 -17,9 -18,1 -17,9 -17,6 -20,8 -24,2 
+14,3 +26,5 +9,9 +9,7 +9,8 +17,5 -10,1 -28,2 
+15,2 -5,4 -19,4 -3,9 -11,3 +0,6 +12,0 -14,4 
-2,2 -0,9 +1,2 +2,4 -1,6 -3,3 -1,5 +19,3 
+0,1 -19,0 +4,2 + 1,0 +12,7 +7,2 -0,8 -1,2 
+0,3 -0 +0,7 -0,5 -0,5 + 1,3 -0,4 +1,9 
+13,2 -25,3 -13,3 -0,9 -0,8 +5,8 +9,3 +5,6 
+0,9 -3,2 + 1,1 +o +1,4 -3,5 -4,1 -5,3 
+ 16,1 -9,1 +3,3 +1,3 +2,6 +12,2 -7,3 -25,7 
-10,3 -7,2 +5,5 -7,5 -7,9 -7,6 -2,3 +2,2 
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Greece 
Trends and prospects 
Economic activity stopped declining towards the middle of 
1980 and picked up slightly in the second half of the year. 
Overall, gross domestic product in 1980 increased by 1,4% 
compared with 1979, thanks to an exceptionally strong 
contribution from agriculture. The upturn should be 
maintained in 1981 and growth should continue at a 
moderate rate, leading to a further increase of over 2% in 
gross domestic product. 1 
The marked slowdown in activity prior to this upturn had 
been caused by the combined effect of a sharp acceleration in 
price rises--itself reflecting the higher cost of energy and 
imported raw materials, the abolition of certain agricultural 
subsidies and the sharp depreciation in the exchange rate 
early in 1980-and of a restrictive economic policy. The 1980 
budget attempted to curb the increase in the deficit by 
containing the rise in current expenditure and by sharply 
reducing the volume of capital expenditure, while the growth 
of lending to the private sector was kept well below the 
increase in gross domestic product in value terms. In 
addition, the sharp rise during the year in interest rates on 
savings deposits helped to consolidate liquid savings to some 
extent. However, this restrictive stance is likely to be eased in 
1981 : budgetary policy will be much less rigorous in the field 
of current expenditure and above all in that of capital 
expenditure, and will lead to an increased deficit in relation 
to gross domestic product in value terms. Private sector 
lending is likely to keep broadly in line with this aggregate. 
Under these conditions, increased recourse to external credit 
will be necessary to compensate for the planned reduction, as 
a proportion of gross domestic product, in the expansion of 
domestic credit. Finally, incomes policy should exercise both 
a moderating influence on consumer expenditure and 
influence the distribution of value added in favour of 
investment by firms. thanks in particular to the measures 
which have been taken to limit wage and salary adjustments. 
The growth expected in 1981 should result both from the 
spread and strengthening of the upturn in domestic demand 
first noted towards the end of 1980, and from a continuing 
growth in exports. However, it is likely to entail some 
increase in imports, so that the real trade balance, which had 
improved appreciably in 1980, will again tend to worsen 
somewhat. 
Fixed investment, which was hit rather heavily by the 
recession (especially building investment), is likely to prove 
1 See table. 
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the most buoyant component of domestic demand in 1981. 
This upturn will be due above all, it would seem, to the shift 
in economic policy, which is mainly designed to stimulate 
such a recovery in order to meet the major requirements 
arising from the need to adapt the economy to the changed 
external situation. The appreciable increase in capital 
expenditure by general government and public enterprises, 
the relaxation of credit policy, particularly for the benefit of 
building and construction, and incomes policy, all reflect the 
desire to promote this component of demand, which is 
expected to lead the recovery. 
The upturn in consumption, on the other hand, is likely to 
prove limited. The easing of budgetary constraints will cause 
public consumption to accelerate somewhat, but private 
consumption is expected to increase only slowly. Despite the 
elimination of fiscal drag, the overall growth of incomes 
expected in 1981 should lead to only a slight increase in 
purchasing power, and the rise in deposit interest rates is 
expected to cause savings to stabilize at the relatively high 
level reached at the end of 1980. However, the continuing 
high rate of inflation is a factor of uncertainty and the pattern 
of development now forecast for nominal incomes, prices 
and savings may well be disrupted. · 
It is highly likely that the real external trade balance will tend 
to worsen again in 1981 following the recovery in 1980. 
Firstly, it would not seem possible for exports to increase 
more quickly than in 1980. Yet, even if the previous rate of 
export growth is simply maintained, this would mean, given 
the much weaker growth of world demand expected in 1981, 
an appreciable gain in market share which, however, is 
justifiable given present price competitivity and the new 
prospects opened up for agricultural exports by accession to 
the Community. Secondly, the upturn in domestic demand, 
and particularly of investment demand, which involves a 
high proportion of imports, and the first steps made, 
following accession, towards dismantling protection, should 
lead to an appreciable increase in imports, whose elasticity 
with respect to gross domestic product should thus return to 
the medium-term average. 
In view of the prospects outlined above, the employment 
trend should be relatively favourable. The numbers in service 
employment, in both the public and private sectors, should 
continue to increase steadily, while the growth in the 
industrial workforce should accelerate again after being 
temporarily checked by the recession. Nevertheless, ap-
parent unemployment is likely to increase somewhat, 
although it will remain at a very low level. 
Some progress should also be made towards reducing the 
rate of price increases. With import prices decelerating and 
the pressure of consumer demand likely to remain slight, the 
rate of consumer price inflation should slacken a little during 
the year. In addition, the next stage of the progressive 
alignment of agricultural prices with those in the rest of the 
Greece 
Greece: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
1970-79 1979 1980 19814 1979 1980 1980 19814 19814 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) DR 
OOO Mio 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1970 prices 
Private consumption 5,3 3,0 -0,5 1,5 962,6 
Public consumption 6,9 6,0 3,4 5,3 233,5 
Gross fixed capital formation 3,7 8,0 -6,0 3,4 366,1 
Change in stocks 1 2,6 1,2 2,0 2,0 44,1 
Domestic demand 5,0 4,0 -0,3 2,5 1 606,3 
Exports of goods and services 10,8 6,4 2,9 3,0 174,1 
Imports of goods and services 7,7 6,5 -5,0 3,5 349,5 
GDP at market prices 5,1 3,8 1,4 2,4 1 430,9 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 18,9 22,5 24,2 24,3 
Industrial production 7,6 6,0 0,5 3,0 -0,9 1,1 0,7 3,8 3,9 
Unemployment rate 2 2,3 1,9 2,0 2,1 
Compensation of employees 19,0 26,2 24,0 23,5 
M2 22,5 18,6 25,5 20,5 
GDP (implicit price index) 13,1 18,0 22,5 21,4 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 12,4 17,7 24,5 21,5 18,8 30,8 19,5 24,1 18,0 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) . 12,0 12,6 31,1 23,5 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 14,7 19,2 33,2 22,0 
Terms of trade -2,4 -5,5 -1,6 1,2 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
Trade balance (fob/cif) 
Current balance 3 
-12, 7 - 12,2 -12,5 
-2,8 -2,6 -2,9 
Net borrowing of general government 
I As% of GDP. 
2 Unemployment as % of total labour force. 
3 National Accounts concept. 
4 Forecasts. 
Sources: Eurostat; Commission and national services. 
Community should, in fact, have a smaller impact than in 
1980. The rate of inflation, at an annual rate, could thus 
come from the 25,5% of the last quarter of 1980 to 19,5% in 
the last quarter of 1981. 
Finally, the balance of payments deficit on current accouint, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, could well increase from 
2,6% in 1980 to 2,9% in 1981. 1 The deterioration is the likely 
t In national accounting terms, national concept. 
result of a significant worsening of the trade balance, 
although much of this should be offset by a further 
appreciable improvement in the balance on invisibles, in 
particular from transport, tourism and factor incomes. The 
increase in the trade deficit should, however, be practically 
limited to the protracted effects of earlier factors, as the 
additional deterioration in the volume movements should be 
minimal and the terms of trade, helped by the appreciable 
competitive edge enjoyed by most types of product, should 
remain broadly unchanged. 
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Greece: Industrial production (s.a.) 
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Problems of economic policy 
I 'I' I I, I , , 
80 81 
The Greek economy, having been affected by the recession 
much earlier than the economies of most industrialized 
countries, was in a better position than other economies to 
absorb the negative impact on its trade balance of the higher 
oil bill. Its early recovery may have the opposite effect in 
1981 , despite the opportunities for extending market shares 
offered by the economy's present high degree of competitive-
ness. In the short term, therefore, the external constraint 
makes it necessary for economic policy to limit the expansion 
of domestic demand. This constraint will only be eased 
gradually as world demand picks up, so paving the way for a 
progressively faster rate of growth sufficient to ensure full 
employment and permit the structural transformation 
necessary to adapt the economy to its new external context, 
and in particular to the changes resulting from the country's 
progressive integration into the Community. 
This situation presents two main problems. The first is to 
make sufficient room for investment under a policy designed 
to restrict total domestic demand, since structural adap-
tation requires an immediate acceleration in investment. The 
second is to control inflation as quickly as possible, since the 
economy's competitiveness, though quite sufficient in the 
immediate future, may shortly be jeopardized by a rate of 
inflation which continues to be markedly higher than that of 
the main industrialized countries. 
The present policy is designed to achieve these objectives 
simultaneously. It is relying on incomes policy to bring about 
the desired moderation both in the growth of nominal wages 
and salaries, and in the growth of private consumption. It is 
also using various budgetary measures and a relaxation of 
Greece 
domestic credit restrictions to give the necessary boost to 
investment. However, this policy seems likely to1 be more 
successful in stimulating investment than in controlling 
incomes and inflation. Thus the authorities, if they wish to 
fulfil their stated aim of avoiding a downward drift in the 
exchange rate and the likely resulting inflationary spiral, may 
well need to give a more restrictive stance to certain parts of 
their present policy. 
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France 
Trends and prospects 
Economic activity moved into a downward path in the 
second quarter of 1980 and, after a temporary interruption in 
the third quarter, the decline continued in the fourth. Even 
so, as a result of the growth already achieved at the end of 
1979 and the expansion recorded in early 1980, gross 
domestic product in real terms in 1980 was still 1,8% higher 
than in 1979, 1 although in the final quarter it was some 0,6% 
below the average for the year. 
After steadying in the early months of 1981 economic activity 
will probably tend to pick up slowly throughout the rest of 
the year. As a result of this slight improvement, real gross 
domestic product is likely to show an increase of, at best, 
0,5% between 1980 and 1981, although this would imply 
growth of I% in the course of the year. 
The present cyclical slowdown can be traced back to a 
number of external causes and in particular to the substantial 
increase in the cost of imported energy at the beginning of 
1980. In addition large increases in public service charges 
were introduced at the beginning of the year, additional to 
the general increases in the burden of taxation resulting from 
previous decisions taken by central and local government. 
Secondly, public debt policy, in line with the objective of 
reducing inflation, favoured the placing of large amounts of 
long-term debt with the public. This helped to reduce the 
liquidity ratio of the economy without, however, causing any 
significant increase in real interest rates and without the 
credit limits having any real restrictive effect on the demand 
for liquidity by firms. 
The stance of economic policy is not expected to undergo any 
fundamental change in 1981, even though, unlike in 1980, the 
effects of public finance policy will this year tend to have a 
beneficial impact on households' purchasing power. Factors 
contributing to this result include the stabilization of the tax 
burden, the cancellation with effect from February of the 
surcharge on social security contributions introduced in 
August 1979, the granting of financial assistance to farmers 
to compensate for the decline in their real incomes in 1980 
and additional financial assistance for families. Con-
sequently, the above measures will substantially raise the 
general government borrowing requirement. However, the 
1981 budget has placed strict limits on general government 
current and capital expenditure. The objective of monetary 
policy will continue to be the reduction of the rate of 
inflation, which implies not only a strong exchange rate but 
also a reduction in the liquidity ratio of the economy; in these 
1 See table. 
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circumstances, monetary policy could have a slightly 
restrictive impact on demand. Lastly, the authorities will 
endeavour to influence the trend of wages and salaries with 
the aim of stabilizing their real value. All in all, the economic 
policy adopted for 1981 is not therefore expected to provide 
any stimulus to demand. Indeed, the upturn in demand is 
expected to come from spontaneous factors, which may, 
however, be of internal rather than external origin since there 
seems to be no prospect of the anticipated revival in domestic 
demand being accompanied by any appreciable recovery in 
exports. 
Consumption is likely to be the major, and probably the 
initial, factor in any revival in aggregate demand. Public 
consumption, will continue to expand, albeit at a distinctly 
slower rate; private consumption will probably pick up again 
in the early months of 1981 and subsequently remain on a 
slightly upward path. This forecast does not assume any 
further fall in the savings ratio, which, on the contrary, may 
well remain at the level which it had regained during 1980. It 
is based, in essence, on likely improvement in the respective 
trends of prices and incomes. For the major part of 1980, the 
acceleration in the rate of consumer price increases meant 
that incomes were not adjusted quickly enough to keep pace, 
particularly in the early months of the year, and it was only 
because of a pronounced fall in the savings ratjo that the level 
of consumption was maintained until the third quarter. The 
converse is likely to happen in 1981, when transfer incomes 
are expected to show a real increase, taking the average for 
the year, while the deceleration in prices will probably tend to 
be sharper than that in incomes generally, during the year. It 
thus seems highly probable that private consumption will 
pick up even though the exact scale of the recovery is 
impossible to predict because of the continuing uncertainties 
regarding the trend of savings and that of prices. The 
forecasts adopted, point to a real annual increase of 1,3%, 
mid-way between those resulting from a more pessimistic 
assumption as regards savings or a more optimistic 
assumption as regards prices. 
Fixed investment, on the other hand, is likely to have an 
adverse effect on the trend in demand, taking the averag~ for 
the year. Public investment alone will continue to rise a little, 
with the increase for local government slightly exceeding the 
continuing contraction at central government level. Business 
investment, however, which has been declining since the 
second quarter of 1980, will probably maintain its downward 
movement in the early months of 1981 before turning 
towards the end of the year, producing an overall decline 
compared to 1980. The effects of the worsening financial 
position of firms and of the gloomier economic outlook, 
which led to the reversal in trend in 1980, are likely to be felt 
for some time to come and will give way only very gradually 
to a healthier economic and financial climate. The impact of 
planned long-term investment-in particular that by public 
enterprises-and the new forms of fiscal stimulus introduced 
in the 1981 budget should, however, be sufficient to prevent 
France: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
1970-79 1979 1980 19814 1979 1980 1980 19814 19814 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) FF 
OOO Mio 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
Private consumption 4,5 3,2 1,9 1,3 2,4 1,8 1,8 1,2 1,2 1 515 
Public consumption 3,3 2,5 2,6 1,5 2,6 2,6 2,4 1,2 1,2 361,4 
Gross fixed capital formation 2,7 2,5 2,2 -0,6 8,7 0,4 -0,2 -1,8 1,2 517,4 
Change in stocks I 1,5 1,6 1,7 1,1 2,1 2,0 1,5 1,0 1,2 39.7 
· Domestic demand 3,8 3,9 2,2 0,3 5,5 1,4 0,6 -0,2 1,5 2 433.5 
Exports of goods and services 8,7 7,3 2,8 0,2 9,7 0,6 0,6 -0,2 0,6 503,2 
Imports of goods and services 8,5 10,9 4,5 -0,4 13,1 3,0 -0,4 -1,0 0,8 506,J 
GDP at market prices 3,9 3,2 1,8 0,5 4,9 0,8 0,8 -0,2 1,4 2 430,6 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 13,4 13,9 
Industrial production 3,4 3,9 
Unemployment rate 2 3,3 5,9 
Compensation of employees 11,8 13,1 
M2 15,5 14,4 
GDP (implicit price index) 9,2 10,3 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 9,0 10,5 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 7,9 9,9 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 8,6 10,6 
Terms of trade -0,6 -0,6 
Trade balance (fob/cif) -1,3 -1,1 
Current balance -0,4 0,2 
Net borrowing of general government -0,1 -0,8 
I As% of GDP. 
2 Unemployment as ~~ of total labour force. 
3 Provisional estimates. 4 Forecasts. 
Sources: Eurostat; Commission and national services. 
any significant fall in investment. Investment by households, 
however, will probably continue to fall significantly under 
the impact of the rise in production and financing costs in the 
construction industry. 
A great deal of uncertainty surrounds stockbuilding. The 
tendency for firms to adopt a very cautious line over stocks, 
which did much to accentuate the decline in demand in the 
second half of 1980, will probably continue, at least until the 
third quarter of 1981, when a recovery is expected to get 
under way. In any event, the contribution of stock building to 
the annual growth in the volume of demand, which had been 
virtually neutral in 1980, is likely to be distinctly negative in 
1981. 
14,0 11,8 17,9 13,0 12,6 11,3 12,7 
-1,0 0,0 6,7 -3,3 -4,6 1,1 4,9 
6,3 7,3 6,0 6,2 6,4 7,1 7,5 
14,9 12,1 16,0 14,7 14,2 11,5 11,4 
10,53 10,0 12,6 12,4 9,2 10,2 9,8 
11,9 11,3 12,4 11,1 11,7 11,5 11,1 
13,5 11,8 12,8 14,3 12,8 12,2 11,4 
12,2 11,5 12,0 12,4 12,0 11,7 11,3 
19,3 14,0 18,0 20,0 18,6 15,0 13,0 
-5,5 -2,0 -1,2 -6,5 -4,5 -2,0 0,0 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
-3,1 -3,4 -2,5 -2,8 -3,4 -3,6 -3,4 
-1,3 -1,7 0,0 -1,0 -1,6 -1,9 -1,7 
-0,6 -1,8 -0,7 -0,4 -0,8 -1,6 -2,0 
In addition, economic activity is unlikely to receive any 
significant stimulus from movements in the real trade 
balance. In the second half of 1980, imports showed only a 
very moderate decline in response to the weakening of 
demand, and this would seem to provide confirmation of an 
unfavourable trend of import penetration, notably for 
consumer durables and for plant and machinery. Since a 
reversal in this trend is rather unlikely in the short term, any 
further decline in imports in the first half of 1981 is expected 
to be minimal and will probably be followed by an upturn in 
the second half of the year as domestic demand picks up. 
Taking the year as a whole, imports are expected therefore to 
show an insignificant decline overall compared with 1980. 
Exports showed little vigour in 1980, reflecting both the 
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France: Industrial production (s.a.) 
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slowdown in world demand and a contraction in market 
shares. A short-term reversal of this trend can hardly be 
expected, in spite of the improvement in sales by certain key 
sectors such as agriculture and the food industry, and heavy 
machinery. For 1981 as a whole, exports are therefore to 
show little or no increase over 1980, with this virtually 
unchanged situation masking, however, an initial downturn 
followed by a slow improvement. 
The outlook for activity in 1981 points to an emplorment 
trend that will bring, at best, a general levelling-off or. m()rL' 
probably, a slight fall in the number of persons employed. 
The continuing decline in employment in industry will 
doubtless not be fully offset by the slower expansion or 
employment in the services sector due primarily to the 
decision to allow no increase in the number of civil servants. 
In these circumstances, unemployment will probably rise 
more rapidly (average annual rate of 7 ,3% in 1981 , corn pared 
with 6,3% in 1980). 
Price inflation, on the other hand, will probably show a more 
satisfactory trend. The tendency for prices to climb less 
rapidly, discernible in the closing months of 1980 and 
momentarily disrupted by exogenous factors in the early 
months of 1981, will probably be resumed and may actually 
strengthen subsequently. 1 As the pressures built up under 
past price freezes disappear the effects of the fall in the prices 
of imported raw materials other than oil, and the weaker 
pressure of demand will probably serve to bring down the 
annual rate of consumer price increases from around 11 % in 
the first quarter of 1981 to around 8% in the last quarter of 
the year. This probability is, however, subject to a fair degree 
of uncertainty stemming from exogenous factors and from 
the behaviour of economic agents. 
Lastly, there would seem to be no way of averting a further 
deterioration in the balance of payments on current accowlf in 
1981. The deficit in 1980 was kept to 1,3% of GDP:! as a 
result of the substantial improvement in the balance on 
invisibles, which compensated in part the large increase in the 
trade deficit. A further, but smaller, improvement in the 
balance on invisibles will occur in 1981, but the trade deficit 
will probably continue to increase markedly under the 
impact of the further deterioration in the terms of trade 
attributable in large measure to the higher prices of imports 
invoiced in dollars. The current account deficit could 
therefore reach 1,7% of GDP in 1981 , a figure which 
presupposes that the major part of the effects of thL' 
deterioration in the terms of trade will appear in the first re\, 
months, to be followed by an improving trend during thL' 
remainder of the year. 
See graph. 
As defined in the ESA. 
France 
Problems of economic policy 
The outlook for 1981 is relatively satisfactory in that, unlike 
the situation in many other industrialized countries, it rules 
out the possibility of a recession. Nonetheless, whether it will 
become a reality depends in part on an international 
environment still subject to considerable uncertainty. But 
above all, no appreciable short-run improvement in the 
overall response of the economy to the external challenge can 
he discerned in these circumstances as witnessed by the very 
small contributions that the real trade balance is expected to 
make to the recovery in growth. 
The major problem confronting the economy would indeed 
seem to be that of competitiveness, a factor which will 
determine its capacity for future growth and, to a large 
degree, any eventual improvement in employment prospects. 
It involves not o.nly the difficulty of increasing shares of 
export markets but also, and perhaps more important, the 
domestic market's vulnerability to imports. The problem 
stems both from the unfavourable trend of real costs and 
from the fact that the structure of production has not 
sufficiently adapted to changes in the composition of 
aggregate demand. 
The containment of cost inflation is all the more urgent in 
that stability will, from now on, have to be preserved against 
the backdrop of an external environment in which rises in the 
prices of traded goods and services will probably slow down 
significantly. Budgetary and monetary stringency is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the required price 
deceleration. In addition, the authorities could well make 
greater efforts to impress more vividly on economic agents 
the prejudice, both individual and collective, caused by 
inflationary chain reactions and expectations, and influence 
their behaviour in such a way as to break the pattern. 
Exhortation could be backed up by even longer-term 
measures aimed at reforming certain economic and financial 
structures that help to underpin this inflationary pattern of 
behaviour. It would appear to be inconceivable that the 
principles underlying current price policy should be 
abandoned. On the contrary, this policy could lead to further 
measures aimed at increasing somewhat the role of market 
forces in price determination. 3 
As regards the reorganization of the structure of production, 
thL' policy of allowing free play, for the most part, to market 
i'lllTes and of confining government intervention to national 
L'11te rprises and to certain specific sectors has been largely 
successful. notably with regard to energy saving, the switch 
to alternative sources of energy, the development of high-
St.'i.: hu.\ ,ippi.:nded 'Lifting of price controls in France·. 
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technology industries and the rundown of obsolete produc-
tion capacities. On the contrary, however, certain measures 
favouring traditional industries have tended to delay 
inevitable conversion operations. On the other hand, the 
results obtained are more clearly manifest in the highly-
concentrated sectors of industry than eJsewhere. Thus, it 
would appear necessary now to strengthen the industrial 
fabric at the level of smaller firms. Since these are flexible in 
structure and creative in outlook, they'i have an eminent 
capacity for adapting to market developments that has not 
yet been fully exploited and which could be better used if 
certain administrative constraints were relaxed and if access 
to credit was made easier. Among other initiatives, the size of 
the appropriations in the 1981 budget for assisting this 
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category of firms is an indication of the extent to which the 
authorities are now preoccupied by this problem. 
Basically, the employment situation can be improved only if 
economic structures are strengthened and the economy 
becomes more competitive. But employment policy as such 
can be an useful adjunct. In this connection, the important 
measures taken to promote vocational retraining and to help 
young people to find jobs could be expanded with a view to 
matching initial training more exactly to labour market 
requirements and to introducing more flexible working 
hours. There is absolutely no doubt that the gains from such 
measures in terms of employment and productivity will 
justify the efforts made. 
Lifting of price controls in France 
After more than thirty years of controls that have at times 
resulted in prices being frozen, not to mention compulsory 
reductions, the lifting of controls first on prices in industry and 
then on the prices of certain services can be seen as a major 
turning-point in the direction of economic policy in the post-war 
period. I This complete break with the past is all the more 
conspicious in that it comes only shortly after the worst bout of 
inflation in France since the end of the war (with consumer prices 
rising by 51 % between 1973 and 1977), this period itself having 
been followed by a further upsurge in the prices of certain 
imports and by a broad-based escalation of inflation rates in 
most industrialized countries. 
The application of price controls during the lengthy period of 
economic growth up to 1973 was a fundamental and constant 
feature of economic policy. Generally speaking, budgetary 
policy and monetary policy were regarded as instruments that 
did not readily lend themselves to the task of restoring overall 
economic equilibrium. It was, in any case, acknowledged that 
little was known about their effectiveness over a period of time 
and that, in the short term, their effects on the trend of demand 
might create difficulties for firms and might lead to higher 
unemployment. For this reason, the authorities responsible for 
economic policy maintained in force the texts empowering them 
to exert control over price movements on the grounds that this 
provided them with an unrivalled instrument for curbing price 
rises. 
This power can be traced back to the Order of 30 June 1945 
('Charte des prix'), which applies to all goods and services, except 
those expressly excluded by the Order itself or by subsequent 
provisions. It manifested itself in a very wide variety of forms 
including price freezes, tax measures, 'controlled' and 'super-
vised' freedom to determine prices, contracts for stabilizing 
prices, 'programme contracts', contracts for combating price 
rises, and controlled annual price programmes. Generally 
speaking, the implementing provisions, which differed widely, 
enabled the arrangements to be tailored to the situation in 
individual branches of activity (to take account of their 
· productivity performances) and, in some cases, even to a 
particular firm's individual products. Lastly, the degree of 
compulsion for firms varied considerably over the years. 
Attempts to remove price controls were, however, always short-
lived for fear of triggering a fresh acceleration in price rises. 
The authorities responsible for economic policy deployed a 
number of arguments based on the observation that the French 
economy had special features that distinguished it from the 
economies in which the freedom to determine prices seemed to 
Controls on the prices of industrial products were lifted on 15 August 
1978, with the exception of two categories of goods, namely petroleum 
products, the importation and distribution of which have been 
governed.by special legislation since 1928, and such pharmaceuticals 
as qualify for reimbursement under the social security system. 
France 
produce excellent results. These special features fall into two 
categories. Firstly, it will be seen that one feature of the French 
economy is a very broad degree of indexation and that action on 
prices was a very effective way of using indexation to bring all 
nominal movements under control (particularly since firms 
tended to anticipate cost increases). Secondly, the laws of the 
market function imperfectly : more than half of expenditure on 
consumption goes on services in which there is probably no 
genuine competition, and public service charges are, in any event, 
fixed in the light of different criteria. And so, at best, competition 
probably operates only in respect of prices of industrial products, 
which are, to a variable but significant degree, themselves made 
up of prices that are broadly sheltered from competition. 
The present arrangements-under which industrial prices are 
free from any controls whatsoever, the prices of services have 
been extensively and progressively deregulated and public 
service charges are meant to reflect actual costs-have, for the 
most part, been instituted since 1978. It took several years for the 
realization to dawn that the period of rapid inflation since 1974 
had brought out more clearly the negative aspects of price 
controls, particularly in the wake of the significant changes in 
price structure that have occurred. In addition to being 
ineffective, price controls have, because of the element of rigidity 
they introduce into price formation, been found to have had 
numerous perverse effects on production and distribution: 
development ofnew products involving artificial innovations (to 
justify higher prices): discontinuation of unprofitable product 
lines (the prices of products that have been on the market a long 
time have become unrealistic as a result of not being adjusted 
sufficiently); compensation for inadequate profits on the 
domestic market sought through export prices; penalization of 
all firms and branches of activity unable to resort to the contrived 
practices· mentioned above (semi-manufactures or traditional 
products); lastly, firms that are large enough are tempted to 
invest abroad or, above all, to import goods (since, in the latter 
case, only mark-ups on the domestic market are subject to 
controls). It was for all these reasons that the French authorities 
decided to extend and entrench the various decisions to abolish 
price controls, the first of which date back to 1972. 
It is extremely difficult to ascertain just how the trend of retail 
prices may have been affected by the lifting of controls. This is 
because the period prior to deregulation was marked by a 
number of decisions (price freeze during the last quarter of 1976 
and adjustments in VAT rates in i 977) the effects of which 
hamper comparisons, as do the sharp increases in import prices 
registered since then, and in particular during the early months of 
1980. 
The statistical data set out below, which are taken from a study 
that was published recently in the French-language review 
Economie et statistiques (No 125), at least show that price 
deregulation has not engendered any surge in prices and that the 
latest increase in oil prices has, if anything, been absorbed more 
smoothly by the French economy than the previous increase. 
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1. Comparison of consumer prices over time (change through period) 
Composite index for France's main trading partners 
France 
1978 
6,3 
9,7 
2. Comparative increase over three typical periods 
All industrial products 
September 1973 
to March 1975 
23,5 
3. Compa~ative increase in the prices of industrial. products 
1979 
II 
Raw materials 12,8 6,9 
Wholesale prices (exclusive of tax) 6,2 2,5 
Wholesale prices of semi-manufactures 6,0 2,3 
Retail prices 2,3 2,7 
Source: IN SEE. 
1979 
10,6 
11,8 
III 
3,3 
2,7 
3,0 
2,8 
Increase 
between 1978 
December 1976 
to June 1978 
12,7 
IV 
9,8 
1,3 
2,0 
3,6 
and 1979 
4,3 
2,1 
1979 
36,9 
13,2 
13,9 
11,8 
First 
half 
of 1980 
6,3 
7,1 
November 1978 
to May 1980 
20,1 
1980 
II 
14,6 -18,7 
2,9 0,0 
2,5 0,6 
4,2 2,9 
The remaining controls on the prices of services are expected to 
be lifted in the coming months, marking the end of a long period 
of 'repressed inflation'. The future trend of costs and prices will 
then, irreversibly, have to be managed solely with the help of the 
macroeconomic instruments of budgetary and monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, the role played in cost and price formation by 
unjustified profit situations resulting from the absence of 
genuine competition in certain branches of activity will not have 
to be overlooked. In such cases, the authorities will doubtless 
endeavour to improve the working of the laws of the market. 
Ireland 
Trends and prospects 
The slowdown in economic act1v1ty which began in the 
second half of 1979 continued into 1980, despite a certain 
buoyancy of consumption in the first half of the year, a 
significant rate of growth of exports and a downward 
adjustment in imports. The major factor behind the low 
growth was a substantial fall in investment particularly in the 
first half of the year and a poor second half performance by 
the other components of demand. In volume terms, the 
increase in gross domestic product for 1980 as a whole is 
estimated at 0,8%. 1 
For the first half of 1981 the upturn of certain indicators, 
towards the end of 1980, such as cement sales and imports of 
equipment and raw materials, points to a certain recovery of 
growth and this will be further stimulated by public sector 
investment and by the slowing down in the rate of 
destocking. For the year as a whole these factors should 
boost the growth rate of gross domestic product to almost 2%. 
The more moderate trend in economic activity since the 
second half of 1979 has resulted from external factors 
superimposed on a cyclical downturn in the Irish economy 
from the substantial growth rates of the previous two years, 
when expansionary economic policy supported the recovery 
from the first oil-price shock. Over the past few years the 
execution of budgetary policy has not been as restrictive as 
originally intended. The general government deficit, as a 
percentage of GDP, for the three year period 1978-80, has 
been around the same high level as in 1975. The budgetary 
measures so far announced for 1981 promise a major change 
in the stance of budgetary policy. Monetary policy has 
restrained the growth of credit to the private sector, whilst 
permitting firms to borrow abroad for most of the year. In 
view of the gap in domestic and foreign interest rates, foreign 
currency borrowing has been expanding, a factor, in addition 
to public sector overseas borrowing, behind the rise in 
official external reserves in 1980 ( + IRL 371 million). 
Effectively therefore, monetary policy was geared towards 
financing rather than correcting the external deficit for most 
of the year. However, the termination with effect from 
October 1980 of the exemption from the 1980-81 credit 
guideline on foreign currency lending to residents has 
tightened up credit policy. 
Guidelines have been announced for the credit policy year to 
February 1982. It is likely that they will neutralize, as far as 
possible, any supplementary expansionary pressures which 
might arise from the execution of the budget, by maintaining 
upward pressure on interest rates. 
See table. 
Ireland 
The outlook fo r domestic demand as suggested is somewhat 
more favourable than the evolution in 1980. Judging from 
the budget, government consumption will be curbed in 1981 
but investment is likely to recover during the course of the 
year as the · recently published Investment Plan is im-
plemented. The diversity in trend noted in 1980, with 
significant increases in public investment counterbalanced 
by a large fall in private sector investment, is likely to 
continue in 1981 , although the downward trend in private 
investment may well come to an end. For the second year 
running, overall private capital formation is likely to be 
sluggish despite the continued high level of investment 
associated with the establishment of new industrial under-
takings in Ireland. However the modest profitability of the 
company sector, and high interest rates are likely to dampen 
new investment projects. Investment in construction, where 
some turnround was observed towards the end of 1980, could 
be more sustained than in equipment. 
Any increase in private consumption is likely to be modest 
given the projected behaviour of prices and incomes. 
Although the pay terms of the National Understanding 
provide for an approximately 12% rise in wage and salary 
incomes in 1981 , average earnings are expected to be 
markedly higher, at over 15%, due to structural movements 
(loss of jobs in lower-paid industries and strong growth in 
more specialized sectors) and an increase in overtime 
payments as production begins to recover. Income in 
agriculture is expected to grow by 5% as cattle prices rise due 
to a scarcity in supply, after a fall of over 10% in 1980. The 
other major positive factor on disposable incomes is likely to 
be the fall in the growth rate of personal taxation implied by 
the full-year effect of the 1980 tax measures, with taxes on 
personal incomes projected to rise by only 17% as against the 
36% figure recorded on 1980. Overall, disposable income 
could rise by some 15%, slightly lower than inflation. 
However a downward trend in the savings ratio is projected, 
due to the continued fall in real agricultural incomes, thus 
leading to a marginal increase in the volume of private 
consumption. 
Destocking, which contributed massively to the poor growth 
performance last year, could continue in 1981 but at a very 
much decreased rate so that the contribution of the change in 
stocks will be markedly positive. 
Export performance in 1980 appears to have been quite 
dynamic, taking account of the fall in export markets. 
However this was due mainly to the strong growth in cattle 
and beef exports, with industrial exports experiencing some 
slide in performance during the year. Forecasts for 1981 
assume a reversal in this pattern although this may not occur 
before the middle of the year. A continued gain in market 
share in expected due to the impact of new firms on Irish 
output and exports and the fact that these firms are less 
affected by cyclical trends than the existing and, on average, 
more traditional industries. The latter could be particularly 
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Ireland: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
1970-79 1979 1980 19816 1979 1980 1980 19816 1981 6 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) Million IRL 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1975 prices 
Private consumption 3,5 3,6 -1,0 0,3 -2,0 2,6 -7,0 3,6 1,4 4 550 
Public consumption 5,7 3,5 2,0 -1,5 2,0 1,0 4,0 -2,9 -4,0 1 450 
Gross fixed capital formation 5,4 15,6 -10,0 6,8 10,0 -15,9 -9,7 8,0 16,2 2 330 
Change in stocks l 1,2 0,9 -2,7 -1,3 -0,5 -3,4 -1,8 -1,8 -0,8 75 
Domestic demand 4,3 7,0 -6,0 2,9 -3,0 -8,0 -3,2 3,6 6,2 8 405 
Exports of goods and services 7,0 6,7 5,4 1,6 15,1 4,2 -1,1 2,5 2,4 3 943 
Imports of goods and services 6,9 14,7 -6,7 3,3 4,8 -12,2 ~6,0 5,9 7,9 5 113 
GDP at market prices 3,9 1,9 0,8 1,8 0,9 2,1 -0,l 1,5 2,8 7 235 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 17,8 15,4 15,8 16,2 7,4 21,8 10,8 18,1 12,9 
Industrial production 2 5,1 6,1 -1,0 4,0 3,3 2,1 -10,9 8,8 10,9 
Unemployment rate 3 7,1 6,0 6,0 7,4 
Compensation of employees 19,2 20,0 22,4 15,1 
M3 18,3 29,6 14,2 19,8 17,9 7,6 23,1 
GDP (implicit price index) 13,4 13,2 14,8 14,1 6,4 19,2 10,9 16,4 9,8 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 12,9 12,2 18,2 16,0 15,0 19,9 18,3 16,9 11,8 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 14,0 9,2 10,0 14,2 7,2 12,4 8,5 16,6 15,1 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 14,6 13,4 19,7 16,0 21,2 21,1 16,3 17,4 12,6 
Terms of trade -0,4 -3,3 -7,1 -1,3 -10,3 -6,0 -6,0 -0,5 2,0 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
Trade balance (fob/cif) -12,4 -18,4 -15,4 -17.6 -19,3 -15,3 -15,6 -17,0 -18,2 
Current balance -4,6 -10,1 -8,3 -11,4 
Net borrowing of general government 5 10,24 11,9 13.5 11.7~ 
As% of GDP. 
Transportable goods industries. 
3 Unemployment as% of total labour force, mid-April. 
4 1973-79. 
5 The net borrowing of general government amounts to 13,8% of GDP in 1981 if no account is taken of IRL 200 million private-sector participation in public investment, an item which 
according to standard definitions is not deductible. 
Forecasts. 
Sources: Eurostat; Commission and national services. 
hit by sluggish demand in the UK, a market which still 
accounts for one-third of Irish industrial exports. Agricul-
tural export volumes are forecast to decline by as much as 
10% due to the limited availability of suitable cattle. Imports, 
after the substantial volume fall registered in 1980, will pick 
up again through the year as destocking levels off and 
investment turns around. Nevertheless import elasticities for 
1981 with respect to final demand may be somewhat lower 
than previously experienced due to the contribution of 
agricultural stockbuilding to the change in demand, which 
has little effect on imports. This factor operated in 1980 to 
prevent an even more dramatic fall in imports. 
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The outlook for the recovery in activity in 1981 will not be 
reflected in any great improvement in the employment 
situation due to the consistent drop of numbers in 
agricultural employment. In addition the continued rapid 
growth in the labour force (at approximately 1 % per annum) 
means that unemployment, broadly defined, may continue 
rising in the early part of the year. 
Consumer prices, after slowing down through 1980, are 
projected to rise again significantly due to changes in excise 
duties. By autumn, given a greater stability of the exchange 
rate, the absence of new external price shocks and no further 
Ireland: Industrial production (s.a.) 
1975 = 100 
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build up in wage demands, inflationary pressures may abate. 
For the year as a whole the rise in the consumer price deflator 
is projected to fall to 16%. 
The current balance of payments will be substantially weaker 
than the result recorded in 1980 (deficit of 8,3% of GDP) 
because of some deterioration in the terms of trade, although 
at a less rapid pace than in 1980 and this, together with the 
factors mentioned above causing a weakness in agricultural 
exports, will increase the deficit to 11,4% of GDP. 
Problems of economic policy 
The prospects for the Irish economy in 1981 are not 
altogether encouraging. The outlook portrayed above is of a 
deterioration in the current balance of payments deficit to 
about 11 % of GDP, and thus higher than the forecasts for 
other Member States. Inflation is near the top of the range of 
Community countries and prospects for an early tapering off 
in the rise in consumer prices are uncertain. Although 
comparing relatively favourably to rates experienced 
elsewhere, growth for the· third year running is likely to be 
low py Irish standards and insufficient to bring about an 
improvement in the current unemployment situation. 
The main cause of the present slow growth is the stagnation 
in world trade. However, to some extent the weak 
performance can also be attributed to domestic causes. Thus 
in 1979 and 1980, although growth was sluggish and the 
effect of the terms of trade on real domestic income 
significantly negative ( - 1,9% in 1979 and - 3,5% in 1980), 
real compensation of employees grew markedly (by 6,9% and 
3,4% respectively), thereby affecting competitiveness and the 
current balance of payments. An additional factor which 
postponed the achievement of better external balance was 
the continued high level of the public sector deficit. Indeed, in 
order to avoid an unduly sharp deflationinthe economy, the 
government relaxed the very restrictive limits on spending 
which were originally outlined in the 1980 budget. The out-
tum for the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (EBR) was 
accordingly 14,5% of GDP instead of the budgeted 10,5%. 
Policy in 1981 is geared to supporting economic activity and 
protecting and generating employment. Severe restraint will 
be exercised on non-pay expenditure and indirect taxes have 
already been raised to cut back the current government 
deficit to just over 5% of GDP. An increase of36% in public 
investment is provided for, principally in the areas of 
infrastructural investment and industrial promotion. The 
EBR emerges at IRL 1496 million (15,4 % of GDP). 
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Participation by the private sector in public investment may, 
however, reduce this figure by up to IRL 200 million. 
Pay development in 1981 will be determined by the terms of 
the second National Understanding negotiated last year, 
which provided for a two-phased fifteen month agreement to 
apply for most of 1981. Basic pay rates under this agreement 
will rise by just under 12% in 1981 while average earnings 
could grow somewhat faster. Given the expected develop-
ments in prices this would imply some pressure on real 
incomes, compensating to a very limited extent for the 
considerable gains of the past few years. However even a 
growth in earnings of this order of magnitude has serious 
implications for competitiveness which would only be 
compounded if the second-phase review provision, to apply 
if the consumer price index in the period May 1980 to 
February 1981 exceeds 10%, was to result in an increase in 
the second phase of over the 7% provided for; 
Quantitative controls on private credit in the year to 
February 1982 were announced on 27 February. Given the 
borrowing needs of the public sector, interest rates are 
unlikely to show an,y tapering off as the expected recovery 
leads to increasing demand for credit from the private sector 
and the current balance of payments deficit tends to deplete 
liquidity. 
The growth in public sector external debt, if continued, coulc;l 
increasingly be felt as a constraint on economic management. 
Public sector indebtedness abroad has more than quad-
rupled in the past decade to reach a level ofIRL 3 OOO million 
(35% of GDP) at the end of 1980. Although Ireland entered 
the external financial market later than many other 
countries, interest charges on government debts held abroad 
already amounted to IRL 155 million per annum in 1980 and 
represented a persistent drain on the balance of payments 
and a significant burden on the current budget; in 1980 
interest payments abroad equalled just over 13% of the yield 
of total direct taxation. 
The longer-term prospects for the Irish economy are however 
significantly brighter than the short-term outlook. The 
success of the strategy introduced this year of shifting 
resources from current to capital expenditure, will, if 
continued over a period of years, add to progress already 
achieved on the supply side by attracting investment in high-
technology industries and stimulating the interest of 
entrepreneurs in selected areas with high growth potential. 
There will be a continued need for higher investment in 
infrastructure to complement this advance and for the more 
immediate requirement of the development of alternative 
sources of energy and its more efficient use. Progress in these 
areas can, however, only be achieved within the constraints 
presently posed by the need to- reduce imbalances on the 
external and budgetary accounts. 
Italy 
Trends and prospects 
The decline in economic activity which was first discernible 
in the spring of 1980 gathered a great deal of momentum in 
the summer but came to a halt in the autumn, giving way to a 
slight recovery. Because of the very high level of activity 
during the early months of the year, the volume of gross 
domestic product probably grew by nearly 4% between 1979 
and 1980, 1 but its level in the last quarter was slightly below 
the average for the year. 
Activity seems to have registered a further, albeit moderate, 
downturn in the first quarter of 1981, when it probably 
bottomed out. Indeed, a recovery is expected to get under 
way in the second quarter and to gather strength con-
siderably in the second half of the year. Because of the initial 
low level of activity, the volume of gross domestic product is 
likely to show a drop of nearly 1 % between 1980 and 1981, 
although its level in the last quarter should be more than 
1,5% above the average for the year. 
The present slowdown in the economy is due mainly to 
cyclical factors of external and internal origin but also to 
economic policy, which, in response to the acceleration in 
price rises and the widening of the external deficit in the wake 
of the second oil-price shock, was given a more restrictive 
bias during the course of 1980. Firstly, tax measures boosted 
the spontaneous growth in revenue by stepping up the 
campaign against tax evasion, streamlining the collection of 
certain direct taxes and increasing indirect taxes on two 
occasions, in July and in December. Secondly, on the credit 
policy front, the penalties intended to persuade banks to 
observe the credit expansion ceilings were stiffened in March 
with the ceilings themselves being tightened up in July 
although the effects of the tighter limits were largely offset by 
the possibility left open to firms to obtain finances from 
abroad. Finally, the tendency for the private sector to 
consolidate its savings has continued and has even ac-
celerated due particularly to the growing gap between the 
effective yield from public securities and that from deposits. 
These policies should be maintained in 1981, with no 
reflationary measures being planned to hasten or accelerate 
the recovery. In point of fact, monetary policy in 1981 is 
geared to bringing about a further significant reduction in 
the liquidity ratio of the economy by compressing further the 
total amount of credit expansion measured as a proportion 
of gross dbmestic product and by pursuing efforts to 
encourage the consolidation of savings. fn this context, the 
monetary authorities established, on 31 January 1981, 
1 See table. 
Italy 
especially strict limits for domestic credit for the current year, 
and fixed the ceiling for external credit used to finance 
imports at the level reached on 31 December 1980. Thus, 
despite the expected deterioration in the financial situation of 
the public sector-as a result, essentially, of automatic 
budgetary mechanisms-the recovery of the economy will 
not receive any stimulus from the current stance of economic 
policy. The recovery should occur spontaneously, due to the 
combined impact of a slow recovery in domestic demand and 
the improvement in the real trade balance. 
The outlook for the trend of domestic demand involves 
aspects that can be predicted with certainty and others that 
are more open to doubt. Public consumption will continue to 
show a steady, albeit moderate increase, and it is expected 
that, in early 1981, investment in building and construction 
will return to the growth path from which it was deflected in 
the second half of 1980. This forecast is based on the 
persistence of relatively sustained demand for private 
housing, on the exceptional reconstruction requirements of 
the disaster-struck areas in the Mezzogiorno, on the more 
rapid growth of public investment and on measures to 
promote the construction of subsidized housing. This set of 
factors is not expected, however, to offset the anticipated 
decline in business investment in plant and machinery and in 
transport, where the downward trend which emerged in the 
second half of 1980 in response to the gloomier economic 
outlook, the. fall in the rate of capacity utilization, the 
contraction in profits and the high level of interest rates, will 
probably continue throughout most of 1981. This trend 
should, however, be attenuated by the budgetary measures in 
favour of investment by public enterprises and by firms in 
which the government has a holding and it could well be 
reversed towards the end of the year if the recovery in the 
other components of demand is confirmed and if the 
financial situation of firms begins to improve. 
It would appear that the recovery in private consumption 
which is expected to get under way in the second quarter of 
1981 and to take a somewhat firmer hold in the second half of 
the year, is likely to be less vigorous to the extent that the 
decline in the second half of 1980 may prove to have been 
very moderate. Indeed, the contraction in disposable income 
and the increase in the savings ratio which caused that decline 
have been fairly slight and much less marked that the 
opposite trends recorded in the first half of the year. If the 
reversal in trend anticipated for 1981 is to take place, not 
only would real personal disposable income have to start 
growing again as at the beginning of 1981 (its growth having 
been interrupted during the final months of 1980) but the 
increase in personal savings would have to be rapidly halted. 
Both assumptions depend on the rate of deceleration in price 
rises from the end of 1980 onwards and, as a result, are 
subject to uncertainty. In this respect, it is a moot point, 
whether the lull in demand discernible since mid-1980 has 
been protracted enough and pronounced enough for the 
anticipated change in trend to take place at the beginning of 
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Italy: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicaton 
1970-79 1979 1980 1981 1979 1980 1980 1981 1981 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) LIT 
OOO Mio 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1970 prices 
Private consumption 3,4 5,1 4,5 -0,5 5,5 6,7 -0,8 -1,4 1,6 170 067 
Public consumption 3,3 2,7 2,1 2,0 2,8 1,8 1,8 2,2 2,0 42 395 
Gross fixed capital formation 0,4 4,5 8,3 -1,2 13,4 12,8 -0,4 -1,0 1,8 50 289 
Change in stocks l 1,5 1,9 3,5 1,4 2,5 4,7 2,4 1,1 1,8 7 945 
Domestic demand 2,9 5,8 6,5 -2,3 9,2 11,9 -5,7 -3,4 3,0 270 696 
Exports of goods and services 8,1 8,9 -4,7 3,0 3,8 -8,2 -5,3 6,1 5,7 68 579 
Imports of goods and services 6,7 14,0 6,4 -4,1 18,8 9,0 -8,8 -5,5 4,2 70 407 
GDP at market prices 3,3 5,0 3,8 -0,8 5,9 7,3 -4,9 -0,8 3,4 268 868 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 16,7 21,3 
Industrial production 3,4 6,4 
Unemployment rate 2 5,7 7,7 
Compensation of employees 19,4 17,8 
M2 20,3 20,3 
GDP (implicit price index) 13,3 15,5 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 13,0 14,9 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 15,0 17,6 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 17,0 18,4 
Terms of trade -1,7 -0,7 
Trade balance (fob/cif) -2,3 -2,0 
Current balance 0,5 1,6 
Net borrowing of general government -7,3 -9,4 
I As% of GDP. 
2 Unemployment as % of total active labour force 
Source: ISTAT. 
Sources: Eurostat; Commission and national services. 
1981. Nevertheless, the above assumptions are still plausible 
and, for the rest, their effect would be merely to push demand 
in the second half of 1981 back up to the level at which it 
stood in the first half of 1980, with the result that, taking the 
year as a whole, the volume of private consumption would be 
slightly down on 1980. 
Stockbuilding, which was a major factor in the decline in 
demand in the second half of 1980 particularly as it had, at 
the outset, risen to an abnormal level in response to 
inflationary expectations, is likely to contract further during 
the first two quarters of 1981 before expanding once again in 
the third quarter as final demand recovers and reverting to a 
normal level in the fourth quarter. 
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25,4 16,8 
4,9 -5,7 8,0 14,1 -14,1 -4,0 0,4 
7,6 8,0 7,6 7,6 7,6 7,9 8,1 
23,6 19,4 25,5 24,0 21,0 19,2 18,7 
12,3 13,1 
20,8 17,7 15,5 25,5 16,7 17,9 18,7 
21,2 18,7 17,1 24,4 19,1 20,l 16,0 
19,5 15,5 18,0 22,3 16,0 18, 1 10,4 
26,0 19,1 27,8 27,7 22,8 22,1 10,4 
-5,2 -3,0 0,2 -0,9 0,6 -1,1 1,3 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
-5,9 -4,9 
-2,5 -1,4 -0,1 -2,3 -2,7 -1,4 -1,5 
-7,8 -8,4 
However, the main stimulus to activity, at least during the 
first half of 1981, will probably come from the underlying 
improvement in the real trade balance. This tendency, which 
was first discernible in the fourth quarter of 1980 I under the 
combined effect of a substantial fall in imports and a slight 
recovery in exports, should become much more distinct in 
1981. Imports, which, for reasons partly to do with 
speculative behaviour, reached an exceptionally high level 
during the first few months of 1980, subsequently fell sharply 
in response to the downturn in demand. The probability is 
that imports will virtually mark time during the first quarter 
I See graph. 
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Italy: Unemployment (s.a.) 
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of 1981 and will pick up again only in the second quarter, 
though this forecast implies a stable degree of import 
penetration at a level slightly above that recorded in the last 
quarter of 1980. The recovery in exports, which began in the 
fourth quarter of 1980 following the sharp drop during the 
previous three quarters, is also expected to continue in 1981 . 
The prospect of a revival in exports presupposes not only a 
strengthening of the underlying recovery in world trade 
during the year, but also a significant expansion in market 
share. This is a quite plausible assumption given not only the 
geographical pattern of exports but also the exceptional 
factors which contributed to the downturn in 1980, namely 
the boom conditions on the domestic market, the sharp 
contraction in oil refining after its exceptional expansion in 
1979, and the fall in exportable agricultural surpluses after 
some poor harvests. The anticipated reversal in trend will, 
however, depend partly on the ability of exporters to 
strengthen their position on markets (notably within the 
Community) where their competitiveness has tended to flag 
and does not seem likely to improve again easily. 
The slow recovery in activity which seems likely in 1981 will 
probably allow only a slight increase in total employment. 
The number of persons employed is likely to show a slight 
decline, in fact, in industry and to grow at an appreciably 
slower rate in the marketable services sector. Under the 
circumstances, unemployment, which started to climb again 
slowly in the second half of 1980, 1 is expected to continue to 
rise in 1981 , to reach a rate of around 8% by the end of the 
year. 
In contrast, there will probably be a deceleration in price 
rises, helped by the slackness of domestic demand and by the 
slower rise in import prices. Thus, the rate of increase in 
consumer prices, expressed as an annual rate, is expected to 
fall from about 23% in the last quarter of 1980 to 17% in the 
last quarter of 1981. Following a fresh upsurge in January 
attributable to the bunching of a number of increases in 
public sector prices, the underlying slowdown that was 
already discernible in December 1980 is likely to resume as 
from February-March 1981. However, whether or not this 
forecast is fully realized will depend on a number of factors 
associated with the uncertainty surrounding the behaviour of 
firms as they come to terms with the relative slackness of 
demand. 
Some improvement is also expected in the current account 
balance, where the deficit could well be reduced, as a 
percentage of GDP, from 2,5% in 1980 to 1,4% in 1981. This 
expected reduction is all the more significant as the 
improvement in the real trade balance will be partly offset by 
a further deterioration of the terms of trade as a result not 
only of the recent rise in oil prices, but also of a full year's 
effect of the fall in the external value of the lira which has 
See graph. 
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occurred since the spring of 1980. The present forecast 
assumes, however, that no further deterioration in the terms 
of trade will occur beyond that which has already taken place 
at the start of the year. The fulfilment of this forecast is, 
therefore, dependant on the future movement of the effective 
exchange rate-a factor which is subject to great uncertainty. 
Problems of economic policy 
In view of the situation created by cyclical developments in 
1980, and given the medium-term targets for restoring 
internal and external equilibrium, which act as constraints on 
economic policy, it would be a relatively satisfactory 
outcome if the economy developed in 1981 along the lines 
described above. This result depends on the fulfillment of 
certain plausible, yet favourable conditions, and a less 
satisfactory outcome can be expected if one or other of these 
conditions is not met. Some of the conditions relate to the 
international environment, over which the authorities have 
no control, whilst others are associated with the behaviour of 
economic agents, which the authorities are able to influence 
inter alia by demand management policy. 
The crucial problem here is to bring inflation under control. 
In the short term, a slowdown in inflation will be the 
determining factor both in the continuing competitiveness of 
the economy and in the revival of domestic demand. This is 
because it will help directly to stabilize the savings ratio after 
the rise stemming from the reconstitution of real balances, 
and it should have an indirect effect via a lowering of interest 
rates and, consequently, an easing of credit conditions for 
firms. A slowdown in inflation is also necessary if the 
mechanisms for allocating the factors of production are to 
function properly. The economic outlook-both in the 
immediate and in the longer term-will therefore be all the 
brighter the more pronounced the slowdown in price rises. 
Inflation is expected to slacken in 1981 in any event. The 
authorities have demonstrated the fundamental importance 
they attach to this objective, and there are grounds for 
thinking that they will not depart from the counter-
inflationary strategy which they have devised for 1981 , and 
of which major elements are the limiting of the general 
government borrowing requirement and total domestic 
credit to some 8% and 16% of gross domestic product 
respectively, achieving exchange-rate stability and kt-eping 
interest rates at sufficiently high levels to guarantee such 
stability. However, because of the need to preserve the 
competitivity of the economy, the authorities will probably 
attempt to supplement this strategy with action on the wages 
front, the aim being to wind down the wage-price spiral. 
In accordance with the guidelines set out in the Three-year 
Plan, action by the authorities should also develop in another 
direction, that of adapting the structures of the economy to 
the new conditions governing economic growth. The Plan 
proposes a reduction in the dependence of the. economy on 
external supplies for the sectors of fuel and food, an 
improvement in the allocation·of resources in those sectors 
suffering a crisis, the use of the resulting room for manreuvre 
to raise the level of socially-useful services (housing, public 
health, transport), and the expansion of output and 
employment by encouraging, in particular, the strengthening 
of the industrial base in the South, the restructuring of 
industry around new technologies and the modernization of 
the distributive system. In many cases, detailed programmes 
have been drawn up and some have been given the legislative 
bases necessary for their implementation. However, the 
implementation of these programmes may be delayed by 
administrative or political difficulties, as has often happened 
Italy 
in the past. The authorities will have to make an effort, 
determined at times-and in particular in the energy sector 
(see appended box on Italy's energy plan)-to overcome 
these difficulties, and will have to earmark large-scale 
resources to ensure that the necessary finance is available. 
Increased stringency in the management of current expendi-
ture will, in these circumstances, be necessary if, as is foreseen 
in the Plan, these requirements-together with those related 
to the reconstruction work required in the regions affected by 
the earthquake of November 1980-are not to lead to a 
further increase in the tax burden. Nevertheless, the 
authorities plan to cover a significant proportion of the 
expenditure involved by increased public sector borrowing 
abroad. 
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Italy's energy plan 
Primary energy consumption in Italy totalled 144 million toe in 
1979, with the degree of dependence on energy imports 
amounting to about 83%. Electricity generation from hydraulic 
power was only 10 million toe and that from nuclear power 
0,6 million toe. With coal and natural gas contributing some 
34 million toe, oil accounted for the largest share (68~;,) of 
consumption in 1979. 
In 1980, Italian imports of energy products came to more than 
LIT 22 500 OOO million. This figure, which was 25% up on the 
previous year, amounted to 26% of the value of total imports for 
the year. In addition, the deficit on trade in energy products (LIT 
18 500 OOO million) was virtually identical to the overall trade 
deficit (LIT 18 700 OOO million). 
This situation has prompted the Italian authorities, in the 
context of the medium-term plan for 1981-83, to concentrate on 
drawing up an energy plan. 
I. The objectives for 1990 
Under the energy plan, the main objectives for 1990 are as 
follows: 
(a) a vigorous policy to promote energy saving and a more 
rational use of resources in all sectors of consumption, the 
aim being to limit energy demand to 200 million toe ; 
(b) reducing dependence on oil from 68% in 1979 to some 50% of 
total energy requirements (100 million tonnes of crude oil 
imports) through the development of alternative and 
competing sources of energy; 
(c) maximum utilization of national energy sources; 
(d) reducing supply risks through divefsification of sources 
and of supplying countries and through the build-up 
of appropriate reserves. 
The promotion of energy savings (some 20 million toe/year by 
1990) is seen as the basic objective of the Italian plan: it 
presupposes that measures aimed at curbing the growth or 
energy consumption, while at the same time allowing 3%-3.5% 
annual growth in gross domestic product between now and 1990, 
will be completely successful. 
2. Energy saving 
(a) Civilian and residential uses 
The introduction of 'heating service' contracts under which 
professionals in the trade would manage heating systems is seen 
as a key component of the policy encouraging energy conserv-
ation in the home. 
In new buildings, application of the standards which already 
exist (Law 373/76) will result in savings of the order of0,2 million 
toe/year. However, the introduction of new building and 
material manufacturing techniques should make it possible to 
achieve more substantial results. 
Lastly. energy savings that can be achieved in the home and in 
the services sector through the proper use of electrical household 
appliances that are better designed from the viewpoint of energy 
consumption are put at some 1,8 million toe/year. 
(b) Industry 
Industry has, in recent years, managed already to hold down 
somewhat the increase in its energy consumption; further 
savings can be achieved only if existing incentives (Laws 675 and 
655) are improved. The aim of other, more general provisions is 
to set up energy-conservation agencies and in particular to 
establish an 'energy diagnosis' service for small and medium-
sized industrial firms. The plan also features a programme for the 
training of experts and technicians in energy management. the 
carrying out of demonstration projects, the dissemination of the 
results obtained, and the introduction of financial incentives for 
investments designed to save energy. 
(c) Transport 
Savings can be achieved here only if there is an improvement in 
the energy efficiency of vehicles and in transport structures. The 
reductions in consumption which seem possible by 1990 will 
come from the rationalization of transport and a reduction in 
specific vehicle consumption. Provision is made for incentives to 
encourage the development of prototype vehicles with low 
energy consumption and their subsequent manufacture and to 
improve the energy efficiency of existing means of transport. 
Measures to promote district heating are also planned. All in all, 
the plan provides for financial incentives amounting to LIT 
9 OOO OOO million up to 1990, including LIT 2 800 OOO million for 
the period 1981-83. 
3. The main sources of energy 
Requirements in 1990 (200 million toe) are expected to be met as 
follows: 
Domestic production (35 million toe) 
- Nuclear power . 
Hydrocarbons . 
of which: -- natural gas . 
- oil. 
- Coal .. 
- New energy sources. 
10 million toe 
9,2 million toe 
6, 7 million toe 
2,5 million toe 
2 million toe 
2 million toe 
Hydroelectric and geothermal power 11,6 million toe 
Imports (165 million toe) (total dependence = 72.5" 0): 
Coal . . . 34 million toe 
Natural gas 30 million tnc 
Oil (to make up total requirements) IOI million toe 
(a) Coal 
Under the plan, the proportion of consumption accounted for by 
coal is to rise from 8% in 1979 to 18% in 1990. The increase in 
coal consumption will mainly involve power stations but will also 
apply, to a lesser degree, in industry. 
Since domestic production in 1990 is put at some 4 million 
tonnes, it will be necessary in that year to import 55 million 
tonnes of coal. 
(b) Natural gas 
With the construction of the Algeria-Italy gas pipeline, which 
will be completed in 1985 and will then enable 12 OOO million m 3 
of gas to be imported annually, the amount of natural gas 
available each year will rise to 35 OOO million m3 in 1985. By 
1990, additional imports of 10 OOO m3 a year will be necessary to 
reach the target of 45 OOO million m3 a year. 
Annual natural gas consumption is thus expected to increase 
from the present level of 22,9 million toe to 37 million toe by 
1990, i.e. to 18% of energy consumption. 
(c) Nuclear energy 
Despite successive delays, nuclear energy is expected to account 
for 10 million toe by 1990, as against 0,6 million toe at present. 
and this means the construction of at least four additional stages 
each of I OOO MW in addition to the Montalto di Castro powcr-
station. A number of initiatives must therefore be taken by the 
public authorities, particularly with regard to : 
- plant safety, 
- selection of sites and location of power-stations, 
- a standard power-station plan. 
Italy 
Investment in the nuclear sector in the period 1981-90 is expected 
to total LIT 12 750 OOO million, more than LIT 9 OOO OOO million 
ol' which will be used solely for the construction of nuclear 
power-stations, the remainder being divided between research 
and dcvelopm~nt activities and the various phases of the fuel 
cycle. 
(d) Oil 
The two main objectives under this heading are: 
( I ) to ensure continuous and regular supplies while minimizing 
costs; 
(2) to bring about a gradual change in the structure of supplies so 
as to make them less oil-dependent and more flexible. 
In quantitative terms, this will involve imports of crude oil and of 
petroleum products amounting to about I 00 million tonnes in 
1990; however, before then, and more particularly towards 1985, 
the 100 million tonnes mark will be passed since substitute 
sources of energy will not yet have been sufficiently developed. 
Investment for the period 1981-90 is expected to amount to LIT 
17 150 OOO million. 
(e) Renewable sources 
The Italian plan provides for increasing use of renewable sources 
(solar energy, wind energy, hydroelectric power, geothermal 
power. biomass and other alternative fuels) more as part of the 
rational use of energy and not so much for the contribution they 
can make to electricity generation, which will remain slight. 
It is mainly in the fields of geothermal and hydroelectric power 
that the relevant investment might be expected to assume 
significant proportions. 
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Luxembourg 
Trends and prospects 
The slowdown in economic activity from the second quarter 
of 1980 was sharply accentuated by the general slackening of 
export demand, and in particular by the crisis in the steel 
industry. For the year as a whole, the index of industrial 
production was 3,3% down with steel production alone 
showing a 4,1% fall. However, real gross domestic product 
was still some 0,5% up, mainly as a result of a moderate 
growth in the services sector. 
Because of the persistently depressive effects of export 
demand in particular, the outtum for industrial production, 
as an average for 1981, should be very much lower than the 
year before. The upturn expected later in the year should 
prove fairly modest. All in all, real gross domestic product in 
1981 could be some 1 % down on 1980. 
The growth of private consumption should again fall back 
because, as in 1980, per capita wages in the corporate sector 
will increase more slowly. Presumably the moderation of 
wage costs envisaged in several competing countries will 
encourage management and unions to agree to limit the rise 
in real wages, in order to preserve the country's competitive 
position. The savings ratio, already up last year, could go 
Luxembourg: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
Private consumption 
Public consumption 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Change in stocks 1 
Domestic demand 
Exports of goods and services 
Imports of goods and services 
GDP at market prices 
GDP at current prices 
Industrial production 
Unemployment rate 2 
Compensation of employees 
M2 
GDP (implicit price index) 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 
Terms of trade 
Trade balance (fob/cif) 
Current balance 
Net lending ( +) or net borrowing ( - ) of 
general government 
l As% of GDP. 
2 Unemployment as% of total labour force. 
3 Forecasts. 
Sources: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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1970-79 
4,3 
3,3 
3,7 
1,2 
3,9 
3,2 
4,7 
2,7 
9,9 
0,4 
0,3 
13,5 
7,0 
6,3 
6,9 
7,7 
-0,5 
-2,4 
18,5 
2,5 
1979 1980 19813 1979 1980 1980 19813 19813 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) LFR 
OOO Mio 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1975 prices 
3,6 1,8 1,2 2,8 1,6 1,2 71,2 
3,5 2,1 1,4 3,8 1,7 1,1 18,8 
2,9 2,7 0,6 4,1 2,8 1,4 31,7 
-1,7 -1,7 
0,5 4,9 -0,1 2,0 6,7 4,3 119,9 
9,1 -1,4 0,3 3,8 -3,2 -3,0 102,6 
5,2 3,5 1,4 4,5 3,6 2,3 101,4 
3,6 0,4 -1,0 1,7 0,3 -0,6 121,l 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
10,9 4,9 5,7 
3,3 -2,5 -6,0 -0,2 -2,6 -4,6 
0,7 0,7 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7 
10,0 10,0 8,2 9,7 10,4 9,5 
7,0 4,4 6,7 
5,8 6,3 6,3 6,6 6,2 6,2 
10,1 4,0 7,5 6,5 2,7 4,3 
8,4 8,5 9,0 8,9 8,3 8,6 
0,6 -3,4 -1,3 -2,2 -5,2 -4,0 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
-8,1 -15,7 -18,4 
28,7 20,9 . 18,0 
0,1 -0,9 -2,1 
,J 
Luxembourg: Industrial production (s.a.) 
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Luxembourg 
higher in 19 1, since the less-favourable short-term prospects 
should enco rage households to be cautious. 
General gov rnment consumption in nominal terms advanced 
fairly vigor sly in 1980. Although public sector recruitment 
is being hel down, this trend is likely to continue in 1981 , 
reflecting a 2% pay increase effective from 1 January, and 
more frequ nt triggering of the indexation mechanism. 
Public inves ment, fairly buoyant in 1980, will be slightly less 
so this year 
Activity in residential construction began to slow down . 
appreciably in the second half oflast year, and will probably 
continue to o so in 1981. Developments in this sector could 
be affected y the moderate growth of incomes foreseen as 
well as th high level of interest rates and the greater 
profitabilit of other placements. 
The expans on of corporate investment proved weaker than 
forecast in 1980, mainly because of delays in executing 
investment programmes in the steel industry and in new 
firms. In 19 1, the propensity to invest is likely to be affected 
by lower ea acity utilization rates and less-favourable short-
term expec ations. The volume of corporate investment is 
likely to st growing, especially since the steel industry has 
revised its riginal programme downward. 
Luxem urg: Consumer prices 
Change e pressed as an annual rate 
% 
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As a result of the sharp drop in steel sales abroad, exports 
declined last year and on the whole there seems little chance 
of improvement in 1981. Imports went on expanding 
vigorously in 1980. The signs of deceleration which became 
evident towards the end of the year will grow stronger in 
1981, because of the weakness of private consumption and 
investment. The very appreciable deterioration in the terms 
of trade, caused in 1980 by the combined effects of higher 
prices for energy products and lower prices for steel 
products, will continue in 1981 but at a more moderate rate. 
The prospects for employment are not very favourable. The 
numbers employed in industry will fall, and reduced 
recruitment must be expected in the services and general 
government sectors. The unemployment rate will neverthe-
less still be very low in comparison with that of the other 
Member States (1 % as against an average of 7 ,3 % for the 
Community as a whole). 
Despite the fairly strong upsurge in consumer prices, 
stimulated in particular, at the beginning of 1981, by a rapid 
increase in import prices in the preceding months, the 
average rise for the year could well be comparable with the 
1980 rates, i.e. 6,3%. 
The balance of payments on current account should close 
with a substantial surplus as it did last year, corresponding to 
18% of gross domestic product. Nevertheless, this out-turn 
conceals a growing deterioration in the trade balance, which, 
seriously burdened by an ever-higher oil bill, is likely to move 
from a LFR 1 300 million surplus in 1979 to a LFR 10 600 
million deficit in 1981. The development of the net balance of 
factor incomes, which depend mainly on the banks' activities 
in Luxembourg, remains uncertain due to the wide 
fluctuation in interest rates on the international markets. 
Problems of economic policy 
The relative importance of industry has tended to fall in the 
Luxembourg economy: this trend which is one of the striking 
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aspects of economic developments in recent years, has 
definitely strengthened as a result of the crisis in the steel 
industry. The jobs lost in this sector between 1970 and 1980 
were offset by jobs created in new industrial firms and above 
all in the services sector - essentially in banking - and this 
made it possible to hold unemployment at an extremely low 
level. It is not, however, certain that such a situation can be 
maintained indefinitely: the expansion of employment is 
tending to slow down inmarket services and the same is likely 
to be true of the public sector because of budgetary 
constraints. 
Because of the weakening of export demand, the problem of 
maintaining competitiveness has become more urgent for 
Luxembourg firms, as it has for most European firms. The 
rise in costs will have to be in line with the trend observed in 
competing countries, and wage negotiations between 
management and unions in concert with the government are 
of particular importance in this respect. 
It is particularly essential for Luxembourg firms to 
strengthen their competitive position since they are, for the 
most part, of average size and hence more dependent on the 
prices charged by their competitors. Moreover, a good many 
of them do not have the resources to finance research into 
new products; in order to increase their profitability they are 
therefore compelled either to ~onfine themselves to improv-
ing traditional products, or to buying patents and licences. 
Added to this problem is that of the diversification of 
Luxembourg industrial production, which must be actively 
pursued if the above-mentioned tendency for unemployment 
to increase is not to continue. 
Lastly, the public finance trend shows a remarkable change 
which gives no cause for immediate concern but nevertheless 
needs to be watched. Up to 1979, and mainly because of the 
growth of incomes in the services sector, higher tax receipts 
meant that budget equilibrium could be maintained despite a 
sharp increase in expenditure. For the years 1980 and 1981, 
the public deficit will probably be some 1 % and 2% of gross 
domestic product respectively. This deterioration means that 
there is less room for manoeuvre for budgetary policy to help 
to strengthen the production potential. 
Netherlands 
Trends and prospects 
The relatively favourable economic picture at the beginning 
of 1980 was replaced, in the second half of the year, by an 
appreciable slowdown in activity. As a result, for the year as 
a whole, the growth of real gross domestic product is very 
small and unemployment has increased significantly. 1 
Although these developments are largely attributable to the 
downturn in export demand caused by the deterioration in 
world economic activity, they also reflect the weakness of 
domestic demand. Real incomes have been eroded by 
measures to limit the rise in wages, and by heavier taxation 
and social security charges, and thi~ has had the effect of 
reducing consumer demand. In addition, the swollen public 
sector deficit has imposed a restrictive stance on budgetary 
policy, though this did not stop general government net 
borrowing in 1980 from going well above the previous year's 
amount. Lastly, the objective of monetary policy has been to 
limit domes.tic liquidity creation . . Interest rates, largely 
determined by the international market, stayed fairly high, 
another factor being the public sector's heavy calls on the 
capital market. 
For 1981, a reduction of approximately 0,5% in real gross 
domestic product was assumed. This figure implies a certain 
upturn during 1981 to follow the sharp fall in the second half 
of 1980. The upturn would, however, be only limited in scale. 
In fact, external economic activity can only be expected to 
produce limited stimuli. As in 1980, restraining effects could 
also come from economic policy, which is centred on 
restructuring the Netherlands economy in the medium term. 
In order to hold down wage costs and irpprove company 
profitability, the automatic working of the indexation 
mechanisms was partially interrupted for the first half of 
1981. The impact of this measure was only partly offset by 
income tax cuts, which mainly benefited the lowest paid. The 
curbing of the structural growth of public expenditure forms 
part of the same policy. 
Of the aggregates of demand, only general government 
consumption will show some increase in real terms, whereas 
the volume of public investment will fall. Particularly 
important here is the difficult financial situation of the local 
authorities, which are responsible for the bulk of this 
investment. 
The fall will be much sharper for private investment. It will be 
particularly perceptible in residential construction, partly 
because of pessimism concerning income expectations, and 
See table. 
Netherlands 
the high level of interest rates. A notable result of these 
factors has been the accumulation of a considerable stock of 
unsold dwellings in the non-subsidized sector. Similarly, a 
distinct fall in corporate investment must be expected, both 
in industrial and commercial buildings and in plant and 
machinery. Despite the slower rise of costs which is bound to 
result from wage restraint, the investment climate is still very 
depressed. The sales outlook still remains generally poor, 
while the financing problems posed by the high level of 
interest rates are also important. In addition, structural 
difficulties are hampering financing by means of risk capital. 
As in 1980, the volume of private consumption must be 
expected to decline, despite some fall in the savings ratio. Not 
only will consumer durables be affected, but a distinct fall in 
tourism is also feared. The per capita wage and salary bill is 
forecast to rise by only 5,5% in the private sector; because of 
the exceptional measures restricting expenditure, the rise in 
civil servants' salaries should be only 0,5%. Consequently, 
and given a foreseeable increase of over 6% in the price of 
private consumption, real disposable income as a whole will 
be reduced further. 
After last year's downturn, exports could pick up in the 
course of 1981 as world economic activity improves. On 
average for the year, however, the volume of sales is still 
forecast to fall slightly, since the bulk of exports go to other 
Community countries, and are heavily dependent on 
economic activity in those countries, particularly in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and in Belgium. A large 
proportion of exported products have a high energy content 
and are greatly affected by the rise in energy prices. However, 
since the increase in wage costs is below the average of the 
other countries, the Netherlands will be able to improve its 
competitive position slightly in 1981. Nevertheless, the level 
of export prices is still relatively high compared with the 
other Community countries. 
In 1981, the weakness of economic activity will have the 
effect of accentuating the reduction in the volume of imports. 
Because of the rise in the price of natural gas, the 
deterioration in the terms of trade will remain limited, so that 
the trade balance deficit, and hence the current account 
deficit could be smaller than those recorded in 1980. 
Towards the end of last year, the number of unemployed had 
already gone above an unprecedented 300 OOO, but the 
number will edge up even further, given the unfavourable 
economic outlook for 1981; on average for the year, it could 
be as high as some 350 OOO, or 7% of the labour force. This 
increase is also expected to affect the male labour force 
considerably. Young people will be particularly hard hit: 
already in 1980, no less than 40% of the unemployed were 
under twenty-five years of age. The slump in employment in 
industry and construction is only marginally offset by an 
increase in market and non-market services. On the supply 
side, the natural increase in the labour force will continue. 
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Netherlands: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
1970-79 1979 1980 19813 1979 [980 1980 19813 19813 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) HFL 
OOO Mio 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1975 prices 
Private consumption 3,9 2,2 -0,5 -1,0 4,5 -1,5 -3,3 -3,6 6,8 173,8 
Public consumption 3,1 2,9 1,2 0,8 1,7 0,8 0,6 0,9 1,0 56,4 
Gross fixed capital formation 1,7 0 -1,4 -5,6 43,2 -13,0 -11,7 -6,0 2,4 64,8 
Change in stocks 1 1,3 0,5 0,3 0,2 -0,1 0,8 -0,1 1,7 -1,2 1,2 
Domestic demand 3,1 1,3 -0,5 -1,7 8,2 -1,9 -6,l -0,4 0,3 296,2 
Exports of goods and services 6,5 8,0 0,7 -0,4 1,4 6,1 -9,9 0,0 9,1 151,0 
Imports of goods and services 5,6 6,2 -0,6 -2,4 3,5 2,5 -10,4 -1,9 5,6 148,2 
GDP at market prices 3,5 2,2 0,2 -0,6 7,0 0,0 -5,9 0,6 1,6 299,0 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 11,4 6,2 
Industrial production 3,8 2,8 
Unemployment rate 2 3,1 4,2 
Compensation of employees 12,1 7,1 
M2 11,5 7,1 
GDP (implicit price index) 7,7 3,9 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 7,4 4,3 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 5,9 8,6 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 7,1 11,l 
Terms of trade -1,0 -2,3 
Trade balance (fob/cif) -2,2 -2,7 
Current balance 1,3 -1,4 
Net lending ( +) or net borrowing ( - ) of 
general government -0,5 -2,0 
I As %of GDP. 
2 Unemployment as % of total labour force. 
3 Forecasts. 
Sources: Eurostat and Commission services. 
The average 6,5% rise in consumer prices recorded in 1980 is 
lower than the rate forecast at the beginning of that year. Part 
of this relative success is certainly due to the slower rise in 
wage costs achieved by the pay policy. Another factor was 
the movement of import prices, which rose less sharply than 
estimated. In 1981, the inflation rate could fall again, mainly 
owing to a less-rapid increase in import costs. 
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5,9 4,5 12,2 6,8 -2,2 7,2 5,5 
-1,0 -1,3 1,8 2,6 -10,6 1,5 3,4 
5,0 6,8 4,2 4,4 5,5 6,8 6,8 
5,5 3,0 7,1 5,8 3,1 2,1 4,9 
5,8 7,6 
5,6 5,2 4,9 6,8 3,9 6,6 3,8 
6,5 6,3 4,3 9,0 3,9 7,7 5,8 
13,5 10,0 16,7 19,0 0,7 13,4 12,8 
14,5 10,5 19,4 19,5 1,3 14,5 12,1 
-0,9 -0,5 -2,3 -0,4 -0,6 -1,0 0,6 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
-2,8 -2,2 
-1,5 -0,9 
-2,8 -3,2 
Problems of economic policy 
The Netherlands economy is faced with substantial struc-
tural problems seriously affecting employment, further 
aggravated by the cyclical slowdown in economic activity. 
Since it must be presumed that, in the next few years, the 
increase in employment will be very limited in the public 
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sector, the private sector will have to make the main 
contribution toward remedying the situation. An improve-
ment in company profitability and, in general, in the 
corporate business climate is of prime importance in this 
respect. 
If the economic situation is to recover on any lasting basis, 
income restraint is essential, despite its negative impact on 
consumers' expenditure in the short term. The system of 
automatic compensation for price rises must not be allowed 
to undermine restraint, and it is very important for 
management and unions to agree on this. The application of 
the system was partially suspended last year. In 1981 too, a 
similar measure will limit the increase in nominal wages. 
There is a close correlation between income restraint and 
improved company profitability on the one hand, and 
holding down public expenditure and cutting back the 
sharply-increased public budget deficit on the other. Unless 
present guidelines are modified, the public sector ( central 
government and local authorities) cash deficit will be some 
7,5% of net national income in 1981 as it was in 1980; it 
would thus be well above the public authority target (5,5%). 
The difference is largely attributable to unfavourable cyclical 
developments and their automatic impact on public receipts 
and expenditure. In view of the worsening budgetary 
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situation and the poor prospects for growth over the next few 
years, new measures seem essential. Since the tax burden is 
already very heavy, further savings will be necessary in 1981. 
In making these savings, public authority purchases of goods 
and public investment ought to be preserved as far as 
possible, because of the employment situation. The better 
course would be to hold back transfer expenditure, 
particularly social expenditure, and the rise in remuneration 
in the public sector. The formal link between these types of 
public expenditure and the growth of wages in the private 
sector poses special problems. It especially limits the 
flexibility of budgetary policy since expenditure in these 
categories accounts for two-thirds of total public expendi-
ture. There. is thus a very close correlation between fiscal 
policy and changes in incomes. 
Reduction of the budget deficit.is also of great importance 
for a structural improvementofthe balance of payments. In 
addition, by limiting public authority's borrowing on the 
capital market, the interest rates could be kept down, thus, in 
the longer term, helping to improve the employment 
situation. Similarly, this would give greater support to a 
monetary policy centred on moderating inflation since the 
target adopted in this connection for monetary financing by 
the public authorities would not be overshot in 1981 as has 
often been the case in recent years, with the.result that the 
authorities have created excessive liquidity. 
United Kingdom 
Trends and prospects 
For 1980 as a whole gross domestic product (GDP), as 
measured from the expenditure side, fell by 2%.1 The major 
part of this fall was concentrated in the second half of the 
year, when GDP is estimated to have contracted at an annual 
rate of over 5%. In particular there was a sharp fall in stocks 
as well as a marked decline in gross domestic fixed capital 
formation. 
This fall in output is reflected in the employment and 
unemployment figures. Between December 1979 and De-
cember 1980 unemployment (seasonally adjusted and 
excluding school leavers) rose by 850 OOO, an increase in the 
unemployment rate from 5,4 to 8,8%. 
There was also a sharp fall in the rate of inflation in 1980. In 
the six months to December retail prices increased by less 
than 8% (at an annual rate) whilst the December year-on-
year change was 15%. 
On the external side the balance of trade registered a massive 
surplus of UKL 1 900 million in the second half of the year, 
following a deficit of UKL 900 million in the first half, a 
development which owes much to the steep fall in import 
volume, itself associated with large-scale destocking. In 
addition, the UK benefited from a significant improvement 
in the terms of trade, reflecting the UK's oil production. At 
the same time the surplus on invisibles in 1980 reached UKL 
1 200 million. 
The present outlook is that gross domestic product in 1981 
will fall by a further 2%. In particular the sharp contraction 
in output, which occurred in the second half of 1980, is 
expected to be followed by a further fall in activity in the first 
half of 1981, and a slight recovery is foreseen for the second. 
The pattern of demand, however, changes significantly over 
this period. In the second half of 1980 the fall in domestic 
demand, including the effects of destocking, was offset, but 
only to a limited extent, by an improvement in the external 
position. Through 1981 the fall in domestic demand 
(including stocks) is now forecast to moderate. On the other 
hand a significant deterioration in the external position is 
expected as exports decli~e, and import volumes increase. A 
sustained decline in wage and price inflation is foreseen. 
The combined fall in output through 1980 and 1981 of over 
4%, together with the easing of inflationary pressures, are in 
part due to the response of both internal and external 
demand to a particular economic policy stance together with 
some significant structural changes in the UK economy. 
See table. 
United Kingdom 
In mid-1979 the present government effected a marked 
switch from direct to indirect taxation, whilst at the same 
time raising interest rates, with a view to controlling the 
expansion of the money supply, so as to reduce the rate of 
inflation in the longer term. This policy, combined with 
expanding UK domestic oil production at a time of increases 
in world oil prices, led to a significant strengthening of the 
sterling exchange rate. However, as wages continued to rise 
rapidly, particularly in the public sector, whilst price 
inflation decelerated markedly (helped by the unexpected 
strength of sterling in the exchange markets), the company 
sector experienced an exceptional financial squeeze, which 
led to a fall in stocks and fixed investment. 
During the first half of 1981 real personal disposable incomes 
are expected to stagnate or even to decline somewhat, as the 
rate of growth of earnings is expected to fall below the rate of 
inflation, and this suggests there may well be a further but 
small decline in private consumption. In the second half of the 
year real incomes are expected to recover slightly, and 
assuming no marked change in the savings ratio, this should 
permit a modest expansion of consumer demand. 
In line with the authorities announced intentions general 
government consumption is expected to decline slightly in 
1981, less rapidly however than general government fixed 
investment which is foreseen to remain on the declining trend 
established since the mid- l 970s. Private sector fixed capital 
formation is forecast to fall further in 1981 although the 
outlook is that, in the second half of the year, falling interest 
rates may give a modest stimulus to private sector house-
building activity. 
Some improvement in the financial position of the company 
sector in the latter part of 1981, resulting from previous 
adjustments to investment plans, and stock and employment 
levels, together with the easing of inflationary pressures, is 
expected to bring the des tocking cycle to an end, by the end of 
the year. · 
For 1981 as a whole a decline in the volume of non-oil exports 
of at least 4% is foreseen, reflecting the effects of the UK's 
loss of export price competitiveness due to the strong 
exchange rate; the volume of non-oil imports is expected to 
rise, partly as a result of the movement in stocks and private 
consumption. Although a modest improvement in the terms 
of trade is expected to occur between 1980 and 1981 this will 
largely be the result of an assumed increase in the real price of 
oil, and no significant change in the terms of trade for non-oil 
goods is foreseen. Consequently the outlook is for a deficit on 
non-oil trade in 1981 following the surplus of UKL 
900 million in 1980. The volume of crude oil exports is 
expected to rise markedly (by more than 25%) and the 
volume of crude oil imports to fall (by more than 15%). These 
favourable volume movements combined with the terms of 
trade improvement, point to a substantial surplus in trade in 
crude oil in 1981, leading to an overall surplus on the balance 
of trade equivalent to 0,2% of GDP. 
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United Kingdom: Supply and uses of goods and services together with main economic indicators 
1970-79 1979 1980 19815 1979 1980 1980 19815 1981 5 1979 
II I II I II 
Annual data Half-yearly data (s.a.) Million 
UKL 
at current 
prices 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
- at constant 1975 prices 
Private consumption 2,3 4,7 0,2 -1,l -2,2 3,4 -3,7 -1,5 2,2 115 543 
Public consumption 2,5 2,0 0,7 -0,7 1,8 1,5 -2,0 -0,3 -0,3 38 316 
Gross fixed capital formation 0,6 -1,4 -2,5 -5,3 8,2 -4,3 -8,8 -5,4 -1,5 33 646 
Change in stocks I 0,8 1,4 -1,5 -0,6 1,1 -0,7 -.2,4 -1,3 0 2 760 
Domestic demand 2,1 3,6 -3,0 -0,9 -0,6 -2,0 -7,4 0,3 3,6 190 265 
Exports of goods and services 4,5 2,7 0,8 -2,4 9,5 1,3 -8,1 -0,5 -0,1 54 676 
Imports of goods and services 4,2 11,0 -2,9 1,5 8,5 -1,9 -14,9 8,0 7,1 54 501 
GDP at market prices 2,2 1,3 -2,0 -2,0 -0,5 -1,1 -5,2 -2,1 1,4 190 440 
% change over preceding period at annual rates 
GDP at current prices 15,7 16,1 
Industrial production 2 0,7 0,1 
Unemployment rate 3 4,0 5,3 
Compensation of employees 15,1 16,7 
Sterling M34 14,1 12,4 
GDP (implicit price index) 12,6 14,6 
Private consumption (implicit price index) 12,2 12,2 
Exports, goods (implicit price index) 13,9 12,0 
Imports, goods (implicit price index) 14,9 7,9 
Terms of trade -0,9 3,8 
Trade balance (fob/cif) -2,l -1,8 
Current balance -0,9 -0,9 
Net borrowing of general government 4 -2,6 -5,0 
I As% of GDP. 
2 Manufacturing industry. 
3 Unemployment as % of total labour force. 
4 Financial years. 
5 Forecasts. 
Sources: Eurostat; Commission and national services. 
Taking the developments in domestic and external demand 
together, a fall of about 2% in GDP (at an annual rate) is 
forecast for the first half of 1981, followed by a modest 
recovery in the second. 
On the output side the fall in manufacturing production is 
expected to continue in the first half of 1981, but at a much 
slower rate than in 1980. Furthermore the end of the 
destocking cycle is expected to provide the stimulus for a 
small recovery in manufacturing output in the second half of 
the year. However, for the year as a whole the fall in 
manufacturing production is still expected to be 4%, bringing 
the decline over two years to 12,5%. 
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16,6 10,0 22,3 15,1 14,7 7,8 9,7 
-8,9 -3,8 -1,9 -10,4 -12,8 -2,1 2,6 
6,8 9,8 5,2 6,0 7,6 9,4 10,1 
18,1 8,2 20,6 18,0 14,7 4,9 8,5 
20,0 10,0 
19,0 12,3 22,8 16,5 20,9 10,1 8,2 
16,1 11,0 19,6 15,5 14,1 11,5 7,0 
14,0 11,5 15,1 18,7 4,9 13,5 14,0 
10,5 9,2 7,5 20,9 -5,3 14,3 14,7 
3,2 2,1 7,1 -1,8 10,8 -0,7 -0,6 
As a percentage of gross domestic product 
0,5 0,2 -1,3 -0,8 1,7 0,9 0,1 
1,0 0,3 -0,5 -0,2 2,1 0,9 -0,4 
-5,3 -4,3 
Despite the modest upturn in activity foreseen for the second 
half of the year, unemployment is expected to increase 
throughout 1981 reaching a level of perhaps 2,75 million 
(including school leavers) by the end of the year. However, it 
appears that, after allowing for school leavers, the rise in 
unemployment so far has been broadly equal to the fall in 
employment and this suggests that the available labour force 
has not been affected by any significant change in overall 
activity rates. 
The assessment of the likely trends in inflation has been 
based on the assumptions that the value of sterling will 
remain at the level established at the end of 1980, and that 
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The economies of Member States 
over the 1980-81 pay round (the twelve months to July 1981) 
the rate of increase of average earnings will fall to 11 %, from 
the 19% recorded for the previous pay round, an outlook 
which seems to be justified by the most recent information on 
wage settlements. At the same time some decline in interest 
rates is foreseen in response to the strength of recessionary 
forces. As a consequence of these assumptions consumer 
price inflation should fall to 11 % for 1981 as a whole from the 
16% estimated for 1980. Indeed, a significant deceleration 
can be expected to occur in the first half of 1981, despite the 
large rate and rent increases foreseen for the start of the 1981-
82 financial year, and the likely revalorization of specific 
indirect taxes. In the second half of the year, the assumed 
strong pound and the effect of the more recent and 
anticipated lower wage settlements, should permit a fall in 
the annual rate of inflation to well below 10%. 
The surplus on the current account of the balance of 
payments which reached UKL 2 200 million in 1980 (1% of 
GDP) is forecast to fall to about 0,3% of GDP in 1981. This 
deterioration is expected to occur despite reduced public 
sector transfers following the agreement concerning the 
UK's EEC contributions (UKL 700 million), and partly 
reflects the deterioration in the balance of net factor incomes, 
resulting from payments of profits and dividends abroad 
associated with the North Sea oil development programme. 
In assessing future trends in borrowing by the public sector it 
has been assumed that the UK authorities will be successful 
in keeping general government expenditure, at current 
prices, within the cash limits already indicated. In addition, 
the effects of announced tax changes for the financial year 
1981-82 have been taken into account, namely, the 
supplementary oil tax and the increase in national insurance 
contributions. Together these two measures are expected to 
increase revenues by UKL 2 OOO million at current prices. 
However the revalorization of direct tax allowances and 
specific indirect taxes, which it is assumed will be announced 
in the forthcoming budget, are foreseen to have a broadly 
neutral impact on general government revenues. 
Overall, the total increase in general government revenues is 
foreseen to counterbalance broadly the increase in expendi-
ture induced by the recession, and so the general government 
financial deficit is not expected to increase between 1980-81 
and 1981-82. In addition the financial position of the public 
corporations is expected to improve somewhat, and so an 
overall fall in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR) in nominal terms is foreseen, from a forecasted out-
tum ofUKL 12 OOO million for the financial year 1980-81 to 
UKL 10 7 50 million for 1981-82. This implies a fall in the 
PSBR as a percentage of GDP. 
Problems of economic policy 
The UK authorities have enjoyed considerable success in 
reducing the underlying rate of price inflation, to which the 
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strength of sterling has made a significant contribution. This 
achievement was however accompanied by a marked fall in 
output and employment, particularly in manufacturing 
industry. Moreover, the volume of fixed investment, which 
reached its high point in 1978, and which fell in both 1979 
and 1980, is forecast to register a further significant fall in 
1981. The drop in activity has, however, benefited the 
balance of payments, although the adverse effect of the 
strong pound on the volume of UK exports is expected to be 
increasingly felt in the years ahead. The UK's surplus on 
current account contrasts sharply with that of other member 
countries of the Community, and owes much to the UK's 
status as an oil producer. Details of the UK's position with 
regard to North Sea oil are given in the attached box. 
In the budget of 26 March 1980 the UK Government made 
clear that it aimed to reduce inflation by strictly controlling 
the expansion of the money supply as broadly defined 
(sterling M3), and by effecting a substantial reduction in the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) as a propor-
tion of GDP. The authorities' intentions with regard to the 
financial year 1980-81 were set down in the Medium Term 
Financial Strategy (MTFS), published at the same time as 
the budget, which set out target ranges for the growth of 
sterling M3 for the years 1980-81 and 1983-84, together with 
an illustrative profile for the PSBR, as a percentage of GDP. 
For the fourteen months to April 1981, the announced target 
range for sterling M3 was 7-11%, at an annual rate, and the 
associated PSBR for the financial year 1980-81, at UKL 
8 500 million. 
Various fiscal measures were announced in the budget to 
enable these objectives to be achieved and they amounted 
overall to a move to a more restrictive budgetary stance. In 
addition, interest rates were maintained at a high level. 
However as the financial year progressed it became clear 
that: 
- the greater-than-anticipated strength of recessionary 
forces would cause the PSBR to exceed significantly the 
planned level; 
- monetary growth (sterling M3), was moving rapidly 
outside the target range; indeed the growth of this 
aggregate over the financial year 1980-81 is now expected 
to be 20%. 
A number of factors account for the rapid monetary growth. 
For two years the Bank of England imposed quantitative 
controls on the growth of bank deposits and these were 
removed in June 1980, leading to adjustments to the sterling 
M3 statistics, significantly greater than anticipated. At the 
same time the severity of the recession and the strength of 
sterling, by intensifying the financial squeeze on the company 
sector, helped to sustain bank lending, despite the very high 
levels of interest rates. 
Conscious of the financial difficulties of the company sector 
and of the need to assure financial markets that the MTFS 
was not being abandoned, the Government announced a set 
of measures on 24 November 1980. In particular: 
- anticipating that monetary growth was about to slow 
down, the Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) was reduced 
from 16 to 14%; 
- increases in national insurance contributions and taxes on 
North Sea oil revenues were announced for the financial 
year 1981-82. The revenue measures coupled with various 
adjustments on the expenditure side point to a fall in the 
PSBR in 1981-82. 
Fiscal and monetary policy for the financial Year 1981-82 
will be laid down in the budget to be presented to Parliament 
on 10 March, and the recent departure from the scenario set 
out in the MTFS must be a major consideration of the 
authorities when formulating policy objectives and deciding 
upon the appropriate measures. 
The PSBR for 1980-81 is now expected to be some 5,5% of 
GDP and on the basis of present policies (but not counting 
the proposed introduction of a new tax on North Sea oil and 
gas production, which has yet to be approved by Parlia-
ment), the PSBR for 1981-82 is forecast by the Commission 
services to be some 5% of GDP, so probably implying a 
modest tightening of fiscal policy. 
The central element of the MTFS is the set of growth ranges 
for sterling M3 with the suggestion that, for the financial year 
1981-82 the target range should be 6-10%. Given the rapid 
monetary expansion and the higher than expected PSBR in 
1980-81, the authorities may take the view that fiscal policy 
should be tightened. In particular the MTFS sets down an 
illustrative value for the PSBR in 1981-82 equivalent to 3% of 
United Kingdom 
GDP, and if the authorities wish to steer the PSBR towards 
this figure then a substantial fiscal adjustment must be made, 
by increasing taxes markedly, by reducing public expendi-
ture, or by both. Such a move could amplify recessionary 
forces in the short term. However it could well provide room 
for a substantial fall in interest rates. 
In considering any fiscal adjustment, the Government's 
room for manoeuvre is bound to be limited. Substantial cuts 
in public expenditure in 1981-82 would be difficult to 
achieve, especially given the low level to which public sector 
investment has already sunk. On the other hand increases in 
personal taxation would not contribute to the Government's 
objective of reducing the burden of taxation in order to 
improve incentives to effort and enterprise. Nonetheless this 
would appear to be the main avenue of adjustment open to 
the authorities, since there is little scope for raising the level 
of taxation on companies, except possibly in the financial or 
North Sea sectors. I 
The manuscript of this chapter, like the rest of the publication, was 
completed by 3 March 1981 . However, at the proof stage information has 
become available about the budget, which the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer presented to Parliament on 10 March 1981. The budget 
measures, which reaffirm the authorities' commitment to the MTFS, 
provide for a substantial increase in the burden of direct and indirect 
taxation on persons, higher taxes on oil and gas production and a special 
tax on banking deposits. Public expenditure, in volume terms, is planned 
to remain broadly unchanged between the financial years 1980-81 and 
1981-82. Taken together these measures are expected to reduce the PSBR 
from UKL13 500 million (6% of GDP) in 1980-81 to UKLIO 500 million 
(4,25% of GDP in 1981-82). In addition, it was announced that the target 
range for sterling M3 would be 6-10% at an annual rate in the fourteen 
months to April 1982. Minimum lending rate was reduced from 14% to 
12%. 
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North Sea oil and the British economy 
Three aspects of North Sea oil production are of particular 
interest: 
- its contribution to the balance of payments; 
- the increase in government revenues due to the taxation of 
North Sea production activities; 
- associated changes in industrial structure. 
Each of these points will be considered in turn. It should be 
stressed that this brief treatment of certain questions relating to 
North Sea oil does not attempt to assess the overall impact of 
North Sea oil on the UK economy. This would be a very 
ambitious undertaking and can only be based upon detailed 
assumptions about how the economy would have developed in 
the absence of North Sea oil. In any case, given that the North 
Sea oil production and development programme has now been 
underway for almost a decade, it may well be impossible to 
establish an agreed alternative scenario. 
The balance of payments 
The North Sea oil and gas I development and production 
programme affects both the current account and the capital 
account of the balance of payments. The contribution of the 
current account may be considered under four headings: 
(i) Reduction in net imports of crude oil, due both to increased 
crude oil exports, and reduced crude oil imports. It is 
estimated that about 49% of the total volume of North Sea 
oil production was exported in 1980. This was also a year 
when total production of crude oil was over 90% of total 
consumption and so crude oil imports amounted to some 
52% of total consumption. 
(ii) Import of goods associated with the North Sea programme, 
for example production platforms. 
(iii) Net import of services for the programme, in particular hire 
of equipment, diving and labour costs. 
(iv) Interest, profits and dividends remitted abroad; mainly the 
net earnings of foreign companies on their North Sea 
investments. 
Table 1 sets out official figures for these current account items for 
the period 1973 to 1979 together with estimates for 1980 and 
1981 ; the total of the individual items is given in the line 'Oil 
balance of payments on current account'. For purposes of 
comparison, figures for the oil balance of payments on current 
account as a percentage of GDP, are also presented, together 
with the most appropriate figures for France and the Federal 
The i,;npact of North Sea gas production on the balance of payments is 
very small and will not be considered. Indeed, North Sea gas 
production has largely replaced the previous shore-based gas 
manufacturing industry which used coal and oil. 
Republic of Germany-namely crude oil imports as a percentage 
of GDP. The following points should be noted: 
- the total debit items associated with North Sea exploration 
and development are considerable; 
- these debit items have been increasing in recent years, largely 
because of the build-up of payments of interest profits and 
dividends as North Sea oil production has come on stream; 
- such payments are foreseen to increase significantly in 1981 
partly offsetting the contribution to the current account from 
the increased oil output expected. Indeed the oil balance of 
payments on current account is forecast to remain negative in 
1981 ( - UKL 400 million) even though the UK will be more 
than self-sufficient in oil. The expectation is that this debit 
item will become even greater in the early to mid-1980s, so 
reducing the contribution to the balance of payments of 
increased crude oil output for some time to come. 
The item concerning the imports of goods for North Sea 
development and production has its counterpart in inward 
capital movements. Official estimates of these movements for the 
years 1973 to 1979 are also given in Table I under the heading 
'Related capital account flows'. Up to 1980 (fbr which year the 
figure is estimated) these inward capital movements are likely to 
have been considerable. This .state of affairs is expected to 
change. Indeed from 1981 onwards net outward rep~yments of 
capital loans, facilitated by the build-up of oil production, are 
expected to offset new inward capital movements. As a 
consequence the total oil balance of payments on current 
account plus related capital transactions is foreseen to remain 
slightly negative in 1981. 
Increase in government revenues 
The increase in North Sea oil and gas production will also benefit 
central government revenues, since the value of the output of 
these activities, and the associated profits, are subject to four 
types of taxation: 
- royalties on seaward activities; 
- the special petroleum· revenue tax; 
- corporation tax on the profits of companies engaged in 
North Sea oil and gas production and development; 
- the more recent supplementary tax on oil and gas production 
announced by the Government on 24 November 1980, and 
applicable to the 1981-82 financial year. 
As production builds up so these revenues will increase rapidly. 
Revenue figures for the fmancial year 1979-80 are set out in 
Table 2 together with estimates for 1980-81 and 1981-82. They 
show that by 1981-82 taxation from North Sea activities should 
yield UKL 6 OOO million, 6,0% of total general government 
revenues from taxation and social security contributions. In 
1979-80 North Sea revenues at UKL 2 300 million accounted for 
just over 3% of general government revenues. 
United Kingdom 
Table 1 
Net balance-of-payments transactions on oil and related items 
(UKL OOO million) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Net exports of crude oil (deficit - ) -0,9 -3,4 -3,1 -3,9 -2,8 -2,0 -0,8 0,1 2,3 
Other current account entries associated with the North Sea 
programme (deficit - ) 
- imports of goods fob -0,1 -0,1 -0,3 -0,5 -0,5 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 
- net imports of services -0,1 -0,2 -0,5 -0,6 -0,7 -0,5 -0,5 -0,5 -0,5 
- interest profits and dividends -0,6 -0,7 -1,3 -1,6 
Oil balance of payments on current account ( deficit - ) -1,1 -3,7 -3,9 -5,0 -4,6 -3,4 -2,8 -2,1 -0,4 
Related capital account flows (surplus +) 0,1 0,2 0,9 1,1 1,5 0,8 0,7 0,5 
Total (deficit - ) -1,0 -3,5 -3,0 -3,9 -3,1 -2,6 -2,1 -1,6 -0,4 
Memorandum items : 
United Kingtlom: Oil balance of payments on current account as } 
% of GDP 1,4 4,5 3,7 4,0 3,2 2,1 1,5 0,9 0,2 
France { Crude oil imports ( cif) 1,4 3,8 2,9 3,3 3,1 2,5 3,0 4,0 
FR of Germany as % of GDP 1,0 2,3 1,9 2,1 2,0 1,6 2,1 3,0 
Sources : UK balance of payments: HMSO; Overseas Trade Statistics ; International Financial Statistics IMF ; 1980 and 1981 : Estimates of Commission departments. 
Table 2 
Central government revenues from North Sea oil and gas production 
(UKL OOO million ; Financial years ) 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
Royalties on seaward activities 0,7 1,2 1,6 
Petroleum revenue tax 1,4 2,5 2,9 
Corporation tax 0,2 0,5 0,5 
Supplementary oil tax 1,0 
Total 2,3 4,2 6,0 
Sources: Financial Statistics, HMSO; Economic Progress Reporl July 19110, H.M. Treasury ; Estimates of Commission services. 
North Sea oil production and changes in industrial structure 
The argument has been put forward that the expansion of North 
Sea oil production is likely to be accompanied by structural 
changes elsewhere in the British economy, in particular by a 
decline in the output of manufacturing industry. This argument 
may be outlined as follows: 
As a result of increasing North Sea oil production, the balance of 
payments on current account should, ceteris paribus, show a 
tendency to move into surplus. However, in order that the 
balance of payments, overall, should, over a longer period, be in 
equilibrium, there must be a tendency for other components of 
the balance of payments to move so as to offset the effects of the 
increased oil production. 
A strengthening of the exchange rate, partly reflecting exchange 
market sentiment about the present and future benefits of oil 
production, is seen as one of the ways in which such a structural 
change is brought about. Thus, as the exchange rate rises, so the 
volume of exports of tradeable goods (largely manufactures) 
declines and the volume of imports oftradeable goods rises. This 
leads to a deterioration in the balance of trade in non-oil goods, 
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and to an associated contraction in the output of manufacturing 
industry. The recent sharp decline in ma1,1ufacturing output in 
the United Kingdom is seen as evidence that this particular 
structural change is underway. 
However, it should be stressed that such a development is by no 
means inevitable: there are other ways in which the economy can 
adjust to increased North Sea oil output in the shorter term. Thus 
- Increased capital outflows {the purchase of foreign, financial 
and physical, assets) could well increase to offset the impact 
of the oil. However, the extent to which this occurs depends 
upon a number of factors over which the UK has little or no 
control-the rate and pattern of expansion of the world 
economy, movements in interest rates in other financial 
centres, etc. 
The invisibles account could well take part of the adjustment, 
in particular a move towards a smaller surplus on services 
may occur in the years ahead. 
- The argument that increased oil output leads, through a 
strong exchange rate, to a lower level of manufacturing 
production is dependent upon the authorities assuming a 
particular fiscal and monetary policy stance. Should 
conditions emerge that permit a less restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policy, which could well be associated with a 
weaker exchange rate, then manufacturing output could 
possibly be maintained at a more satisfactory level. 
Unit labour costs in manufacturing industry 
Between 1970 and 1980, unit labour costs in manufacturing 
industry in the Community, expressed in dollars, went up by 
35% ( or at an annual rate of 3,0%) by reference to a weighted 
average of the other industrialized countries. Expressed in 
ECU, unit labour costs in the Community went up 2,4% 
more than the average for the competing countries (in 
national currencies), the difference between the two 
measures of relative labour· costs being explained by an 
appreciation of the effective exchange rate for the Com-
munity averaging 0,6% a year (Table 1). 
All the Member States with the exception of Denmark 
averaged for the period (1970-80) an increase in their relative 
costs in dollars. In the case oflreland, Italy and the United 
Kingdom an effective exchange-rate depreciation did not 
Table 1 
Changes in labour costs from 1970 to 1980 
B 
DK 
D 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
UK 
EC9 
us 
CN 
J 
AU 
OS 
CH 
N 
s 
SF 
E 
Compensation 
per employee 
in national 
currency 
12,4 
13,1 
9,2 
13,3 .. 
18,2 
18,4 
10,8 
11,1 
17,6 
13,2 
Source: Eurostat, estimates by Commission services. 
Productivity 
(per employee 
5,6 
4,6 
3,7 
4,2 
2,8 
3,4 
1,9 
4,6 
2,1 
3,8 
entirely offset the rise in relative-labour costs. For the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and the Nether-
lands, the currency's effective appreciation was greater than 
the fall in relative labour costs. Denmark and France 
averaged only a slight change over the period both in the 
effective exchange rate and in relative labour costs (see 
graph). 
Among non-member countries, a real appreciation (position 
to the right of the diagonal in graph) was recorded for 
Switzerland, Japan, the Scandinavian countries and Spain 
while Australia and, in particular, the United States 
experienced a real depreciation. The latter country is in fact 
the only one in the group of industrialized countries to have 
combined an effective exchange-rate depreciation with a fall 
in relative labour costs (in national currencies). 
Change over previous year average. /971-80 ( at w11111af rate ) 
Labour Relative Effective Relative 
cost per unit labour exchange labour 
of output, costs in rate COSlS 
national national in LiSD 
currency currency 
6,5 -1,3 2,2 0,8 
8,1 -0,4 0,2 -0,2 
5,3 -3,0 5,2 2,0 
8,7 0,6 -0,2 0,4 
14,9 4,6 -3,2 1,2 
14,5 6,7 -6,5 0,2 
9,4 
I 
6,2 
15,2 
-1,7 2,8 1,0 
7,3 -3,1 4,0 
I 9,1 2,4 0,6 3,0 
I 
6,1 
7,4 
-1 ,6 -2,7 -4,2 
0,5 -2,2 -1,7 
5,7 -1,8 3,1 1,3 
8,7 1,4 -2,7 -1,3 
3,2 -4,6 4,0 -0,8 
2,4 -5,3 7,2 1,5 
8,7 0,1 1, 1 1, 1 
9,4 1,0 -0,8 0,2 
11,9 3,1 - 1,5 1,5 
11,8 3,5 -2,8 0,6 
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The main feature of the decade was the relatively large 
fluctuations in relative labour costs for the Community (in 
national currencies). Since exchange-rate fluctuations did 
not always follow the same curve as relative labour costs, the 
result was a fairly irregular movement of dollar labour costs 
with sharp falls in 1974 and 1976. 
The year-to-year changes in the different Member States 
often show peculiarities and differences linked to the short-
term fluctuations in exchange rates. In the United Kingdom, 
in particular, relative labour costs in dollars tended to fall up 
to 1977 (because of sterling's effective depreciation). Since 
1977 sterling's increasing strength, combined with a steady, 
and, in l 2?0 even accelerated rise, in wage costs in national 
currency, has led to an unprecedented increase in relative 
wage costs in dollars. 
It will be noted that the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Table 2 
Price and cost indicators, EC 9 
Labour costs in industry 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative 
per (output costs labour 
employee per per unit costs 
national employee) of output national 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 11,6 2,9 8,5 3, 1 
1972 11,6 5,5 5,8 4,1 
1973 15,7 6,3 8,8 3,8 
1974 17,2 2,8 14,0 -2,2 
1975 17,8 l , 1 19, 1 3,2 
1976 15,3 9,5 5,4 2,1 
1977 10,4 2,8 7,4 2,7 
1978 8,3 2,7 5,4 0,9 
1979 11,0 4,6 6,2 2,4 
1980 13,8 2,1 11,5 4,4 
1971-1980 13,2 3,8 9,1 2,4 
1981 3 10,7 2,1 8,4 -0,1 
Unit labour costs in manufacturing industry 
the Benelux countries in 1980 (and Belgium even in 1979) 
improved their relative labour-cost positions appreciably, 
the fall in relative labour costs not having been offset in that 
year by an appreciation in the weighted exchange rate. 
For the Community as a whole, relative labour costs in 
national currencies could, in 1981 , show a slight fall 
(Table 2). 
On the basis of the market exchange rates at the beginning of 
February one could expect a sharp effective depreciation for 
most of the Community currencies on average for 1981 and 
therefore a marked improvement in the relative dollar 
labour-costs position with the ·united Kingdom again 
proving the exception to the rule. Given the great volatility of 
exchange rates in the last few months, however, the outlook 
for dollar labour costs seems particularly uncertain. 
(% change over preceding year) 
General indicators 
Relative Effective GDP Private Exports Terms 
labour exchange deflator con- price of trade 
costs rate sumption (goods) 
in USD 2 deflator deflator 
3,9 0,8 7,4 6,5 3,2 0,3 
513 1, 1 6,6 6,2 2,3 1,9 
56 1,7 7,5 8, l 8,1 -3,4 
-4(7 -2,6 11,1 12,7 23,6 -9,6 
5,7 2,4 13,5 12,5 7,5 3,2 
-65 -8,4 9,7 10,2 9,6 -2,1 
3,6 0,9 9,6 9,8 8,1 -0,2 
3,9 3,0 8,5 7,3 3,7 3,1 
8,4 5,8 9,5 9,4 9,0 -1,0 
6,4 2,0 12,1 11,6 15,4 -3,3 
3,0 0,6 9,5 9,4 8,9 -1,l 
10,4 9,9 10,9 -0,9 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 10 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 10 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source : Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
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Table 3 
Price and cost indicators, Belgium 
Labour costs in industry 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective 
per (output costs labour labour exchuge 
employee per r:t unit costs costs rate 
national employee) o output national in USD2 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 12,9 4,2 8,4 1,2 1,3 0,1 
1972 15,1 9,2 5,4 1,3 4,8 3,5 
1973 12,7 9,4 3,0 -3,6 -1,6 2,1 
1974 20,4 2,4 17,6 3,9 5,7 1,8 
1975 14,6 -1,4 16,2 -0,3 1,3 1,6 
1976 17,9 13,0 4,3 -0,6 1,6 2,2 
1977 9,5 4,0 5,3 -1,2 4,8 6,1 
1978 8,1 5,8 2,3 -2,7 0,9 3,7 
1979 6,5 7,1 -0,6 -5,6 -4,2 1,5 
1980 7,5 3,3 4,1 -5,0 -5,4 -0,4 
1971-1980 12,4 5,6 6,5 -1,3 0,8 2,2 
1981 3 6,6 3,0 3,5 -4,l 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
Table 4 
Price and cost indicators, Denmark 
Labour costs in industry 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective 
per (output costs labour labour exchange 
employee per tct unit costs costs rate 
national employee) o output national in USD2 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 14,6 6,2 7,9 0,6 -0,3 -0,9 
1972 8,2 5,0 3,0 -1,2 -1,4 -0,2 
1973 14,6 2,7 12,0 5,5 12,1 6,3 
1974 22,9 5,5 16,5 1,3 2,0 0,7 
1975 15,9 7,1 8,2 -8,9 -5,7 3,4 
1976 7,6 7,5 0,1 -6,0 -3,8 2,3 
1977 15,4 3,3 11,7 4,1 3,8 -0,3 
1978 8,7 3,1 5,4 -0,7 -0,3 0,4 
1979 13,7 3,7 9,6 4,2 3,4 -0,8 
1980 10,1 1,9 8,0 -2,3 -10,2 -8,1 
1971-1980 13,1 4,6 8,1 -0,4 -0,2 0,2 
1981 3 11,4 1,5 9,8 1,0 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
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(% change over preceding year) 
General indicators 
GDP Private Exports Terms 
detlator con- price of trade 
sumfition (goods) 
de ator detlator 
5,4 5,2 0,9 -1,4 
6,3 5,5 1,0 1,3 
6,9 5,9 8,0 0,7 
12,3 12,5 25,5 -2,7 
12,5 12,4 4,1 -1,0 
7,5 8,0 6,1 -0,9 
7,3 7,0 2,3 0,3 
4,2 4,2 0,2 -0,2 
4,0 3,5 9,9 0,1 
5,1 6,2 11,0 -2,7 
7,1 7,0 6,7 -0,7 
6,1 6,0 8,5 -0,1 
(% change over preceding year) 
General indicators 
GDP Private Exports Terms 
deflator con- price of trade 
sumJ::on (goods) 
d tor deflator 
7,9 7,3 3,0 -7,9 
9,0 8,3 6,2 1,9 
10,2 10,2 11,2 6,1 
12,9 14,4 17,6 0,8 
12,6 10,0 6,9 -10,5 
9,2 9,4 7,1 1,1 
9,0 10,8 6,1 -2,2 
9,2 9,4 3,5 0,7 
7,3 9,6 7,7 0,7 
8,5 11,0 14,0 -6,5 
9,6 10,0 8,2 -1,6 
8,9 9,5 9,0 -2,2 
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Table 5 
Price and cost indicators, Federal Republic of Germany 
Labour costs in industry 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective 
per (output costs labour labour exchaqge 
employee per per unit costs costs rate 
national employee) of output national in USD2 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 10,6 2,1 8,4 1,5 4,9 3,4 
1972 10,2 4,7 5,3 1,8 4,6 2,7 
1973 13,5 5,7 7,3 0,9 11,9 10,9 
1974 12,2 4,1 7,8 -6,9 -1,1 6,3 
1975 8,2 0,7 7,4 -10,6 -8,9 1,9 
1976 10,3 9,2 1,0 -4,4 1,3 5,9 
1977 7,5 3,8 3,6 -3,5 4,7 8,5 
1978 6,3 1,8 4,4 -0,8 5,9 6,8 
1979 6,5 4,3 2,1 -3,5 1,5 5,2 
1980 7,1 1,2 5,9 -3,8 -3,4 0,4 
1971-1980 9,2 3,7 5,3 -3,0 2,0 5,2 
1981 3 4,6 2,4 2,2 -7,0 : I 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
Table 6 
Price and cost indicators, France 
Labour costs in industry 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective 
per (output costs labour labour exchange 
employee per per unit costs costs rate 
national employee) of output national in USD 2 
currency national currency I 
currency 
' 1971 11,8 4,7 6,8 -0,7 -2,~ -2,2 
1972 9,8 5,0 4,5 0,7 3,4 2,7 
1973 12,5 4,4 7,7 1,0 4,7 3,7 
1974 14,3 2,3 11, 7 -2,5 -8,7 -6,3 
1975 24,0 1,7 21,9 3,9 14,0 9,7 
1976 17,9 8,6 8,6 4,1 0,3 -3,7 
1977 12,3 4,0 8,0 1,1 -3,6 -4,7 
1978 5,3 4,0 1,3 -4,6 -5,7 -1,1 
1979 12,4 5,1 7,0 1,7 2,3 0,6 
1980 14,2 2,7 11, 1 1,6 1,9 0,3 
1971-1980 13,3 4,2 8,7 0,6 0,4 -0,2 
1981 3 12,2 1,8 10,2 1,9 : 1 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
(% change over preceding year) 
General indicators 
GDP Private Exports Terms 
deflator con- price of trade 
sumption (goods) 
deflator deflator 
7,6 6,0 3,1 2,6 
5,5 5,6 2,2 1,9 
6,0 7,5 4,6 -5,0 
6,7 7,1 15,7 -5,1 
6,4 5,9 4,7 5,3 
3,4 4,4 3,0 -2,6 
3,8 3,9 1,0 0,1 
3,9 2,6 0,6 4,0 
4,0 4,0 3,9 -3,2 
5,0 5,4 6,0 -4,4 
5,2 5,2 4,4 -0,6 
4,4 4,5 5,5 -0,4 
(% change over preceding year) 
General indicators 
GDP Private Exports Terms 
deflator con- price of trade 
sumption (goods) 
deflator deflator 
5,8 5,5 4,4 1,0 
6,2 5,9 0,9 2,2 
7,8 6,8 6,2 0,7 
11 ,1 13,2 23,6 -13,5 
13,4 11,4 3,9 4,6 
10,1 9,9 8,7 -1,6 
8,9 9,2 9,2 -2,4 
9,8 8,8 5,4 3,9 
10,4 10,5 10,0 -0,6 
11 ,9 13,5 12,2 -6,0 
9,5 9,4 8,3 -1,2 
11 ,3 11,8 11 ,5 -2,2 
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Table 7 
Price and cost indicators, Ireland 
(% change over preceding year) 
Labour costs in industry General indicators 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective GDP Private Exports Terms 
per (output costs labour labour exchange deflator con- price of trade 
employee per per unit costs costs rate sumption (goods) 
national employee) of output national in USD2 deflator deflator 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 16,2 3,8 12,0 4,6 4,3 -0,3 10,5 9,4 7,8 1,8 
1972 17,7 5,8 11,3 7,2 4,8 -2,2 13,4 9,6 13,3 6,3 
1973 18,7 5,9 12,1 5,5 -1,8 -6,9 15,3 11,6 21,3 5,6 
1974 18,1 -0,4 18,5 1,3 -1,4 -2,7 6,0 15,8 24,0 -15,2 
1975 20,9 -7,0 29,9 7,4 1,7 -5,3 22,3 22,3 18,3 -1,6 
1976 22,2 10,6 10,5 3,3 -7,3 -10,2 20,2 18,7 23,6 3,7 
1977 13,9 3,1 10,4 2,6 -0,6 -3,1 12,4 12,7 14,9 -1,8 
1978 12,0 4,5 7,2 -0,2 1,1 1,3 10,1 7,2 6,7 1,8 
1979 18,7 5,0 13,l 4,9 5,3 0,4 13,0 12,2 9,0 -3,5 
1980 24,1 -1,8 26,5 10,0 7,0 -2,7 14,8 18,2 10,0 -8,1 
1971-1980 18,2 2,8 14,9 4,6 1,2 -3,2 13,7 13,7 14,7 -1,1 
1981 3 13,8 6,9 6,5 -3,1 14,1 16,0 14,2 -1,5 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
Table 8 
Price and cost indicators, Italy 
(% change over preceding year) 
Labour costs in industry General indicators 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective GDP Private Exports Terms 
per (output costs labour labour exchange deflator con- price of trade 
employee per rar unit costs costs rate sumption (goods) 
national employee) o output national in USD2 deflator deflator 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 10,9 -1,0 11,9 5,0 3,5 -1,4 7,2 5,5 4,4 -1,0 
1972 11,1 4,9 5,9 2,3 1,4 -0,9 6,3 6,4 2,0 -1,3 
1973 22,5 8,5 12,9 6,4 -4,0 -9,8 11,6 12,4 16,9 -8,5 
1974 23,2 3,7 18,7 4,4 -5,6 -9,6 18,5 20,9 39,6 -13,1 
1975 22,3 -9,4 34,9 16,9 12,2 -4,0 17,5 17,6 10,6 4,7 
1976 24,0 12,4 10,4 6,0 -12,4 -17,4 18,0 18,l 22,6 -2,9 
1977 19,9 2,0 17,5 11,3 2,7 -7,7 19,1 18,2 18,7 1,9 
1978 14,3 2,8 11,2 6,2 0,1 -5,8 14,1 12,8 6,7 3,1 
1979 18,l 6,9 10,5 5,4 2,0 -3,2 15,2 14,9 12,2 -1,0 
1980 19,1 5,0 13,5 4,0 0,2 -3,7 20,8 21,2 19,5 -5,2 
1971-1980 18,4 3,4 14,5 6,7 0,2 -6,5 14,7 14,7 14,9 -2,3 
1981 3 16,1 -2,9 19,6 11,7 17,7 18,7 15,5 -3,0 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
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Table 9 
Price and cost indicators, Luxembourg 
Labour costs in industry 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective 
per (output costs labour labour exchange 
employee per per unit costs costs 
national employee) of output national in USD2 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 7,0 -3,6 11,0 
1972 9,3 3,4 5,7 
1973 9,3 7,3 1,8 
1974 25,9 2,0 23,5 
1975 8,2 -18,0 32,0 
1976 11,5 7,6 3,6 
1977 I 9,1 3,3 5,6 
1978 10,8 10,8 0,0 
1979 8,1 5,8 2,1 
1980 8,5 0,1 8,4 
1971-1980 10,8 1,9 9,4 
1981 3 7,5 -4,4 12,5 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source : Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
Table 10 
Price and cost indicators, Netherlands 
Labour costs in industry 
rate 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective 
per (output costs labour labour exchange 
employee per per unit costs costs 
national employee) of output national in USD 2 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 12,4 3,9 8,2 0,8 1,8 
1972 13,5 6,0 7,1 2,9 4,6 
1973 17,2 9,2 7,3 0,6 4,4 
1974 15,6 4,3 10,9 -2,4 3, 1 
1975 12,2 -2,4 15,0 -1,5 1,0 
1976 12, 1 12,0 0,1 -4,7 -2,0 
1977 8,2 3,4 4,6 -2,0 3,7 
1978 6,9 3,6 3,2 -2,1 0,9 
1979 6,9 4,0 2,7 -2,4 -0,8 
1980 6,4 2,9 3,4 -5,9 -5,9 
1971-1980 11, 1 4,6 6,2 -1 ,7 1,0 
1981 3 5,6 4,1 1,5 -6,0 
Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
Provisional forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
rate 
1,0 
1,7 
3,9 
5,6 
2,5 
2,8 
5,8 
3, 1 
1,7 
0,1 
2,8 
(% change over preceding year) 
General indicators 
GDP Private Exports Terms 
deflator con- price of trade 
sumption (goods) 
deflator deflator 
-1,3 4,7 -5,0 -7,9 
5,6 5,2 2,2 1,9 
10,8 5,0 17,6 6,1 
16,4 9,9 24,2 0,8 
-1 ,0 10,2 -2,9 -10,5 
13,0 9,5 7,0 1, 1 
1,5 5,8 -0,1 -2,2 
4,4 3,5 4,6 0,7 
7,0 5,8 10,0 0,7 
4,4 6,3 4,0 -4,1 
5,9 6,6 5,8 -1,3 
6,7 6,3 7,5 -1,4 
(% change over preceding year) 
General indicators 
GDP Private Exports Terms 
deflator con- price of trade 
sumption (goods) 
deflator deflator 
8,5 8,5 2,3 -1 ,4 
9,4 8,9 0,7 1,9 
8,4 9,1 6,4 -0,5 
9,3 10,0 28,4 -5,4 
11,2 10,7 4,7 0,8 
8,9 8,8 .. .. 6,3 0,2 
6,3 5,9 3,1 0,5 
5,1 4,2 -2,0 0,8 
3,9 4,3 8,5 - 2,6 
5,6 6,5 13,5 -0,8 
7,7 7,7 6,9 -0,7 
5,2 6,3 10,0 -0,5 
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Table 11 
Price and cost indicat~rs, United Kingdom 
(% change over preceding year) 
Labour costs in industry General indicators 
Compensation Productivity Labour Relative Relative Effective GDP Private Exports Terms 
per (output costs labour labour exchange deflator con- price of trade 
employee per per unit costs costs rate sumption (goods) 
national employee) of output national in USD2 deflator deflator 
currency national currency I 
currency 
1971 12,4 3,3 8,8 2,2 1,7 -0,5 9,3 8,6 4,8 0,8 
1972 11,2 6,0 4,9 1,2 -2,6 -3,8 8,3 6,6 4,6 1,6 
1973 14,0 7,0 6,6 -0,1 -10,7 -10,6 7,1 8,6 11,5 -8,8 
1974 22,5 0 22,6 6,8 3,1 -3,5 15,1 17,4 28,1 -12,1 
1975 33,1 -0,6 33,9 16,5 7,6 -7,6 26,8 23,5 22,8 5,8 
1976 19,7 6,8 12,1 7,4 -8,5 -14,8 14,3 15,5 18,6 -1,7 
1977 10,7 0,2 10,5 4,2 -0,8 -4,8 13,9 15,1 16,9 1,1 
1978 14,5 1,7 12,6 7,7 8,8 1,1 10,7 8,9 7,7 4,1 
1979 15,2 1,2 13,8 8,9 15,9 6,4 14,6 12,5 12,0 3,6 
1980 24,0 -4,2 29,5 20,0 32,0 10~0 19,0 16,1 14,0 3,1 
1971-1980 17,6 2,1 15,2 7,3 4,0 -3,1 13,8 13,2 13,9 -0,3 
1981 3 16,7 2,6 13,8 5,5 12,3 11,0 11,5 2,1 
I Unit labour costs in national currency by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
2 Unit labour costs in dollars by reference to the weighted average for the 17 main competing countries. 
3 Provisional forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat, estimates and forecasts by Commission services. 
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Methodological note on unit wage costs 
The labour cost per unit of output is defined as the ratio of 
compensation of employees at current prices to value added at 
constant prices for industrial products (base 1975 = 100). The 
basic data for the Community countries are the EUROSTA T 
data up to 1978 and Commission department estimates for the 
period 1979-81. Two special cases: Denmark and Ireland have 
value added series at factor cost and not at market prices, and 
furthermore their figures for compensation of employees are 
estimated from 1976. 
Since there are no data in the same nomenclature for the non-EC 
countries, gross domestic product per branch were used, as 
published by OECD from 1970 to 1978. The series were 
completed to 1981 on the basis of Commission estimates based 
on OECD data. 
In order to calculate relative costs, non-EC countries had to be 
taken into account so that the study covers 18 OECD countries 
whose foreign trade is more than 1 % of total world trade: EC l 
plus USA, Canada (CN), Japan (J), Austria (OS), Australia 
(AU), Switzerland (CH), Norway (N), Sweden (S), Spain (E) and 
Finland (SF). Labour costs per unit of output are then weighted 
by an effective exchange-rate matrix, the weights being those 
used by Commission services in competitiveness index calcu-
lations. The weighting coefficients take account not only of 
bilateral trade but also of the intensity of competition in third 
markets and in the domestic market of each country. The 
exchange rate used is that of the number of dollars per unit of 
national currency. This first calculation gives a 'competitors' 
labour cost'. The ratio of the labour cost per unit of output 
calculated on the basis of national currency data to this 
'competitors' cost' gives the 'relative cost'. 
The same calculation can be made but without including the 
exchange rate, giving a 'relative cost in national currency'. Thus, 
three series are used as a basis for the study. 
- The labour cost per unit of output: 
RSN 
ULC= ---
- The relative labour cost in national currency: 
18 
antilog r Wij Log ULCj 
j=l 
Belgium and Luxembourg aggregated in the calculations of relative 
data. 
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The relative labour cost in USO: 
ULCUSDi 
ULCR USDi = --------- --
RSN 
ULCUSDi 
18 
antilog r Wij Log ULC USDj 
j= 1 
17 
antilog r Wij Log TCHj 
j= 1 
Compensation of employees (wages + total 
social security charges) in national currency, 
Industrial products value added in 1975 prices, 
Exchange rate of the currency of country i 
against the USO, 
ULCi x TCHi = labour cost per unit of output 
in USO 
Weighting for country i 
- ------ --- = effective exchange rate 
17 
antilog r Wij Log TCHj 
j = 1 
All the data have been calculated on the basis of the cost in 
national currencies expressed as a index (base 1970 = 100) for 
each country. 
Caution is required in interpreting gross data, particularly over 
the period 1979-81. The use of a weighting matrix based on the 
structure of international trade from 1974 biases the end-of-
period results, especially in the case of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, the geographical distribution of whose trade has 
cihanged since their entry into the Community. Fresh calcul-
ations will be carried out subsequently with a matrix of moving 
weights. 
The data relating to the effective exchange rate for the 
Community are calculated for the ECU by reference to a 
weighted average of the ten competing countries, the Com-
munity being considered as one market. Relative labour costs for 
the Community were calculated using the same matrix of 
weighting coefficients. 
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The Community's borrowing and lending operations: 
recent developments affecting certain instruments 
I 
Jn recent months the Community has taken three initiatives concerning its borrowing and 
lending instruments. 1 As a result of the external payments imbalance caused by the two 
oil crises, the Community was prompted to consider the role it ought to play in recycling 
oil-producing countries' surpluses: this led to the adoption of a regulation amending the 
Community loan mechanism which had been set up in 1975 to give Member States 
balance-of-payment support. At the same time, the Commission, learning from eighteen 
months' operational experience of the New Community Instrument, which was created in 
1978 to promote investment in the Community, proposed that it be made permanent; 
Commission proposals on this point are under examination by the European Parliament 
and the Council. Lastly,following the earthquake which struck the south of Italy, the 
Community took exceptional measures to help reconstruct the areas affected. This article 
describes the content and purport of these initiatives. 2 
1. Adjustment of the Community loan mechanism for 
balance-of .:.payments purposes 
The agreement reached in the -Council, 3 on 16 February 
1981, on the adjustment of the Community loan mechanism, 
is the outcome of a comprehensive examination of issues 
raised by the recycling of oil surpluses which the Commission 
began in mid-1980 in close collaboration with the Monetary 
Committee. 
1.1. It was for several reasons essential to retain this 
mechanism within the Community's panoply of borrowing 
and lending instruments. 
The mechanism in its original form had been established in 
1975 4 to help member countries in balance-of-payments 
difficulties caused by the first oil crisis. As a result of new 
massive increases in petroleum prices, payments imbalances 
increased considerably at the end of 1979 and they will 
probably be long-lasting. For 1980, the current payments 
deficit for the Community as a whole is put at USD 41 OOO 
million, as against USD 11 300 million in 1974 immediately 
after the first oil price rise. It will probably be around 
USD 44 OOO million in 1981. Furthermore, unlike in 1974 
when the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux 
countries maintained current account surpluses, all member 
countries except the United Kingdom are now running 
deficits. 
An earlier issue of European Economy reviewed the Community's financial 
instruments as a whole. See 'Borrowing and lending instruments in the 
context of the Community's financial instruments', European Economy 
No 6, July 1980. Overall statistical data tracing the development of the 
different borrowing and lending instruments over the period 1970-80 are 
given in Tables I and 2. 
This article was prepared on the basis of contribution by J.P. Bache from 
the Directorate-General 'Economic and Financial Affairs'. 
At the time of going to press, the Council had not yet formally adopted the 
regulation adjusting the Community loan mechanism, pending finaliz-
ation of the text in the various Community languages. 
Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 397 /75 and 398/75 of 17 February 1975 
(OJ L 46/ 1 of 20 February 1975). 
International financial markets will continue to handle a 
large proportion of recycling operations. In 1980 inter-
national bond issues and Eurocurrency bank loans totalled 
close on USD 120 OOO million, i.e. three times the annual 
volume of operations in 1975. However, markets alone 
cannot ensure the right combination of financing external 
deficits and adju~tment to the new terms of trade. Closer 
cooperation between States and international organizations 
must supplement, guide and strengthen the capital markets 
so as to preserve the stability of the international financial 
system. Here the Community has a specific role to play, 
especially as far as its members are concerned. 
The Community loan mechanism fills a need not met by the 
Community's other borrowing and lending instruments. Its 
objective, balance-of-payments support for Member States 
coupled with economic policy conditions, distinguishes it 
from the structural instruments intended to finance invest-
ment projects; because of the origin of the funds borrowed, 
third countries, financial institutions or capital markets, it 
does not commit member countries' foreign exchange 
reserves directly, unlike medium-term financial assistance. 5 
The original 1975 instrument limited borrowing operations 
under this mechanism to USD 3 OOO million in principal and 
interest. Two series of operations were carried out: 6 
- the first, authorized by Council Decision of 15 March 
1976, for USD 1 100 million and DM 500 million for the 
Medium-term financial assistance is one form of the mutual assistance 
provided for in Article I 08 of the EEC Treaty. It is granted by the Council 
to a Member State in difficulties or seriously threatened with difficulties as 
regards its balance of payments. This mechanism was introduced in 1971 
and in December 1978 its lending capacity was increased to adapt it to the 
needs of the EMS. Each Member State is required to grant credits up to a 
commitment ceiling. The ceiling's total was raised to 14 100 million ECU. 
The borrowing country must enter into undertakings in respect of 
economic and monetary policy. 
For the characteristics of the various loans, see Table 3. 
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Table 1 
Borrowing operations of the European Comm.unities 
(million ECU) 
Year ECSC EIB 1 Euratom2 EEC3 NCI Total 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
60 
102 
230 
263 
528 
731 
956 
729 
981 
837 
1 004 
169 
413 
462 
608 
826 
814 
732 
1 030 
1 863 
2 437 
2 384 
99 
72 
153 
181 
1 249 
571 
178 
304 
229 
519 
692 
871 
1 354 
1 545 
2 937 
2 429 
2 916 
3 605 
3 873 
1 Excluding third-party contributions totalling EUA 319 million in the period 1972-79 to EIB financing operations. 
2 The figures given for the period prior to 1977 correspond to drawings on the credit lines negotiated and concluded with the Eximbank (United States). 
3 For balance-of-payments financing. 
Source: Commission departments and EIB. 
benefit of Italy (10/13ths) and .Ireland (3/I3ths); the 
dollar operations included a floating-rate bank loan 
which was later consolidated by three fixed-rate loans; 
- the second, authorized by Council Decision of 17 May 
1977, was for USO 500 million for the benefit ofltaly; this 
loan replaced the United Kingdom share of the short-
term monetary support granted by the Community 
central banks to Italy in June 1973 and which the United 
Kingdom, in balance-of-payments difficulties, was 
Table 2 
unable to consolidate into medium-term financial 
assistance in December 1974 as the other Member States 
had done. · 
These borrowing operations, including interest, total more 
than the equivalent of USD 2 600 million. The margin 
available for new borrowings under the original ceiling was 
therefore virtually exhausted. 
1.2. The recent adjustments to the mechanism do not change 
Outstanding borrowing of the European Comm.unities (at the end of each year) 
Year ECSC 
1970 741 
1971 802 
1972 963 
1973 1 172 
1974 1 617 
1975 2 393 
1976 3 477 
1977 3 956 
1978 4 416 
1979 4 713 
1980 5 300 3 
I Excluding Euratom figures for the period prior to 1975. 
2 For balance-of-payments fmancing. 
3 Estimate. 
Source: Commission departments and EIB. 
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EIB 
1 020 
1 423 
1 784 
2 287 
3 124 
3 926 
4 732 
5 421 
6 715 
8 541 
10 598 
Euratom 1 
17 
14 
110 
182 
333 
502 
EEC2. 
1 161 
1 500 
1 361 
965 
1 016 
NCI 
178 
402 
(million ECU) 
Total I 
1 761 
2 225 
2 747 
3 459 
4 741 
6 336 
9 384 
10 986 
12 674 
14 730 
17 898 
Adjustment of the Community loan mechanism 
Table 3 
Characteristics of the Community loans raised for the purpose of giving balance-of-payments support 
Operations carried out under the 1975 Regulation* 
Capital 
amount 3 
Rate(%) 
(million) 
1976-1 USD 300 8'/4 
1976-2 DM 500 7'/4 
1976-3 USD 300 variable LIBOR4 + 1% 
1976-4 USD 500 71/2 
1976-51 USD 100 73f4 
1977-Ii USD 25 75/s 
45 75/s 
30 75/s 
1977-2 USD 200 7'/2 
300 73/4 
1977-31 USD 100 75/s 
TOTAL2 USD 1 600 
DM 500 
Regulation EEC No 397/75 of 17 February 1975. 
Loans to consolidate the floating-rate loan, 1976-3. 
Duration Type of loan 
1976-82 Public placement 
on the Euromarket 
1976-83 Public placement 
on the Euromarket 
1976-81 Syndicated loan 
1976-79 Public placement 
on the Euromarket 
1976-81 Public placement 
on the US market 
1977-80 } Private placement 1977-81 with Dutch banks 1977-82 on the Euromarket 
1977-82 } Public placement 1977-84 on the Euromarket 
1977-82 Public placement 
on the US market 
USD 
DM 
USD 
USD 
USD 
USD 
USD 
USD 
USD 
DM 
Beneficiaries 
(million) 
Italy Ireland 
230,5 
384,5 
230,5 
385,2 
76,9 
76,8 
500 
76,8 
1 346,2 
384,5 
69,5 
115,5 
69,5 
114,8 
23,1 
23,2 
23,2 
253,8 
115,5 
Without taking into account the floating-rate loan, 1976-3, consolidated in 1976 and 1977. 
Interest over the life of the loans amounts to USD 649 421 million and DM 253 750 million. 
London Interbank Offered Rate: actual rate on Euro-currencies market in London. 
Source: Commission departments. 
its general design. The principle is still that the Community 
uses its credit worthiness to borrow funds and lend them to a 
Member State in balance-of-payments difficulties related to 
an increase in prices of petroleum products. The Community 
is not involved in transforming maturities, in exchange risks, 
or in managing funds and so bears no risk, except that of 
insolvency of the Member State. The mechanism can be used 
alone or together with other Community or non-Community 
instruments designed to give balance-of-payments support. 
The purpose of the changes is to enable the mechanism to be 
used promptly, rapidly and flexibly, without changing the 
respective decision-making and supervisory powers of the 
various Community institutions. 
It had to be possible to use the mechanism sufficiently early 
to avoid the balance-of-payments crisis becoming acute. To 
this end, the Regulation makes it possible to adopt economic 
policy conditions attaching to the loan according to the 
gravity of the situation in the borrowing Member State. 
Under the new instrument, the borrowing Member State has 
to take the initiative in drawing up an adjustment pro-
gramme which is then presented to the Council in support of 
the loan application and which the Member State undertakes 
to apply. When seeking a loan the Member State can 
therefore choose the means and objectives it intends to set 
itself in order to redress its external position, and this may 
encourage it to seek Community financing without waiting 
for a manifest state of crisis. Having seen this programme 
and after examining the Member State's situation, the 
Council will lay down the economic policy conditions 
attaching to the loan. If the Council considers that the 
situation requires it, the conditions can go further than the 
programme drawn up by the Member State, including, for 
example, quantified targets. 
The Member State benefiting from a loan is subject to a 
monitoring procedure similar to the original instrument. 
This supervision enables the Council to adjust the economic 
policy conditions according to the s1tuation. 
Under the 1975 mechanism, two successive Council Deci-
sions were needed, each involving consultation with the 
Monetary Committee: the first authorized the Commission 
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to negotiate the loan, and the second authorized the 
borrowing and lending operation. The new instrument 
proposes, if feasible, to reduce the process to a single referral 
to the Council. The Council's decision covers the question of 
whether to grant the loan to a Member State, the economic 
policy conditions attaching to the loan and the financial 
arrangements involved. Since the Commission is empowered 
to carry out the corresponding borrowing operations, the 
Council no longer has to be brought in to authorize 
negotiation of the loans and to set their conditions. The 
Monetary Committee remains closely associated with each 
phase in the operation of the mechanism. 
The new mechanism explicitly provides for greater flexibility 
in the choice of financial borrowing and lending techniques 
so that greater advantage can be taken of prevailing market 
conditions and to allow the loans to be more closely adapted 
to the needs of the borrowing Member State. 
Thus, when seeking a loan, the Member State can request the 
inclusion of an early repayment clause. This option aims to 
correct an unsatisfactory feature of the 1975 instrument: in 
October 1977 Italy asked to repay loans before maturity; the 
Community was unable to accede to this request since it had 
no way of making early repayment of the funds it had itself 
borrowed. 
The minimum average period of five years for which funds 
are borrowed is dropped and provision is made for the loan 
to be drawn down in instalments. 
Lastly, it was considered unnecessary to renew the mechan-
ism under which Member States provide guarantees. 
Experience has shown that the entry in the Community 
budget of the liability contracted was a sufficient guarantee 
for lenders. The guarantee system for borrowed funds is thus 
aligned on the system for the Community's other borrowing 
and lending instruments. 
Under the renewed mechanism, and this is one of the most 
important changes, a far larger volume of funds can be 
raised. The ceiling for borrowing operations has been 
increased to ECU 6 OOO million to maintain the Com-
munity's share in the recycling process at a constant level. 
The Community also needed sufficient power of intervention 
to produce a positive psychological effect on foreign 
exchange markets. The ceiling excludes interest and the 
margin available under the ceiling is reconstituted as and 
when repayments are made. 
2. Renewal of the New Community Instrument (NCI) 
This mechanism was created by Council Decision in October 
1978 1 empowering the Commission to contract loans to 
1 Council Decision 78/870EEC of 16 October 1978. 
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finance investment projects which serve the priority 
Community objectives in the energy, industry and infrastruc-
ture sectors. The instrument was first brought into operation 
on an experimental basis. Loans were therefore limited to 
ECU 1 OOO million in principal, and activated by tranches by 
the Council which lays down the guidelines for the eligibility 
of projects. 
In May 1979, the Council authorized a first tranche of 
borrowings for an amount of ECU 500 million to be used for 
investment projects in the infrastructure and energy sectors. 2 
In July 1980 it authorized a second ECU 500 million tranche 
to be used according to the same criteria 3 and in November 
of the same year 4 accepted that, among certain infrastruc-
ture projects, housing and advance factories should be 
financed as part of overall projects directed toward the 
development of priority regions in the Community. 
Authorization of the second tranche exhausted the initial 
endowment of this instrument. Leaming from this experi-
mental period the Commission proposed in October 1980 s 
to make the instrument permanent and to modify it in certain 
ways. 
2.1. Operational experience of the NCI is brief but 
encouraging. 
Despite delays in authorizing the second tranche, loans 
signed from the creation of the NCI in October 1978 to the 
end of 1980, total ECU 475 million spread over 20 projects. 
An examination of loans signed 6 shows the main guidelines 
chosen by the Community in the use of the mechanism. 
- All NCI loans were granted as part of cofinancihg 
operations for projects already covered by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) out of its own resources. The NCI 
financed an average of 13% of the total cost of projects. 
This is a net additional contribution by the Community to 
the financing of these projects, since in setting the level of 
the corresponding loans in its own name the EIB applied 
the same criteria as for projects not benefiting from NCI 
loans (the Bank's contribution represented on average 
some 40% of the cost of the projects that were 
co financed). 
- The loans were concentrated on a small number of 
projects in countries and sectors whose growth and 
development represent priority Community objectives. 
With 47% of the funds granted and 9 projects covered, 
Italy has received the largest share. A total of 27% went to 
7 projects in Ireland, a large share in view of the size of the 
2 Council Decision 79/486/EEC of 14 May 1979. 
3 Council Decision 80/739/EEC of 22 July 1980. 
4 Council Decision 80/11/3/EEC of 25 November 1980. 
s Proposal for a Council Decision, COM (80) 670 final of 30 October 1980. 
6 See Tables 4 and 5. 
Renewal of the NCI 
Table 4 
New Community Instrument: Breakdown of loans signed (from 16 October 1978 to 31 December 1980) 
Country and sector Projects financed 
Number Cost 
(million ECU) 
Italy 9 1867 
Energy 5 1078 
Infrastructure 4 789 
United Kingdom 2 785 
Energy 669 
Infrastructure 116 
Ireland 7 699 
Energy 3 199 
Infrastructure 4 500 
Denmark 2 234 
Energy 2 234 
Infrastructure 
TOTAL 20 3585 
Energy 11 2180 
Infrastructure 9 1405 
Source: Commission departments. 
country. In the United Kingdom, only 2 projects have 
been financed by NCI loans but the share of funds 
involved is relatively large (22%). Very recently, two NCI 
loans were made to finance projects in Denmark. From 
the sectoral point of view, the largest share of the loans-
54% of the total-has gone to investment in energy. 
Infrastructure accounted for the other operations, but no 
loans have yet gone to industry, although it is included in 
the basic Decision. 
Since Italy and Ireland have been designated as less-
prosperous member countries effectively and fully par-
ticipating in the European Monetary System, they are able to 
benefit from a 3% interest-rate subsidy on certain loans made 
out of the EIB's own resources or out of NCI resources. The 
aid is to be concentrated on infrastructure projects and 
programmes. Investment in industry is excluded so as to 
avoid any distorting of competition. The loans on which 
interest-rate subsidies are payable are limited to five tranches 
of ECU 1 OOO million per year; the present value of the 
subsidies is written into the budget in the form of five annual 
appropriations of ECU 200 million each. Almost 78% of 
NCI loans to Italy and 62% of NCI loans to Ireland have 
carried this advantage. Of the ECU 400 million in interest-
rate subsidies which the Community granted in the two years 
1979 and 1980 in respect of the measures accompanying the 
NCI loans 
Amount of which % breakdown % of cost of 
(million ECU) carrying by beneficiary projects 
interest-rate country and sector 
subsidies 
(million ECU) 
222,8 173,0 46,9 11,9 
120,9 120,9 25,4 11,2 
101,9 52,1 21,5 12,9 
105,3 22,2 13,4 
79,4 16,7 11,9 
25,9 5,5 22,3 
128,4 79,0 27,0 18,4 
39,1 14,4 8,2 19,6 
89,3 64,6 18,8 17,9 
18, 1 3,9 7,7 
18,1 3,9 7,7 
474,6 252 100 13,2 
257,5 135,3 54,3 11,8 
217,1 116,7 45,7 15,5 
EMS, ECU 52 million, or 13%, were allocated to the NCI, 
the rest benefiting EIB loans. In net present value the subsidy 
represents on average 20% of the capital amount of the loan 
concerned. 
As laid down in the basic Decision, the NCI loans have been 
granted under a mandate given to the European Investment 
Bank. In accordance with this mandate, the Bank carries out 
transactions on behalf of, for and at the risk of the 
Community. Loan applications are addressed to the Bank 
either directly or through the Commission or a Member 
State. After a Commission decision on the eligibility of each 
project, the Bank examines these applications, decides 
whether and on what terms to grant the loans and 
administers them in accordance with the procedures laid 
down in its Statute and its usual criteria. The division of tasks 
enables the Commission to exercise fully its responsibilities in 
the policy guidance of this new instrument. 
2.2. The Commission, in the light of the experience acquired, 
proposed in October 1980 that the loans be continued and 
expanded and given greater operational flexibility. 
The proposal contains two significant changes to the initial 
Decision: 
- there is no longer any overall ceiling on the loans which 
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Table S 
List of projects financed by the New Community Instrument (from 16 October 1978 to 31 December 1980) 
Country Sector Project Amount EMS interest-
of loan rate subsidy 
(million ECU) 
Italy Energy Alto Gesso hydroelectric power-station· (ENEL) 34,9 X 
Geothermal power-stations (ENEL) 10,5 X 
System for monitoring the production and transmission of electricity 
(ENEL) 17,1 X 
Algeria-Italy gas pipeline, Sicily and Calabria section (ENI) 41,7 X 
AGIP Hydrocarbons 16,7 X 
Infrastructure Aqueduct, Pertusillo III (Cassa) 39,6 X 
Industrial estate, Syracuse IV (Cassa) 12,5 X 
SIP Apulia 12,5 
Friuli II motorway 37,3 
United 
Kingdom 
Energy 
Infrastructure 
Dinorwic hydroelectric power-station (CEGB) 79,4 
Lothian Water 25,9 
Ireland Energy Aghada power-station (ESB) 24,7 
Peat production (BORD NA MONA I) 5,5 X 
Peat briquettes (BORD NA MONA II) 8,9 X 
Infrastructure Dublin Water 24,7 
Irish Telephones 17,9 X 
Irish Roads 19,4 X 
Irish Telephones VII 27,3 X 
Denmark Energy Coal-burning power-stations Anaes III 8,9 
Combined heat/electric Randers stations 9,2 
Source: Commission departments. 
the Commission is empowered to raise. The action of the 
mechanism would thus be given the continuity required 
by the very objectives which it sets itself; to assist, by an 
additional contribution to investment promotion in the 
Community, the greater convergence of economic 
performances and the support of priority sectors; 
- the system of borrowing in tranches is changed to allow 
simultaneous tranches in addition to successive tranches. 
The retention, in more flexible form, of the tranche system 
flows from the need to concentrate NCI contributions on 
the priority sectors of the Community's structural 
policies. 
Lastly, although this involves no change to the basic text, the 
Commission and the European Investment Bank are 
working on a more flexible financial administration of the 
instrument. The former practice designed to avoid risk was 
for the amount of the borrowings contracted to correspond 
exactly, for each project or set of projects, to the amount of 
the loans signed. Thus loan contracts were concluded before 
the funds were borrowed so that the borrower could be given 
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no assurance as to the exact terms of the loan he would 
receive. The two institutions aim to enable funds raised to be 
temporarily invested before being used to finance projects. 
3. Aid for reconstructing regions affected by the 
Italian earthquake 
In December 1980 shortly after the earthquake in the south 
ofltaly, the European Council meeting invited the Council to 
decide without delay, and acting on a proposal from the 
Commission, on exceptional aid measures designed to 
contribute to the reconstruction programme in the stricken 
areas. The Commission immediately presented a proposal 
for a Decision, adopted by the Council on 20 January 1981, I 
which provided for the Community to assist Italy in two 
ways. 
1 Council Decision 81/19/EEC of 20 January 1981. 
3.1. By way of sole exception, and by extension of the 
original provisions of the NCI, the Commission is empowered 
to contract loans for the purpose of financing the reconstruc-
tion of the means of production and the economic and social 
infrastructure in the region of the Italian earthquake. All in 
all, these loans may not exceed ECU 1 OOO million in 
principal and any loans granted for the same purposes by the 
EIB out of its own resources will be deducted from this 
ceiling. The choice of the NCI in its original version was 
necessary for two reasons : 
- since Parliament and the Council had not completed their 
examination of the proposed adjustments, use of the 
renewed NCI mechanism would have delayed a decision 
while the Italian authorities needed rapid and definite 
information on the financing they were to receive from 
the Community in order to establish their reconstruction 
programme; 
- the creation of an ad hoe mechanism would have 
unnecessarily increased the means by which the Com-
munity borrows on the markets; by contrast, the NCI 
offered a well-tried framework for the management of 
loans and for joint action by the Commission and the 
EIB. 
3.2. The Commission is to grant an interest-rate subsidy 
charged to the general budget of the Community of the NCI 
and EIB loans granted. The subsidy is fixed at 3% per annum 
for a maximum period of 12 years. Unlike those granted 
under the EMS, these subsidies will not be the subject of an 
initial budget appropriation for their net present value, but 
will be spread over successive budget years as and when they 
are actually paid. 
Conclusions 
Of the means of action available to the Community, 
borrowing and lending are among those best able to combine 
Conclusions 
rapid action adapted to each situation, with the pursuit of 
medium and long-term structural objectives. It is in the 
in terests of the Community as a whole for this machinery to 
be kept in a fit state to respond to all new demands. The 
initiatives which have just been described are in line with this 
desire. Despite the diversity of the situations motivating 
them and the special features of each mechanism, the 
initiatives stem from a similar approach and reaffirm three 
general principles guiding the Community's action in thi s 
respect. 
The borrowing and lending instruments are based on the 
community of interests of the Member States. In these 
borrowing and lending operations, the Community's role is 
not merely that of a passive intermediary acting on the 
beneficiary's behalf. As a loan-issuing body, it commits itself 
directly vis-a-vis the persons providing the capital. Through 
interest-rate subsidies on certain of its loans, the Community 
assumes part of the costs. In return for the advantageous 
financing terms which the Community can offer by 
committing its credit worthiness and its finances, its loans are 
granted subject to economic policy conditions or to 
conditions which dictate the eligibility of the projects on the 
basis of the Community's objectives. 
Loans from the Community accompany other measures. The 
purpose is to supplement not take the place of existing means 
of finance, by making additional funds available in defined 
areas by adding greater variety and by exerting the maximum 
follow-through effect. 
For these reasons, the loan instruments must be bound by 
specific rules setting the objectives, the amount offunds to be 
raised and the conditions for allocating loans so that the 
mechanisms can be set in motion rapidly (but not automati-
cally) following established procedures. The Community's 
room for manoeuvre must be sufficient for it to be able to 
assess, case by case, the advisability of financial intervention 
and to determine the procedures involved. 
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